

African Countries'



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African Countries' Foreign Policy

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INTRODUCTION

The monograph *African Countries' Foreign Policy*—in the Foreign Policy of Developing Countries series—is the first in-depth fundamental study of the way newly independent African countries act on the international scene, carried out jointly by scholars from the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The team of authors approached this complex subject aware that the available material, sources and facts relating to the foreign policy initiatives, programs and domestic problems of newly liberated African countries made it possible to scientifically study the current state and prospects of these countries' international relations. At the same time, the authors did not intend to trace the foreign policy history of each African country. The book deals mostly with current issues, and the several historical flashbacks it offers are necessary for the analysis which follows. Methodologically, the monograph is based on a fundamental precept of Marxism-Leninism today—the one stressing the considerable increase of developing countries' influence and their noticeably more active foreign policy in the contemporary world.

In their examination of what is common and what is distinctive in different aspects of newly free African countries' international relations—among themselves, with the socialist community, with the developing countries of other continents, with imperialist powers, with the smaller capitalist nations, in international organizations—the authors were aware that the foreign policy programs proclaimed by African countries were quite close as far as their shape was concerned. At the same time, many governments interpret the generally held principles and doctrines—of anticolonialism, nonalignment, unity, etc.—in their own way. The way they approach these issues depends on the social essence of government in each country, on the alignment of domestic political forces and the direction in which the public is oriented: all this gives rise to different concepts of one's vital national interests. In his Report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said: "These countries are very different. After liberation, some of them have been following the revolutionary-democratic path. In others capitalist relations have taken root. Some of

them are following a truly independent policy, while others are today taking their lead from imperialist policy. In a nutshell, the picture is a fairly motley one.¹ Even a simple comparison of statements made by some African leaders with the actual requirements of their countries shows what is caused by subjective or opportunist considerations and what by the objective situation. This is new proof for Lenin's thought: "Politics are not judged by bare statements but by real class content."²

The authors also pay due regard to the fact that, while on the whole the foreign policy of African countries is shaped by the ideologies of the ruling groups, this ideology does not always reflect the actual balance of class and social forces. Some countries—except the socialist-oriented ones—often base their national interests on narrow ideological platforms and transient political considerations. That is why an analysis of the foreign policy pursued by most African countries should take into account both the actual situation in them and the convictions of certain leaders. The study of the part superstructure institutions play in the shaping of African countries' foreign policies is of special importance in this regard.

Historically, any activity by African classes, parties and governments, including their foreign policy, takes place against the background of the worldwide confrontation of the socialist and the capitalist social systems. This factor is of decisive importance for understanding the distinctively conflicting and inconsistent policy of some developing countries.

Since newly free African countries were born of the liberation revolution, ideological and political factors play an important role in an analysis of their international actions. For example, despite the inconsistent course pursued by some African governments, the anti-colonial doctrine, common to all, remains a salient feature for practically every newly free country. The struggle to liberate Namibia and South Africa is a priority task with virtually all African governments. An overwhelming majority of African states view the support of the colonial and racist regime by the imperialist powers as an anti-African policy. Meanwhile, the approach of socialist countries which facilitates the advancement of the liberation revolution in the South of the continent encourages African governments to pursue a positive policy vis-a-vis the socialist community.

The authors do not lose sight either of the situation in Africa which accompanied the shaping of foreign policy or of this policy's "age". After all, only a little over two decades have elapsed since the historic Africa Year which brought about a decisive turn in the liberation of this long-suffering continent. We know that in 1960 17 countries gained independence—only one-third of the states that exist in Africa now. In the years that followed, the wave of national liberation has swept throughout the continent, colonial empires have collapsed completely, and the patriots in the racist-colo-

nial enclaves have been stepping up their struggle steadily. These years have also witnessed newly independent states emerge, choose their path of socio-economic and political development and build their foreign policy, including a system of inter-African relations. These were the years when free Africa became active on the international scene.

Just as it is still premature to maintain that the peoples of Africa are now free from all elements and holdovers of colonial rule, it is too early to claim that independent African countries have arrived at a definite foreign policy. There are many indications that this policy is not yet fully stabilized, either at the continental or at the global level. So far, questions concerning the prospects of inter-African relations and the role of many African countries in world politics are numerous enough. Complex and interrelated ideological, social, political, economic and ethnic processes, objective ties and contradictions among newly independent states, the impact of outside forces and world events give rise to widely dissimilar developments in Africa.

The past two decades, especially the latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, highlight the parallel development in Africa of completely opposite phenomena and trends which have a direct bearing on foreign policy. For example, the number of countries who have opted for socialist orientation is growing steadily; at the same time, some of them pursue their social development in zigzags, with consequent turns in foreign policy. While the overall contradictions between independent Africa and imperialism are obviously growing more acute, some countries display a willingness to agree to compromises with transnational corporations. Some turn to West European nations and the United States for aid, including military aid.

The rivalry between the centripetal and centrifugal trends in inter-African relations does not abate, with ascendancy alternating between them. Although there is a striving for peace throughout Africa and the principles of peaceful coexistence are turning into norms of inter-African relations, conflicts have come to a head in some areas of the continent. The urgent need to solve the problems of Southern Africa has brought about a clash between two incompatible trends—anticolonialism and neocolonialism.

This scientific monograph is important in practical terms if we recall that, on the whole, Africa's role in world affairs, already considerable, continues to grow steadily. In this connection the following should be stressed: amid the historical confrontation of the two world systems—socialism and capitalism—which is the decisive factor in the development of today's world, international relations and the alignment of forces owe their current diversity and unprecedented complexity also to the fact that developing countries, including those in Africa, have emerged as a powerful international political force.

This explains the growing worldwide interest in studying the foreign

policy and international relations of African countries, borne out by the rise in the number of monographs, collections and articles on the subject published in different countries. They usually sum up a great amount of facts, but the conclusions are often quite motley, due to the differences in the authors' ideological positions and the difficulty to assess the complex phenomena and developments under way in Africa.

Bourgeois African studies are especially numerous (see Bibliography). One must note that some of them are serious and more or less objective, paying due regard to the recognized irreversibility of revolutionary change in Africa and the world. However, this trend is not typical of bourgeois analysis. The latter's salient feature is that it argues that newly independent African countries display a supraclass, "purely national interest" in their foreign policy. Bourgeois scholars try to ignore, refute and undermine the interrelationship, the natural union between the national liberation revolution and other antiimperialist revolutionary forces in today's world, to deny the aggressive essence of imperialism and the danger of neocolonialism.

The chief social goal of bourgeois experts on African affairs is to prove that it is possible and necessary to keep Africa within the capitalist system, within the Western political orbit. With this end in view they assert that pragmatism is what suits the Africans' national interests best. These arguments are often reduced to anticommunist propaganda, to attempts to alienate newly independent states from antiimperialist ideology and politics, at convincing them that alliance with the former colonial powers, the United States et al., is inevitable. In the final analysis, bourgeois African studies are to prove the "legitimacy" of neocolonialist development for independent Africa.

Bourgeois science and propaganda increasingly try to camouflage their true aims, adapt to new conditions and even use progressive phraseology. The reasons behind this evolution are quite clear. Leonid Brezhnev has observed that "imperialism spares no effort and resources in the battle for the minds of the people. The growing influence of socialism is compelling the imperialists constantly to adapt their ideological weapons, their propaganda to the changing situation."³ In their analysis of the state of affairs in African countries and their foreign policy, bourgeois political scientists increasingly admit that developed capitalist countries should aid newly independent states in carrying out some social reforms and give in, to a degree, to the demands of the progressive forces. Recently, many bourgeois authors have even begun to champion peaceful coexistence and detente, but with a catch: to try and convince African countries that these notions should be extended to their relations with the racist colonial regime in the South of the continent.

The number of scientific studies written by Africans on current international relations and foreign policy of the continent's countries

is still relatively small, compared to the number of these countries. Actually, African scholars are just beginning to study this aspect of their countries' activity. But even their first works, especially joint studies, are already of considerable interest (see Bibliography).

An intense search for the place of new Africa in today's world, for ways to overcome its dependence and backwardness as vestiges of colonial rule is especially typical of African scholars. Their studies offer a view of African foreign policy seen through the eyes of Africans and not outsiders. This is not only useful but indispensable for a deeper understanding of this policy's socio-economic, historical and ideological principles and distinctive features.

African studies in the socialist countries number many monographs and other papers on the continent's problems (see Bibliography). Marxist scholars examine both individual aspects of independent African countries' foreign policy and the activities of the Organization of African Unity, the factors that affect it and the main trends in the relations of African countries with imperialist powers and the socialist states. Close attention is paid to an analysis of Western neocolonialist policies, their methods, forms and directions.

The team of scholars from socialist countries who wrote this monograph took into consideration the results of the already available studies of African foreign policy and set themselves the task of taking a step forward in analyzing the main trends, objective laws and distinctive features displayed in the development of Africa's international relations. Naturally, the authors do not claim that the analysis of this or that aspect of African foreign policy this book offers and especially the elaboration of several new theoretical points are exhaustive. At the same time, unlike many previously written works, this monograph is an in-depth, theoretical and integrated study. It highlights the foreign policy problems and developments which are most typical of all African countries and the distinctive features of their actions on the international scene. The authors were united in their belief that their study would aid in strengthening the ties and understanding between independent African states and the socialist community.

Chapter One

THE MAIN PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDEPENDENT AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1. The Growing Role of Independent African Countries in International Relations and World Politics

Africa today is a region of sharp political and social contrast. Here, liberated countries have racist South Africa for their neighbor, a state which maintains a special form of colonial rule and has set up pseudosovereign Bantustans no country recognizes. There are still some territories in Africa (former colonies) without a definite government status. The continent's liberated countries, too, are far from homogeneous. For an overwhelming majority of these, the first stage of the national liberation revolutions is practically over—the period of broad, generally similar nationwide movements and political coalitions born of the accumulated antagonistic contradictions between the entire population of the colonies and the colonial powers. After that stage the situation began to change, and today republics exist side by side with kingdoms, and socialist-oriented countries, with neocolonialist regimes.

Economically and socially, Africa is an intricate tapestry of multi-structural patterns, of barter economies and modern industrial projects, of transitional prebourgeois social groups with a complex structure of estates and classes and the vigorously growing proletariat and national bourgeoisie.

All this has in recent years complicated bilateral and multilateral ties in Africa. All-African cooperation is taking shape, but conflicts still flare up between some countries. The Organization of African Unity is becoming more active. Economic, social and political upheavals of the capitalist system increasingly affect African countries. On the one hand, neocolonialism is escalating its offensive. On the other hand, socialist orientation, the influence of socialist ideas and of the socialist community are steadily gaining strength in Africa.

Still, dominant trends can be singled out of these conflicting developments: an overwhelming majority of African countries wants to strengthen peace, continue detente, attain genuine decolonization and overcome poverty and backwardness.

The character of any country's foreign policy hinges on whose class interests political power in this country represents. At the same time, the record shows that in African countries political power

itself cannot grow stronger without pursuing a progressive foreign policy. New African countries differ substantially in the type of their social systems, the levels of economic development, the international ties they have established and in many other aspects. But on the international scene they are all united in their antiimperialism, anticolonialism, the struggle for genuine sovereignty, economic and social progress.

The growing influence and role of liberated countries in world affairs are a distinct feature of contemporary history.

What factors shape this dynamic and positive development in relation to African countries? Naturally, a contributing factor is that as more and more colonies and semicolonies gain freedom, the number of newly independent states is growing, and so is the population living in this zone of the world. Today, of the 157 UN member countries 50 belong to the African group; they account for about 10 percent of the world population. This, of course, is important, but other factors appear more significant.

First, national liberation has made great progress. The colonial system is completely disintegrating. The peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe, the Cape Verde Islands, Angola, Djibouti and Zimbabwe have won their sovereignty. The peoples of the South of Africa are on the verge of gaining freedom. Social and economic emancipation is the order of the day.

Second, the positive socio-political evolution of many newly independent states, their choice of socialist orientation enhance their role in the struggle for peace and international security, in the world revolutionary process.

Third, there is the greater activity and initiative of African (and other developing) countries toward radically restructuring international political and economic relations, their transition to collective effort in this field.

Fourth, stronger friendship and cooperation between African states and socialist countries today do much to determine the weight of each independent country on the international scene.

The growing role of African countries in world affairs is easily traced in the evolution of their foreign policy.

For example, a comparison of the foreign policy purposes and principles set forth in the more recent statements and documents by the leaders and governments of most OAU members and the principal tasks of Soviet foreign policy formulated by the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of the CPSU clearly shows that the views African countries and the Soviet Union, as well as other socialist countries, hold of many urgent problems of today either coincide or are quite close. That is natural: Africa's independent countries and national liberation movements can attain their objectives only through strengthening their solidarity and unity with those forces in world politics which are firmly in favor of full equality in the international communi-

ty, for preserving and deepening detente and for more democratic economic relations.

Finally, the fifth factor connected with the change in the status of African countries in world capitalist economy, industrial production and the system of external economic ties. The rise in the economic significance of such ties, coupled with the substantially increased share in the imports of all types of commodities from these countries to the major capitalist nations, generally enhances the political role of the former in international affairs, too.

In Africa, new opportunities are continuing to open for newly independent countries to successfully resist imperialist diktat in the current global balance of class forces. African countries and national liberation movements base their policies on the precept that truly durable peace is impossible while colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, discrimination and foreign rule exist. That is why they advocate a system of international relations that would do away with the disgraceful situation when millions still suffer from colonial exploitation. "We want detente to meet the interests of all peoples," Mohamed Said Mazouzi, member of the Political Bureau of the Party of the National Liberation Front of Algeria, stressed in his message of greetings to the 26th CPSU Congress, "and to help those nations that are still suffering under the yoke of colonialism to gain self-determination and resist imperialism, which is continuing its attempts to impose its domination on the world, and to preserve unjust regimes and inequitable international relations."¹

The peace drive should pay due consideration to the interests of all nations—such is the invariable position of the socialist community. That is why it stresses that peaceful coexistence, while creating favorable conditions for solving economic and social problems in all countries without exception, does not at all contradict the right of the oppressed peoples to use all the means at their disposal in their liberation struggle, the right of all countries to resort to armed force in order to repulse aggression and to external support so as to attain justice. Independent African countries also share this foreign policy principle of the socialist community and actually adhere to it in their own foreign policy. This is clear from the decisions taken at recent OAU conferences.

Elimination of colonial rule was the first issue to generate African activity in international affairs jointly with the world's progressive forces. Already at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet Union advanced the historic proposal on immediate and complete elimination of colonialism in all its forms. African countries welcomed and supported the Soviet initiative. The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In the years that followed African nations and socialist countries worked firmly and successfully toward its implementation. In the course of this struggle, fascism collapsed in

Portugal and so did the last colonial empire. Then Ian Smith's racist regime in Zimbabwe crumbled. The new victories in the anticolonial revolution opened an important stage in the drive toward complete and final liberation of Africa. They were a serious blow to imperialism.

In assessing the growing role of independent African countries in world politics one should remember that they have a distinctive political front of their own, deriving from the existence of a racist regime in the South of the continent, a regime constantly threatening the further advance of the liberation movement. In recent years the authorities of the Republic of South Africa have been acting under the aegis of their imperialist sponsors and trying to create the impression that they themselves change the situation in the South of Africa. However, no one is fooled by the racists' plans and promises. Independent African countries adhere firmly to a specific program of action. Their demands have included independence for Namibia, the dismantling of apartheid and genuine political democratization in South Africa. For example, Shadreck Joshua Soko, member of the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia, stressed in his address to the 26th CPSU Congress: "Meanwhile, against the background of a determined attempt by liberation movements, with the support of the Frontline States in Southern Africa, we have, in recent years, witnessed maneuvers at so-called internal settlements in Namibia and so-called moderate legislation in South Africa designed to impose a puppet regime in Namibia and to pacify the struggling masses in South Africa. Those indulging in such maneuvers hope to cling to power and the natural resources in Southern Africa. The schemes are also intended to exploit the black workers and to perpetuate imperialism and racism."²

It is clear from statements by many African leaders that independent Africa appreciates the assistance its national liberation movements receive from socialist countries and, in particular, the fact that the USSR is the only great power which maintains neither diplomatic, nor economic nor trade relations with South Africa and scrupulously observes all the decisions taken by international organizations against racism.

The growing role of liberated African countries on the international scene is also due to the fact that they do not confine their foreign policy to exclusively African issues but are increasingly active in tackling problems directly concerning the future of all nations—detente, an end to the arms race, a ban on nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, the elimination of hotbeds of armed conflicts. Resolutions adopted by various OAU bodies alone show a positive evolution in African governments' views on the ways of solving major international issues. A similar conclusion can be drawn from speeches by many African statesmen. For example, Marcelino dos Santos, Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Standing Political Committee of FRELIMO, said in his address to the

26th Congress of the CPSU: 'Proletarian internationalism has become a permanent and active factor in our people's lives. We look upon the oppressed peoples' struggle as a vital concern of our own. Socialist Mozambique will continue to be a secure stronghold for Southern Africa's people fighting for national liberation under the leadership of the African National Congress against the criminal racist Pretoria regime. We support, too, in every way, the just struggle of the peoples of Namibia, El Salvador, Chile, East Timor, the Western Sahara and Palestine... We express our solidarity with the Afghani revolution. Afghanistan is a sovereign state that knows who are its friends and who its foes. The Afghani revolution will win through in spite of all imperialist actions and intrigues.'³

The growing role of independent African countries in international relations is also the result of their contribution to the change in the global balance of political forces to the disadvantage of imperialism. For example, the 29th session of the UN General Assembly refused to recognize the credentials of the South African delegation largely due to the votes of African representatives who make up almost one-third of the UN membership. Another example is the decision taken by that same session to put the Palestinian question on the agenda and invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend the meetings. At all subsequent UN General Assembly sessions, especially at the 36th session, African countries supported resolutions aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war, preserving peace and restricting imperialist expansion both in Africa and throughout the world.

However, it is also obvious that considerable latent possibilities for further enhancing the role and prestige of African countries in international affairs remain unused. Particularly, this concerns efforts to overcome inconsistencies in the foreign policy of some African countries and contradictions between them, as well as their susceptibility to the influence exerted by the reactionary quarters of some Western countries. The tendency still persists to make no distinction between the socialist countries and the imperialist powers, thus ignoring the fundamental difference in their socio-political essence and foreign policy objectives.

2. The Social Roots of African Foreign Policy

Against the background of the rivalry between the socialist and capitalist socio-economic systems international relations are increasingly becoming the scene where social contradictions clash and at the same time the scene of class solidarity.

The foreign policy objectives and directions of African countries took shape in the course of the liberation movement. From the very start, both revolutionary-patriotic and nationalist programs aimed

at consolidating national sovereignty, decolonizing society, abolishing foreign domination and one-crop structure of the economy, and establishing a new economic order in the exchange of goods and services. Gradually, ruling coalitions differing in their interests have been emerging in African countries; essentially, they gravitate either toward the nascent bourgeoisie or the working class.

In the countries where probourgeois coalitions are now dominant, attempts are still being made to do something in the interests of all people. Generally though, the comprador elite there is growing richer fast and increasingly yielding its positions to neocolonialism while most of the working population is growing poorer. Naturally, these countries cannot yet be called bourgeois—all of them are still prebourgeois, comprising many economic modes of production, and the capitalist mode there has not yet become the underlying, dominant pattern. Still, the external ties cultivated by probourgeois governments invariably tend toward rapprochement with the former colonial powers and other developed capitalist countries.

But when coalitions of the working strata and classes come to power, imperialism loses the opportunity to control these countries' domestic and foreign policies. In Ethiopia, Angola, Benin, the People's Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Mozambique, Algeria, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, Libya and other countries, imperialism no longer commands a stratum of politicians who could guarantee the development of indigenous capitalism or superprofits to foreign companies.

Briefly, the foreign policy of liberated countries depends, in social terms, on the path of social development they have chosen. External ties reflect internal social contradictions and interests.

A socio-psychological approach to the assessment of external ties and foreign policy tasks prevails in liberated countries at the stage when new class entities are emerging there.

As regards the peasants, their foremost problems are land (in Arab countries) and purchase prices for commodities (in Tropical Africa). The shortage and unjust distribution of land in the North of Africa leads, apart from constant struggle for land redistribution, to mass emigration by the fellahs. The ties of Arab emigres in Europe with their families in Africa affect the politics of many Arab states. In the tropical countries, export products provide the state with foreign exchange needed to buy industrial equipment. That is why the peasants who are interested in selling more products exert certain influence on external ties. For example, in Senegal and Mali peanut growers demand a stable market for their produce. The same happens in Nigeria which exports palm oil; in Sudan which needs a steady market for cotton; in the Ivory Coast with its coffee plantations; and in Tanzania which produces sisal and pyrethrum for export.

The indigenous bourgeoisie, above all that engaged in trade, is vitally interested in receiving the necessary foreign equipment and

industrial goods, in securing support from European and American private capital. Ties with the capitalist world are profitable to the bourgeoisie. As a rule, it has allies in the remnants of the former ruling quarters: tribal chiefs, feudal lords and former colonial civil servants. But it is not very safe to rely on capitalist countries: today, capitalism is passing from crisis to crisis—the energy, finance, food and other crises. Permeated with nationalist ideas, the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals want the government to be neutral toward both capitalist and socialist countries. However, development through "self-reliance" is impossible in practical terms.

The organized labor movement has repeatedly spoken out in favor of expanding external ties, reiterated its solidarity with the organizations fighting against colonialism and stated its support of disarmament and detente.

Regrouping in class coalitions usually spells revision of political programs. The struggle of different views invariably affects foreign policy. The choice of socialist orientation, with the other conditions unchanged (a shortage of capital and expertise, vestiges of colonial rule, overall backwardness), places African countries, albeit temporarily, in a special position—the capitalist world is waging a vigorous economic, ideological and political war on them.

Recent developments show that not all countries are able to withstand this pressure. Some revise their positions, give up the democratization of management, gradually loosen the control over the activities of foreign and indigenous private capital, and abandon efforts to meet the social needs of the people.

At the same time, most revolutionary-democratic regimes take it upon themselves to decolonize society, relying on the support of the working masses. Party control is introduced in all spheres, including the armed forces and the top-level civil servants. The political activity of reactionary elements and Western bourgeois propaganda is restricted. Nationalization of foreign property, differential taxes on private companies, economic and commercial activity by the state—all that affects external ties.

Socialist-oriented countries want to protect themselves from imperialist interference. They keep a careful watch over their sovereignty and vigorously develop their relations with socialist countries. On the whole, they support Soviet initiatives in detente much more resolutely than capitalist-oriented countries, aware that decolonization would be easier in conditions of peace.

3. The Main Principles of African Foreign Policy

The Great October Socialist Revolution was the strongest worldwide impetus for the struggle for peace, against colonialism and racism, for the right to freely choose one's social development path,

for equitable cooperation among all nations. That is why solidarity with the Soviet Union, with the entire socialist community is historically logical for newly independent African countries and national liberation movements. Most liberated countries come out firmly against colonialism, neocolonialism, aggression, inequitable international relations and other manifestations of imperialist policy. Their action is supported by socialist countries and the working class of developed capitalist nations, fighting against imperialism as a system. The important thing is that all revolutionary currents are now waging a joint ideological offensive against imperialism. One result of this offensive is the emergence of socialist-oriented countries, considerably changing the balance of forces in the world.

Such is the historical and socio-political background against which African countries, who have thrown off centuries-long colonial rule, have been shaping the main principles of their foreign policy. Occurring amid the rivalry of the two opposite social systems, this process is affected both by this rivalry and by each of the two systems.

Oriented differently in social terms, African countries pursue foreign policies that are far from identical. At the same time, they have three fundamental principles—anticolonialism, unity and non-alignment—which invariably run through official declarations, documents and decisions taken both individually and collectively. This reflects that which is historically common for liberated countries, the fact that they have gained independence amid the rivalry of the two social systems, in the course of the national liberation revolution. These three principles are a common achievement of African liberation revolutions; they are recognized throughout the world because they objectively determine Africa's place in world affairs and are in conformity with the socio-political developments within African countries.

Anticolonialism comprises both the struggle for the liberation of the last two African countries still under racist and colonial domination—Namibia and South Africa—and the drive to eradicate all the social aftereffects of colonialism, against attempts at new enslavement, that is, against neocolonialism. The intensity of decolonization is different in different African countries. Socialist-oriented countries are the most dynamic and consistent in this regard; they have emerged as the vanguard of Africa's revolutionary forces. At the same time, common antiimperialist interests made it possible, on the basis of anticolonialism, for all liberated countries and the socialist nations to pool their efforts both to secure complete decolonization—liberating the last colonies—and to fight against neocolonialism.

African unity, manifested above all in the OAU, stems from the realization by African governments that collective guarantees are needed to preserve and strengthen liberated countries' sovereignty and to regulate their relations without interference by the former colonial or other imperialist powers. The OAU has become the foremost in-

strument of peace in Africa, of African unity in the face of colonial vestiges and the neocolonial threat, of equality among African countries.

Nonalignment is designed to ensure an independent position for newly liberated countries on the international scene, to erect a psychological and legal barrier between them and imperialist powers. It is no accident that, having refused to join military and political blocs like CENTO or SEATO, newly independent countries began to expand their cooperation with the socialist nations. True, the trend toward transferring nonalignment to the ideological, political and socio-economic spheres still exists in Africa, fostered by neocolonialism and its accomplices. However, it contradicts the essence of this important foreign policy principle and is constantly rebuffed at nonaligned conferences which have adopted scores of resolutions reiterating the right of each nonaligned country to freely choose its partners in international cooperation.

Having emerged in specific historical circumstances, the three major foreign policy principles of African countries continuously add to their content under the influence of the fundamental foreign policy principles of the socialist states—peaceful coexistence of countries with different socio-political systems and proletarian internationalism. Hence the obviously promising future of broader cooperation between developing countries and the socialist community in solving the problems of the African liberation revolution.

4. The Role of Nationalism in Shaping the Foreign Policy of Independent African Countries

Nationalism is and will obviously long be playing an important part in shaping the foreign policy programs of many African countries and the principles underlying these programs, in specific ways they are implemented. The impact of nationalism on African foreign policy and the way this policy reflects it are explained by the historical and social roots of nationalism itself. This was succinctly formulated by Lenin in his address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East: "You will have to base yourselves on the bourgeois nationalism which is awakening, and must awaken, among those peoples, and which has its historical justification."⁴ This extremely important observation is indispensable for arriving at a historically correct assessment of nationalism as a factor influencing African foreign policy.

This impact of nationalism on foreign policy changes depending on the path of development chosen by a given country, the rates at which the social content of national liberation intensifies, the character of nationalism and its evolution in this or that country. Three main stages can be singled out, although relatively, in the dynamic

interrelationship between nationalism and African foreign policy. They are the stage of Pan-African nationalism, the period of departure from it toward local nationalisms, and finally, the period in which revolutionary, antiimperialist nationalism is in some cases replaced with conservative, reactionary and proimperialist nationalism. These stages clearly reflect the way nationalism acquires a social and class content which meets the interests of the African bourgeoisie, increasingly gaining strength.

These periods overlap one another in everyday foreign policy practice. In the first years after winning political independence African nationalism remained overwhelmingly anticolonial and preserved its Pan-African trends. The striving of African peoples for national self-assertion was expressed in the struggle to strengthen the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly free countries. Oriented at consolidating political liberation, nationalism influenced the emergence of anticolonialism, unity and nonalignment as the foremost principles of African foreign policy. In the first post-independence years the leaders of the national liberation movement realized that it would be practically impossible to safeguard independence and secure full and complete African liberation without unity and without rejecting insistent imperialist attempts to draw them into blocs. The prominent African scholar, Ali A. Mazrui, offered this interpretation of such foreign policy: "Unity is power and neutrality is freedom."⁵

The ideological and political convictions held by advocates of Pan-African nationalism contributed to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity and formed the basis of its Charter. Pan-African trends were reflected in foreign policy programs of many African countries, aided in the renunciation of territorial claims on their neighbors and made it possible to settle many inter-African disputes.

To a certain degree, it was precisely Pan-African ideas that motivated new African governments to aid the fighters for full and complete liberation of Africa. In that period, nationalism was above all aimed against imperialism, the common enemy of African peoples, and African foreign policy was still tackling issues of the national liberation revolution.

The struggle for African liberation brought into being more and more new countries to replace former colonies and dependent territories. This inevitably changed African nationalism and weakened its unifying function. From Pan-African, based on the idea of joint struggle for the liberation of the continent, nationalism began to turn into the political ideology of the ruling quarters of individual African countries, from a factor of consolidation into a force separating African countries from one another and sometimes undermining their positions in the struggle against neocolonialism and imperialism. Nationalistic slogans began to be used to back claims some African

countries had on others, to the detriment of common African interests. Meanwhile, these slogans were losing their opposition to external forces hostile to Africa. Local nationalism which contrasted itself to all-African goals was emerging as an important factor in the foreign policy of several African countries.

While preserving its general democratic content, typical of the nationalism of oppressed nations and dependent peoples, local nationalism mostly reflects the distinctive and far from identical interests of the ruling quarters. It confuses the masses and often leads to clashes between neighboring African countries. The press commented that the struggle against backwardness turned into a slogan, and the struggle against one's neighbor turned into a permanent factor. This was borne out by the very first serious inter-African conflicts in North-West and East Africa. Commenting on the former, which remained acute for a long time, the press noted the "intransigent and demanding nationalism" of l'Istiqlal Party which "irritated" Algiers.⁶ It was now more difficult to overcome the inter-African contradictions rooted in nationalism.

Naturally, local nationalism is not homogeneous. It reflects virtually all types of nationalism that existed in the former colonial world, conventionally classified by the Soviet researcher R. Ulyanovsky: "The antiimperialist nationalism of the patriotic strata of national bourgeoisie; comprador nationalism of the new mediating bourgeoisie; nationalism of the military and bureaucratic bourgeoisie; overtly chauvinistic, anticommunist and anti-Soviet nationalism which in some aspect merges with bourgeois nationalism; and the nationalism of feudal and semi-feudal elements advocating independence. It is imperative to add the most important link here—national and revolutionary democracy."⁷

An analysis of local nationalism should by no means ignore the fact that sometimes it contains elements of an antiimperialist, anti-colonial, antiracist—in other words, a general democratic program. At the same time, its negative aspects are becoming increasingly pronounced. For example, facts show that local nationalism complicates inter-African relations at all levels, whether local, regional or continental. When regional economic groups began to emerge in the late 1960s, many difficulties in their organization stemmed, among other things, from nationalism in which inter-African contradictions were expressed. Such was the case with implementing the plans for the West African Economic Community. Nationalism also acted as an obstacle to the creation of an East African "common market".

The negative impact of local nationalism in the economic sphere is also evident in the way African countries draw up their joint positions for UNCTAD sessions and coordinate their approach to the European Economic Community (EEC), reflected, in particular, in the talks on the Second Lomé Convention in November 1979. Students of this problem show how the individual positions of some

countries hampered the elaboration of a joint approach to the talks with the Common Market.⁸

Local nationalism has repeatedly caused serious difficulties in the OAU. It disrupted the unity of action in drawing up a common strategy on the assistance rendered by the OAU Liberation Committee to national liberation movements and on Israel and the racist regimes in Southern Africa. One might recall the way the problem of a "dialogue" with South Africa seriously split the ranks of the OAU, the way any resolution on sanctions against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia gave rise to serious friction among OAU members because it touched on their relations with imperialist countries who threatened to impose sanctions in return. A mistaken interpretation of national interests forces some African governments to refrain from criticizing their former colonial powers who are today actively aiding South Africa and are still capable of exerting pressure on many African countries which are dependent on them.

Outside the continent, local nationalism prevents the unity of the African group at the United Nations and lies at the root of dissent in tackling global problems directly affecting African interests. This refers to issues like a ban on nuclear weapon tests, zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and the like.

A factor contributing to isolation, local nationalism restricts the field of vision of the ruling quarters in some African countries and obstructs their view of truly national and long-term interests with considerations of short-term profit. The most graphic example of this type of foreign policy is the approach of the ruling quarters of Egypt, their betrayal of the common progressive objectives of the Arab world, of the liberation struggle of the Arab people of Palestine. R. Ulyanovsky stressed that "the revolutionary, antiimperialist nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser was replaced by the conservative, reactionary, proimperialist nationalism of Sadat".⁹

As the social content of revolutionary processes in Africa is intensifying, the role of nationalist ideas is changing, but nationalism retains its influence on the foreign policy of many African countries. In the countries which have chosen the capitalist path with the intensification of class antagonisms and ideological contradictions, nationalism acquires a typically capitalist class and political content, becoming increasingly bourgeois and perceptibly losing its general democratic content. That is why it becomes a weapon of indigenous exploiter strata who strive for their mercenary objectives under cover of nationalist slogans. "In Tropical Africa," the authors of *Social Shifts in Independent African Countries* argue, "the bourgeoisie has not consolidated itself into a dominant class either economically or politically, and it is yet too early to talk of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie even in capitalist-oriented countries. Representatives of different social strata may be in power there but, objectively, the policy pursued by these ruling groups meets the interests of capitalist devel-

opment and, consequently, of the growing African bourgeoisie."¹⁰ Businessmen and representatives of the bureaucratic and commercial bourgeoisie, as well as some in the middle urban strata, stick to nationalism because it reflects their business and social interests. These strata either have their own men in the ruling quarters which shape foreign policy or can bring pressure to bear on those who do.

The bourgeois nationalism of the 1970s and 1980s is becoming increasingly harsh in a number of African countries. As a rule, this shifts their foreign policy to the right and enhances their pro-Western orientation. Simultaneously, there are cases when all-African slogans are renounced; this can no longer be dismissed as a result of a localization of interests. It is far from simple to reveal the mechanism of change in foreign policy, if only because nationalism is an important but not the only factor affecting it. Besides, one should not lose sight of the fact that in today's Africa, the bourgeoisie in the making is not homogeneous and its different strata can have different, sometimes even conflicting goals. Regrettably, in its evolution toward chauvinism, nationalism can exert decisive influence on the foreign policy of the countries whose leaders once declared that they had chosen the socialist path (for example, Somalia).

With regard to socialist-oriented countries, one should note that nationalists there are not homogeneous and their right wing often acts contrary to national interests. Since these countries have yet to break free of the world capitalist system, neocolonialism is still trying to divert them from the chosen path, among other things, by encouraging bourgeois nationalism. Neocolonialists see no danger to their interests in it, and the indigenous right-wingers willingly cooperate with foreign capital, hoping it would become their ally.

Summing up, one can say that nationalism in today's Africa has a socio-economic base of its own. Another political factor aiding in its preservation is that in many countries clear-cut class ideologies which could replace nationalist views are developed poorly. And, of course, the absence of the parties of scientific socialism, capable of leading the working masses, the working class and the peasants, in an overwhelming majority of African countries.

The authors of *The Contemporary Revolutionary Movement and Nationalism* have noted the extreme viability of the factors nourishing nationalism which, they believe, will, in different forms, be typical of Africa for many years.¹¹

Nationalism's departure from progressive trends will inevitably bring out increasingly negative phenomena in the foreign policy of those African countries where its reactionary aspects are dominant. "Nationalist slogans," the Soviet Academician Boris Ponomarev holds, "can often change their socio-political orientation and turn from a weapon of struggle for national liberation into that of resisting the consolidation of antiimperialist forces."¹²

At the same time, in those African countries where power belongs

to revolutionary democrats who are approaching scientific socialism, the democratic content of nationalism expresses itself with renewed vigor, especially when it faces neocolonialist counterattacks. Today, we see in Africa the "militant, antiimperialist nationalism in Libya ... a restrained nationalism in Tanzania, permeated with the spirit of antiimperialism and rendering assistance to the fighting peoples in Southern Africa".¹³ Thus the struggle of the two trends in nationalism continues and exerts considerable influence on the foreign policy of many African countries.

Chapter Two

DIPLOMACY AS A FOREMOST MEANS OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The history of international relations tells us that a country can and does pursue its foreign policy by different means—from peaceful to violent. The ratio between these means depends on the class essence, character, purposes and principles of a given country's foreign policy; as a rule, it also conforms to the opportunities the country actually possesses and is interconnected with the development of both bilateral relations with other countries and the overall system of international relations.

Unlike other foreign policy means, each with its own immediate tasks, diplomacy is the official international activity of the state and its bodies. Its only mission is to peacefully defend the country's national rights and interests abroad and ensure peaceful settlements of international problems and disputes. Unlike the notion of foreign policy itself—the "general course pursued by a state in international affairs"—diplomacy is viewed as an "integral organic part of foreign policy ... a totality of the practical measures, forms, means and methods used to implement foreign policy".¹

This role of diplomacy is especially important for the developing countries recently freed from colonial rule. Currently devoid or almost completely devoid of other means of wielding influence on the world scene, most newly independent countries use diplomatic channels as the more readily accessible and optimum way for attaining their foreign policy objectives. Diplomacy occupies a place of the utmost prominence in the foreign policy arsenal of newly liberated African countries.

1. The Prehistory and Distinctive Features of African Diplomacy

The diplomacy of an overwhelming majority of today's African countries has the same salient feature as these countries themselves—it is youth, with all its strengths and weaknesses. On the whole, African countries are the youngest in the world. Of the 50 independent

African countries (in 1982) only Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt have a long diplomatic experience. The average "record of independence" and, consequently, of modern diplomacy of almost all the other African countries is 20 years. For most states, their foreign policy and diplomacy, it has been a period of emergence and initial steps in international affairs.

This does not mean, however, that African countries have no diplomatic history of their own, as apologists of colonialism have only recently maintained, taking advantage of an almost complete lack of studies in this field. African diplomacy, a 1973 research symposium in Bristol, Great Britain, noted justly, leads the "investigator onward into regions of inquiry which, until comparatively recently, were as little trodden by scholars as was the African continent by European explorers before the nineteenth century".²

Meanwhile, diplomacy and diplomats are nothing new to Africa. Their history goes back to ancient Egypt and Carthage. Besides, in precolonial times, there existed in Africa independent states which had to tackle international issues of war and peace and regulate political and economic relations with neighboring and other states. We know, for example, that in 1824 the king of the West African state of Benin and his vassal from Anim (now Lagos, Nigeria) were among the first to recognize the independence of Brazil after it freed itself from Portuguese domination. They deposited their instruments of recognition through a special representative. After that the ties between African countries and Brazil gradually developed and grew stronger until they were ruptured by the European colonization of Africa, as were Africa's contacts with other countries.

But in the colonial era, long before the revival of their sovereignty, African countries and peoples continued their participation in international life: their national liberation movement was an integral part of the world revolutionary process. Stimulated by the October 1917 Revolution in Russia, they began turning from objects into subjects of international law even before the elimination of colonial empires. Their advance in this direction was accelerated by the victory of the anti-Nazi coalition in World War II in which hundreds of thousands of Africans were involved too. It was after the war that African national liberation organizations considerably stepped up their international activities. In October 1945 their leaders held a Pan-African Congress in Manchester; they repeatedly addressed the United Nations as petitioners and took part in the historic Bandung Conference in 1955. As early as in the period of "internal self-government" some African countries secured the opening of their trade and consular missions abroad. For example, shortly before the declaration of independence Nigeria opened bureaus for Muslim pilgrims in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, consular offices in Gabon and Fernando Poo, a trade mission with consular functions in London and a communications mission in Washington.

Therefore the history of African diplomacy confirms that today's free Africa cannot be divorced either from its own past or from that of international relations in general. Africa ceased to play a passive role in world politics considerably earlier than in recent years, although naturally its participation in international relations could not be as active as it is today. Complete involvement of African countries and peoples in modern international life became possible only after the eradication of colonial regimes.

The winning of national independence has radically changed the status of African countries in all spheres, including that of international affairs. At last they had the opportunity to pursue independent foreign policy, to choose its main objectives, principles and ways of realizing them. Their choice was largely identical with that of other countries recently freed from colonial dependence, but it differs visibly from the foreign policies of the socialist countries and the imperialist powers.

If we set aside some distinctive objectives of African foreign policy and single out those of paramount importance for all African countries, we will easily see certain common features. In the final analysis, they can be summed up as efforts aimed at creating international conditions which would be best for eradicating the colonial and racist regime in Southern Africa, strengthening political independence, economic emancipation, accelerating socio-economic development and achieving full equality for African countries in world affairs. The level of socio-economic development and the orientation newly independent African countries choose also predetermine their choice of ways and means to reach these goals.

Theoretically, certain foreign policy purposes and principles of independent African countries (for example, that of freeing Africa from the racist regime) allow for the use of both peaceful means and force. The actual emergence and development of African international relations over the 25 years of independence has witnessed armed conflicts, the threat and use of force. However, in almost all cases African countries took up arms not to impose their policy outside their own borders but only to defend their independence and sovereignty within these borders. They have been repeatedly made to resort to armed force for defending themselves from imperialist aggression, racist provocations instigated by imperialist and reactionary forces, and attacks by mercenaries.

Armed conflicts between neighboring African countries deriving, as a rule, from the partition and repartition of the continent in colonial times and from imperialist instigation are usually quite short-lived. For 26 years—from 1951, the year of Libyan independence, to the summer of 1977, when Somalia launched its aggression against Ethiopia—not a single war which could conceivably be called large-scale or prolonged broke out between African countries, and the brief armed conflicts that did occur ended not in victory on the battlefield but in

diplomatic compromise at the negotiating table. The total duration of fighting in all inter-African conflicts is insignificant compared to the total duration of peaceful foreign policy conducted by newly independent countries.

An analysis of the African foreign policy record shows that so far most African countries oriented their foreign policy toward renouncing aggression and the use of force as a matter of principle, toward peaceful coexistence with neighboring and other countries and peaceful settlement of international disputes. This orientation has been repeatedly formalized in decisions taken at international forums which African countries have held since 1955, the year of the Bandung Conference, both jointly with other nonaligned countries and at the African level. This general direction is the essence of the Organization of African Unity, its true mission both in Africa and in the world. "We in Africa have a vested interest in peace," Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, said. "There must be an enduring peace in the world to enable us the new emergent countries to consolidate our hard won freedom."³

Thus, from their very birth, independent African countries have preferred purely peaceful means of foreign policy. And, in assessing the role of diplomacy as a foreign policy tool of newly independent countries, still working to attain full national liberation and social emancipation, this inevitably brings to mind what Lenin said about the forms of revolutionary struggle: "Marxism demands an absolutely *historical* examination of the question of the forms of struggle. To treat this question apart from the concrete historical situation betrays a failure to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism. At different stages of economic evolution, depending on differences in political, national-cultural, living and other conditions, different forms of struggle come to the fore and become the principal forms of struggle..."⁴

One can assert that in the current historical period diplomacy is the principal form of struggle on the international scene for most African countries. Their diplomacy makes constant and broad use of propaganda. Moreover, they resort to diplomacy especially frequently because it is virtually the only means of safeguarding independence and developing political relations with neighboring and other countries. African countries, half of them within the category of the economically least developed nations, are simply incapable of using other foreign policy means as widely as they use diplomacy. So far, the cases of some of them using armed force or economic pressure in inter-African relations can be considered exceptions which do not change the general rule.

Today, an overwhelming majority of African countries has good reason to see diplomacy as the most feasible and acceptable way of securing its foreign policy interests. Besides, diplomacy proves quite efficient in influencing the political sentiment at home.

The international situation and above all the existence of powerful allies of Africa—the socialist community, the world working-class and national liberation movement—are decisive in the choice of and preference for diplomacy as the foremost foreign policy means of independent Africa. Its foreign policy develops under the beneficial influence of socialist foreign policy which, the CPSU Program notes, “contrasts imperialism with a new type of international relations. The foreign policy of the socialist countries, which is based on the principles of peace, the equality and self-determination of nations, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, as well as the fair, humane methods of socialist diplomacy are exerting a growing influence on the world situation.”⁵

In the 1970s, a decade of detente, when the direct dependence of a country's international influence on the size of its military potential decreased considerably, developing African countries were able to attain their foreign policy objectives more successfully and steadily enhance their role in world affairs by means of diplomacy. Naturally, this opportunity diminished with the aggravation of the international situation in the early 1980s.

From their very first days, young African countries have been strongly in favor of coordinating their foreign policy and diplomatic efforts, logically seeing it as the only way to assuming a worthy role in the current system of international relations. Although African countries gained independence much later than Asian, let alone Latin American countries, they have progressed much faster and further in the organizational shaping of their all-African antiimperialist solidarity.

The complex process of ensuring joint international action by the numerous and dissimilar new African countries found its practical expression in the Organization of African Unity which comprises all of Africa's independent states except racist South Africa.

The creation of this independent international organization of a new, national liberation type, without imperialist participation, was, the Soviet government said, “one of the greatest political achievements of African peoples... Having united, for the first time in history, on a continent-wide scale, African countries gained the opportunity to jointly solve the problems they face and jointly oppose world imperialism and neocolonialism.”⁶ This opportunity is realized to the fullest and above all through considerable coordination of African diplomatic efforts in accordance with Article 2 of the OAU Charter⁷ both at the organization's forums and in the African groups at the United Nations and in other international organizations.

The continent-wide scale and the constant basis of such coordination “makes it possible to speak not only of the diplomacy of individual countries but of African diplomacy as such”,⁸ that is, of joint diplomatic activity by the OAU countries in solving certain foreign policy tasks common to them in the struggle against imperial-

ism, colonialism and neocolonialism. Of course, generally speaking, the expression “African diplomacy” is as relative and conventional as the widespread terms “new states” or “developing countries”. It can be and is applied only with due regard to the socio-political differentiation of independent African countries, the disagreements among them, and the distinctive interests, foreign policy and diplomacy of each.

This concise term reflects joint efforts—a new quality of diplomacy pursued by African countries, echoing similar features in the diplomacy of the nonaligned countries in general. We know that joint action by liberated countries within individual regions, whole continents or on the global scale is becoming increasingly noticeable in international affairs. Socialist countries attach great importance to the preservation and strengthening of African unity on an antiimperialist basis and invariably support the joint antiimperialist and anti-colonial diplomacy of the OAU countries.

Naturally, Africa today does not and cannot represent any “diplomatic monolith”. The record shows that in their approach to specific international issues, the OAU countries are divided into two or three large groups, each striving to pursue its own diplomatic course. Diplomatic positions of different African countries and their groups are divided not so much by the distinctions in their main foreign policy purposes and principles (they generally coincide and are formally accepted by all) as by the actual attitude to these purposes and principles and by the degree of their radical and consistent implementation.

Diplomatic activity of individual countries inevitably reflects the acceleration of social differentiation as national liberation revolutions evolve into national-democratic ones. It also reflects the choice of the development path. The clash between the two courses of social development—between socialist and capitalist orientation—is becoming more acute; the choice between them has given rise to polarization among the African states. Consequently, division is also beginning to emerge in African foreign policy. Socialist-oriented countries are taking firm root in the vanguard of progressive, antiimperialist African forces. They are opposed by the capitalist-oriented states who tend to appease the imperialists. The centrist positions are held by those countries whose diplomatic tactics is to follow others.

However, in today's Africa which is living through a period of transition, social and foreign policy differentiations are still not fully identical: the former is not yet easily traceable in foreign policy and diplomacy. Besides, with the heightened role of the personality in shaping foreign policy and diplomacy and in the frequent coups d'état in newly independent African countries, there is a greater chance that a change of leaders will entail a change in diplomacy. African Presidents and leaders of military regimes occupy an exclusive place in the state and society and, although their foreign policy

programs and activities are restricted by objective international and domestic conditions, the question of the correlation of objective and subjective factors in the choice of a diplomatic course is often decided in favor of the latter. As J. Chikwe, an African expert, emphasizes, in Africa "the subjective factor plays an important, and perhaps bigger role than anywhere else. The character of the ruling party, the leaders' personal likes and dislikes ... all this may and does lead to decisions often startling from the point of view of a strict scientific analysis."⁹ Long-term forecasts concerning this sort of diplomacy are a difficult and risky matter.

It would therefore be an unwarranted simplification to divide African countries into politically stable groups and describe one as totally progressive and the other as totally reactionary. So far these groups lack firm political or organisational forms, and the dividing line separating them and their diplomacies on specific international issues is relative and uncertain. The same country can join one group on one question and the other on another. A country can also leave one group for the other; as a result, the general content and direction of its diplomacy can change even with relation to one and the same question.

That is why the existence of countries with progressive regimes, Mohamed Harmel, Secretary of the Tunisian Communist Party, notes, "is no reason to list all other developing countries as 'reactionary' ... The imperatives of the national liberation struggle influence the orientation of most of the former colonial countries all the same, though to varying degrees."¹⁰ Viewed from the angle of international politics, the category of progressive African countries can comprise not only those where revolutionary-democratic parties are in charge and which have chosen socialist orientation. This category is considerably broader, especially in questions of the struggle for the elimination of the racist regime.

Thus, the basis for solidarity among new African countries, laid during the struggle for independence, remains despite all the social, economic and other differences among them. Proceeding from their common historical destiny, similar development conditions and foreign policy interests, most OAU countries search for and find a common language in approaching many African and global issues. The almost 20-year OAU experience shows that, although this organization lacks a uniform class basis, is not a supranational but an interstate entity and comprises heterogeneous states which often come into conflict with one another, it has proven its viability. For all its contradictions, the joint African diplomacy of the OAU countries has emerged on the world scene as a political force no one can ignore.

Lenin called such conflicting historical developments "patchwork reality" and stressed: "We cannot cast aside this patchwork reality, however inelegant it may be; we cannot cast away one bit of it..."

We cannot refuse to recognize what actually exists; it will itself compel us to recognize it."¹¹

2. African Unity in Development

In the early 1960s it was common in the former colonial powers to talk and even write whole treatises about Africa's "poor start". This was claimed both for the economic and for the political spheres of activity by independent countries, including their diplomacy. But did the contemporary history of African diplomacy really have a "poor" start?

If we do not reduce the analysis of African diplomacy to isolated cases or gauge the period of its emergence by yardsticks that are unrealistic and alien to Africa, if we proceed, in Lenin's words, "from concrete realities, not from abstract postulates",¹² it becomes obvious that, on the whole, African diplomacy is developing quite successfully. Naturally, it does encounter many difficulties. The distinctive socio-economic, political and ideological conditions in Africa and the salient features of today's system of international relations inevitably give rise to certain unique traits in this diplomacy. Reflections of these traits are logical and possible in all spheres and issues of international activity by newly independent countries. But, while all this is true, the overall foreign policy and diplomacy pursued by most African countries soberly takes into account their objective opportunities; it is highly purposeful and realistic.

An important achievement of newly liberated African countries is that from the very first steps in international affairs most of them made a clear choice of their major foreign policy goals and the diplomatic tactics, forms and methods to attain them.

One can single out three major directions in the strategy of African diplomacy to solve the tasks facing independent Africa: the development and strengthening of African unity; efforts to ensure equality and self-determination in Africa; and nonalignment.

The most characteristic of these directions is the strengthening of African antiimperialist unity within the OAU—a continent-wide organization without parallel in Asia or Latin America—and African groups at the United Nations and in other international organizations. Today, African countries regard this unity not as an end in itself but as a means of attaining vital political and economic objectives. The elaboration of common diplomatic positions and joint diplomatic action to achieve these goals have emerged as the sphere of the most vigorous activity by the OAU; in the African groups at the UN and in other international organizations diplomacy is the only field of cooperation among independent African countries.

Today, the OAU and African groups function quite smoothly as conventional bodies coordinating African foreign policy and diplo-

macy. The range of this coordination is rather broad, comprising both inter-African and key global issues. It is now OAU practice to coordinate, so as to protect their common interests, the fundamental positions of African countries in preparation for sessions of the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD, nonaligned conferences and the like. OAU sessions appoint special representatives for raising this or that question in UN bodies or securing support for various African decisions and documents. Besides, OAU sessions nominate African candidates for high-level UN posts, send special negotiating missions to various countries, and sometimes issue instructions for the diplomatic representatives of individual OAU members in non-African countries. The United Nations has recognized the OAU and extended the status of a permanent observer to it. The OAU cooperates broadly with the UN and its specialized agencies and has offices in New York and Geneva.

The OAU and the African groups in all the international organizations of the UN system have now become effective bodies of joint diplomacy by the independent African states. Membership in the OAU and the African groups has given tangible diplomatic advantages to African countries and considerably enhanced their role in world politics within a very short historical period. The colonial and racist regime and the neocolonialists, the foremost targets of African unity, are forced to acknowledge its power. For example, Western powers, interested not only in preserving their positions in the racist South of Africa but also in developing their relations with independent African countries, had to maneuver and even participate, to a certain degree, in UN- and OAU-imposed sanctions against the racist regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

The OAU has won worldwide recognition as an instrument of peace in international relations which vigorously promotes peaceful settlement of territorial and other political disputes in Africa. Significantly, the OAU is the only regional organization in the world empowered by the United Nations to act as a body maintaining peace and security in its region. Since 1964, when the Security Council adopted a resolution asking the OAU to assist in the settlement of the Congo crisis, the United Nations has repeatedly recognized the OAU's right to search for "African solutions to African problems", and the Security Council has requested it to take measures to complement United Nations action.

The efficiency of African unity and African diplomacy is ensured by the strong political support on the part of the world's antiimperialist forces, above all the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist community. This is recognized in Africa itself.

Naturally, to correctly assess OAU activities and the opportunities of African diplomacy it should be taken into account that the establishment of an all-African international organization not only met the national interests of each and every African country but was also

the result of a compromise among them. Its decisions, statements and all its activity are also based on compromise. The OAU is not a supranational legislative organ but merely a consultative international body: its Charter has no provision describing its resolutions as binding or envisaging any sanctions for non-compliance with or violation of them. Noting the limitations of African unity and of possible joint action by the OAU countries, President Nasser of Egypt warned in 1966: "The OAU should not be burdened with tasks that are too much for it."¹³ OAU decisions were often taken by a majority or even unanimously but were then ignored by many countries; demands for the expulsion of some of them (for example, Malawi) were not supported at its forums.

As a rule, the elaboration of common diplomatic positions on acute international issues and the adoption of agreed resolutions in the OAU follow a period of heated debate. Naturally, contradictions are especially glaring between socialist- and capitalist-oriented countries. Sometimes, some pro-Western governments ostentatiously oppose most of the other OAU members, to the detriment of all-African and, eventually, their own national interests.

While in the OAU, whose bodies work behind closed doors, these conflicts between individual African governments are not too obvious, at the United Nations they surface for all to see. The African group at the United Nations cannot be compared to a parliamentary faction with its mandatory discipline in voting. Here it is individual governments which, in the final analysis, decide whether they should comply with all-African resolutions. In most cases of voting at the UN their diplomacy focuses on such provisions in resolutions which offer them advantages or at least do not contradict their interests and positions.

But then, what maintains the overall course toward greater OAU unity and ensures a joint basis in African diplomacy?

Generally, all this is due to such underlying principles of inter-African relations as sovereign equality and equal cooperation of the OAU countries, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, condemnation of subversive activity, mutual respect for the existing borders and territorial integrity, nonuse of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. Any departure of an OAU country from these generally accepted principles upsets African unity and weakens the effectiveness of its joint diplomacy.

One of the ways to preserve African unity is the established OAU practice to focus attention at its forums on issues which unite Africa and avoid debate on pointed questions which would inevitably split its participants. The salient feature of most African countries' approach to such glaring inter-African conflicts as, for example, the armed conflict in Western Sahara or the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978 is not so much support for or condemnation of either side as the striving for a peaceful settlement or, if that is impossible, temporizing.

Despite the repeated attempts to convene an OAU emergency assembly on Western Sahara in 1977-1978, an overwhelming majority of the OAU members declined to heed these calls; the February 1978 session of the OAU Council of Ministers, meeting at the height of the Somali-Ethiopian war, refused to discuss this conflict; the 1980 OAU Assembly in Freetown referred the Western Sahara question to a special mediation committee.

African delegations often resort to such tactics at UN sessions too. According to the Nigerian scholar Adekunle Ajala, "whenever a member has dissented on a matter of particular concern to Africa as a whole, that member has nearly always either abstained from voting or retired from the chamber during the vote."¹⁴

It is therefore logical that under the compromise approach to OAU solidarity, its common diplomacy cannot progress in a straightforward way but alternates between upsurges and slumps.

Usually, there are vacillation and sharp differences in the OAU when matters come to a head (the Midcast conflict in the summer of 1967, the crisis in Angola in 1975 and the like), but eventually a position acceptable to almost all members evolves and stabilizes. The record shows that, in the final analysis, progressive, antiimperialist forces and trends which determine the general direction of African diplomacy gain the upper hand.

Taking these developments into consideration, one can state that a typical feature of OAU diplomacy is the relative stability of its major directions. The numerical strength of African countries acts here as a balancing factor which levels out "deviations from the norm" in the diplomatic positions of individual countries. This makes it feasible to draw up forecasts of African diplomacy (not the diplomacy of individual OAU countries but their joint diplomacy) in today's international relations.

The all-African antiimperialist unity of the OAU went through yet another test of its strength between 1970 and 1980. African developments in that period showed that the "imperialist forces and their accomplices in Africa are now placing their main hopes on undermining the unity of African countries".¹⁵ Under the pretext of preventing a "second Angola" they rally African reactionaries to the struggle against socialist-oriented African countries: dangerous conflicts were provoked and escalated on their borders, mostly on the pretext of territorial disputes.

This naturally caused socialist-oriented OAU members to respond. They closed their ranks and strengthened coordination of their action—in other words, they revived the process begun at summit meetings of these countries, in 1965-1967, in Bamako, Conakry and Cairo disrupted because of the 1967 Mideast conflict. The struggle is already intensifying in the OAU—and it is quite probable that it will continue to rise—between advocates of stronger antiimperialist solidarity of nonaligned and socialist countries and proponents of Africa's "equi-

distance" from blocs. One can expect that the course of this struggle will largely depend on the greater unity and higher political activity by socialist-oriented countries, on their efforts to further African unity.

In this connection one cannot rule out certain changes in the OAU Charter and in the organizational forms of African diplomacy. The question is arising about practical steps to ensure peaceful coexistence among the OAU countries and the status quo with regard to their borders, about a search for ways toward settling territorial disputes in Africa peacefully and by compromise (a historical precedent for such settlement was established by the 1972 Algerian-Moroccan agreements on the joint economic exploitation of the Tindouf region). In connection with the aggravation of the Chad conflict the 17th session of the OAU Assembly, held in Freetown in 1980, discussed the creation in the OAU of a political security council and inter-African defense forces.

Apparently, African unity and joint diplomacy of the OAU countries will not develop smoothly in the foreseeable future; there were and are conflicts within the OAU, and they will remain. Still, newly independent countries cannot completely abandon the path of unity—this would run counter to their own foreign policy interests and the important and still outstanding tasks they are facing in the antiimperialist national liberation revolution, the tasks which have been uniting Africa. It would be much more difficult for any of these countries to tackle these tasks on their own than with mutual inter-African support. Joint action by the OAU countries at the UN and other international forums continues, and this shows that their governments are fully aware of it. As an expression of an objective necessity, as a historically determined process, the African unity movement, together with African diplomacy, does have a future.

3. The Main Direction of African Diplomacy

It appears that ensuring equality and self-determination of African peoples can be viewed as the main direction in African foreign policy and diplomacy.

It is common knowledge that the slogan of equality and national self-determination was proclaimed immediately following the Great October Socialist Revolution. The struggle of the Soviet Union which turned it into a principle of its foreign policy aided in the worldwide recognition of this political principle as a norm of international law after World War II.

The Soviet Union insisted that the UN Charter include a provision stating that it was a goal of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (Article 1, Paragraph 2). The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples, adopted at Soviet initiative by the 15th session of the UN General Assembly in 1960, revealed the broad content of this principle and stressed: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The Declaration also noted the "equal rights ... of nations large and small".¹⁶

The importance African countries attach to the principle of equal rights and self-determination is borne out by the very fact that the OAU Charter opens as follows: "Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all peoples to control their own destiny..."¹⁷ The "decolonization law", so typical of today's international relations, is reflected to the full in African diplomacy.

In this direction, most OAU countries pool their diplomatic efforts to secure elimination of all hotbeds of colonialism and racism in Africa and achieve economic emancipation of newly independent countries. They aim at doing away with the holdovers of colonial rule in relations between independent African countries and the former colonial powers and other imperialist countries and at expanding international ties; they want freedom to choose their path of development and equal participation by African countries in solving international problems. The drive to attain this many-sided objective revolutionizes all of Africa's political developments.

Newly independent countries use both domestic and foreign policy means in this drive. The awareness of the need to mobilize all efforts, typical of most governments, was recorded by the 1960 conference of independent African countries and the first OAU forums. At the same time, the diversity and complexity of the task of comprehensive African decolonization has imposed and still imposes considerable limitations on the attempts to implement it promptly.

A policy document of Zambia's ruling party, adopted in 1967, stressed that an act of political independence meant only the first stage in the extremely protracted process of decolonization; that apparently it would be impossible to complete this process within the lifetime of one generation; that in many aspects it would be even more difficult than the winning of political independence. The difficulties of this process are compounded by the fact that newly independent countries remain within the world capitalist economic system, by their economic, trade, financial, technological and other dependence on the former colonial powers and other imperialist countries.

No wonder that African diplomacy was initially not very vigorous in tackling the eradication of the holdovers of colonial oppression, in the struggle to strengthen political sovereignty and secure economic independence; it was only reflected in appropriate resolutions of the OAU. But, even unable to take any practical collective action against the former colonial powers and other imperialist countries, the very

expression of Africa's common will in these resolutions succeeded in considerably restricting neocolonialist freedom of action in Africa. The interconnection between the resolve of some OAU countries and their vigorous joint diplomacy in intensifying efforts at complete and comprehensive decolonization emerges here more clearly than in the solution of other tasks. The effectiveness and importance of African diplomacy grew gradually as the number of the OAU members increased who resolutely strengthened their political independence and took practical steps to ensure their economic emancipation. This became especially obvious from the early 1970s.

Generally, one can say that OAU solidarity was among the important factors which almost completely freed the continent from French, British and US troops and military bases. By the mid-1970s the unequal treaties and agreements on military, political and economic cooperation imposed on Africa by the former colonial powers and other imperialist nations had been mostly revised and replaced with new agreements more favorable to African interests.

Direct collective pressure is the most effective method in the struggle against aggression and interference used by the OAU members to influence the imperialist powers and their allies. The OAU countries proved their ability in this regard by their joint severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973. As the May 1974 Soviet-Nigerian Communiqué noted, by their common decisions and actions the OAU countries "have greatly contributed to the favorable change in the international situation".¹⁸ In 1980 the OAU Assembly in Freetown demanded that Britain restore to Mauritius the Chagos Archipelago together with the island of Diego Garcia where the Americans had built a military base. This opened a new stage in the joint struggle of African countries for the removal of that base. Collective pressure is the most promising method of African diplomacy.

In recent years, the OAU countries have been working on the forms and methods of joint diplomatic protection of their interests in the struggle for economic emancipation. Today, Africa's economic diplomacy has rallied almost all the OAU countries around it, including those which only recently were afraid to openly oppose the former colonial powers and other Western nations.

In May 1973 the OAU adopted an economic program of African diplomacy. For the first time it proclaimed the firm resolution of all independent African countries to attain economic independence and identified the main principles of joint and individual action in this direction. These principles include: constantly and jointly protecting the inalienable sovereignty and control of African countries over their natural resources; asserting the common African interests at all international economic and currency negotiations, especially with capitalist countries and their economic alliances; coordinating positions and intensifying trade and cooperation between African and socialist countries; strengthening the common front with the de-

veloping countries of other continents.

African diplomacy is already implementing these principles. The OAU countries used them as the basis for collective talks with the EEC in 1973 and 1974. As a result, independent African countries secured certain concessions from the EEC under the 1975 Lomé Convention. African countries acted similarly when, together with Caribbean and Pacific nations, they held talks with the EEC from July 1978, which ended in the signing of the Second Lomé Convention in September 1979.

Gradually, African countries are arriving at the conclusion that it is necessary to bring collective economic pressure to bear on the neo-colonialist powers and monopolies which depend to a considerable degree on African raw materials and trade. President Sangoulé Lamizana of Upper Volta said in this connection that Africans were encouraged by the success of the oil-exporting countries.¹⁹ The OAU countries lead in the struggle of the nonaligned and other developing nations for changing the entire system of international economic relations on the basis of equitability and mutual benefit. The role Africa and African diplomacy play in this struggle was acknowledged at the 1976 conference of nonaligned countries in Colombo. Its political declaration stressed that it was precisely Africa which provided the impetus to the demands for a new international economic order.

The record shows that prompt eradication of the holdovers of colonial oppression in the economic, cultural, educational and other domestic spheres of newly independent countries' development is organically linked to the decolonization of their international relations. In Africa, this decolonization above all means the winning of an independent and equal place in the world and the diversification and expansion of foreign relations, previously focused mostly on the colonial power. This extremely important foreign policy task has emerged as the exclusive mission of the OAU countries' diplomacy which has been very active in it from the start both on the national and the all-African level.

African diplomacy tackles this problem especially graphically and effectively at the United Nations.

One should note the difference in the way the former colonial rulers and the socialist countries responded to the appearance of African diplomats on the international scene. Those social strata in capitalist countries who had been weaned on the ideas of racist and other superiority over colonial peoples and were convinced that Africans were savages fit to live only in the jungle were shocked to see, at conferences in the early 1960s, young Africans in European clothes who turned out to be government ministers. These Westerners could not understand where Africans like that came from. It took the West many years to realize that Africans were people like any other.

The socialist community approached Africans, their countries and

diplomats on the basis of complete equality from the very beginning. "Some would have us believe," the Soviet representative said at the 16th session of the UN General Assembly in 1961, "that Africans are not yet ready for independence, that they are allegedly incapable of performing the complex functions of government. But Africa has already produced many prominent statesmen and political figures. Are the diplomats of newly independent African countries whose brilliant speeches we have closely followed here inferior in any way to all of us who have graduated from the European school of diplomacy?"²⁰

Indeed, African diplomats soon overcame their initial inexperience and attracted attention by their skill in safeguarding the interests of their countries and Africa in general. Coupled with the support they received from the Soviet Union, the rest of the socialist community and the nonaligned countries, this transformed most new African countries from "cogs" in the Western "voting machinery" into an independent and influential force at the UN already in the 1960s.

The overall course of African diplomacy vis-à-vis the United Nations was identified in a 1967 OAU Assembly resolution. Its aims are maximum advantages for individual African countries and, when necessary, for regional and continent-wide African projects, as well as effective and full representation of African interests at the UN and in its specialized agencies. The resolution also said that African diplomacy was to constantly strive for rationally and effectively aiding in the solution of international problems.

Commanding almost one-third of the votes at the UN (50 of 157 in 1982), African countries pursue this course vigorously. They have secured greater African representation in the Security Council, the ECOSOC and other UN bodies, as well as the choice of Africa as the host continent for some of these bodies and for sessions of others. African diplomats successfully preside over sessions of the UN General Assembly and its bodies and hold top-level posts at the United Nations and in its specialized agencies. The African group is among the most active regional groups at the UN in raising important international questions.

Vigorous African diplomacy has introduced much that is new into the United Nations and contributed to the UN's turn toward more intensive efforts aimed at the eradication of the colonial system. In this connection the West began to talk about a "paralysis of the UN", a "tyranny of the majority", to claim, as the West German periodical *Afrika heute* wrote, that "ruthless attacks against the imperialist powers led into an impasse".²¹ In actual fact, however, it is not African diplomacy but that of some Western powers which hampers the UN by its refusal to comply with just demands of decolonization, to reckon with the spirit of the times.

Facts prove that African diplomacy at the UN attains maximum efficiency when African delegations act jointly with other, above all,

socialist delegations. The coordination of positions on specific questions in the so-called contact groups of regional groups at UN sessions usually guarantees the adoption of a given decision. Today, even in the Security Council where imperialist powers have the right of veto, the West often does not dare reject decisions it dislikes.

African diplomacy at the UN has salient features of its own. For example, there is an obvious desire to demonstrate, as Doudou Thiam, former Foreign Minister of Senegal, said, that "decolonization is their own [African countries']—*Ed.*] affair and that initiative in this field fully belongs to them, while the Eastern [socialist.—*Ed.*] countries can only support them".²² There is also the constant striving to focus UN activities above all on the issues of economic development for newly independent countries, to revise the UN Charter and impose decisions on the UN which do not properly reflect the interests of other nations dedicated to peace.

Efforts to oppose African interests to those of other antiimperialist forces run counter both to the international and the truly national interests of the newly free states. In many of them, the governments are aware of this and work to strengthen the antiimperialist solidarity of African diplomacy with that of the socialist countries. For its part, the socialist community does all it can to protect African diplomacy from a possible turn to reactionary nationalism which harms the cause of freedom, universal peace and security.

One cannot examine the successes, failures or salient features of African diplomacy in isolation from the way young African countries develop their relations with other nations. By early 1982 40 African countries had joined the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, having thus formalized their equality in such relations with all the signatories of the convention. Still, relations of newly independent African countries with each of the major groups of nations existing today have distinctive traits of their own.

The establishment of relations with the socialist world was the most important indication of decolonization in the international ties of independent African countries. One can say that most OAU countries saw rapprochement with the socialist nations as a way to balance their international ties and reduce their dependence on the West. Most OAU members established diplomatic relations with many socialist countries within the first two years of independence. For example, by 1982 only two of the 50 independent African countries, Malawi and Swaziland, had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (relations with the Ivory Coast were established but later severed).

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union highlighted the interconnection between the degree of dependence of a given African country on the West, the desire to be free of this dependence and the rates at which cooperation with the socialist world developed. The countries which were the first to establish diplomatic relations and are now developing friendly cooperation with the Soviet

Union have advanced farthest in their national liberation and social emancipation, and vice versa. This interconnection could also be traced in the recognition of the GDR and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam by African countries. Aside from that, there is an obvious correlation between the rate at which relations with socialist countries develop and the diplomatic activity of African countries—many OAU countries that were prompt in establishing relations with the socialist world are also known as the more active members of the African group.

Bilateral relations are the most typical of the ties between African and socialist countries. Besides, the socialist world has recently begun to develop multilateral contacts with Africa too, for example, through the CMEA.

Of course, the road to cooperation between Africa and socialist countries is not easy. Western propaganda and reactionary nationalist ideas sometimes distort the picture of relations the OAU countries have with the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist world. Egypt and Somalia have even abrogated their friendship and cooperation treaties with the USSR. However, firm, stable, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation and antiimperialist solidarity with the socialist world has remained the dominant African trend. For its part, the Soviet Union will do everything within its power to develop and strengthen friendship with those who really want it.

The relations of African countries with the ex-colonial and other imperialist powers differ somewhat from the expectations born of decolonization and independence slogans in the early 1960s. All newly independent states, including socialist-oriented countries, have largely retained broad contacts with their former colonial powers. These ties, both bilateral and multilateral, are maintained, among other things, through the Commonwealth, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (among French-speaking countries) and other similar organizations.

However, the trend toward restricting the preferential treatment of the former colonial powers and reducing their political influence is growing steadily in Africa. Many governments are deliberately bolstering this trend. Ties have been established and are being developed with other Western nations—above all those in which African countries are especially interested in economic terms: the EEC countries, the United States and Japan. This has ended the monopoly the former colonial powers enjoyed in influencing African international ties.

The development of inter-African contacts and African relations with Asian and Latin American countries also has its unique features. Foremost among them is, it appears, the fact that the development of direct bilateral relations between individual countries clearly lags behind the growth of multilateral relations in international organizations they all belong to. The lack or extreme weakness of trade and economic ties with other developing countries by the time of inde-

pendence and the fact that it was impossible to count on economic or technical assistance from that source have led to a situation where African countries were for long content to maintain mostly political cooperation among themselves within the OAU, while with other developing countries, through the United Nations, the nonaligned movement, the Group of 77 and various international conferences. Consequently, all-African diplomacy has broader prospects in this field than the diplomacy of individual African countries.

It was only in the early 1970s that African countries became more active in developing bilateral ties and establishing diplomatic relations with one another. A new element, dangerous for African unity and peace, has been introduced by the increasingly frequent military agreements between some OAU countries. In the 1970s the African states displayed particular interest in establishing close contacts with the oil-producing Arab states which had by then become capable of providing loans. Bilateral ties are expanding with Asian and Latin American countries.

Beginning with Randung (1955), African diplomacy has forged especially close political cooperation with its Asian counterpart. This cooperation grew, among other things, within the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations. In the 1970s cooperation began between the OAU and the Arab League, and a completely new form of Afro-Asian international organization emerged—the Islamic Conference, based on "Muslim solidarity".

The multilateral cooperation of African states with Asian and other developing countries is advancing on the basis of their antiimperialist solidarity in the struggle for political equality on the world scene, a radical restructuring of international economic relations, and social and economic emancipation. The strengthening of political solidarity among the nonaligned and other developing countries can be regarded as a long-term and dominant trend of African diplomacy.

4. The Course Toward Nonalignment

African countries adopted the course toward nonalignment from Asian countries. But "African nonalignment" is better developed because it implies a unity Asia lacks: African governments have not only refused to join blocs but also set up the OAU, the first continent-wide organization of nonaligned countries. Nonalignment has been included in the OAU Charter as a major principle of the organization. The OAU countries share the conviction voiced by the foreign minister of Tanzania that "there can be no alternative to nonalignment"²³ in their involvement in world politics.

The principal meaning which the notion of "African nonalignment" has for the OAU governments was explained in the special resolution of the 1964 OAU Assembly which recommended that they coordi-

nated their foreign policy with due regard for the fact that nonalignment to blocs did not mean passive neutrality and was the only acceptable means of ensuring Africa's freedom, stability and prosperity; that they strengthened, first and foremost, African unity and Afro-Asian solidarity so as to completely eradicate imperialism in all its forms and preserve international peace and security; and that all obligations running counter to a consistent nonalignment policy be abrogated as soon as possible.

Since the danger of African involvement in military blocs stemmed from the former colonial and other NATO powers to which many African countries were still bound by political and military obligations, African nonalignment has been expressly antiimperialist from the beginning. Despite NATO efforts, almost all the OAU members have gradually joined the nonaligned movement. As the political declaration of the Colombo summit said, "Africa gave a firm anticolonial and antiracist content to the movement."²⁴

However, the record shows that African nonalignment to blocs is often feasible only in organizational terms. In politics, many African countries are unable to keep "nonaligned". To a certain degree, this is rooted in ideological closeness or hostility, likes and dislikes, identical or different political interests. In actual fact, most African countries, while refusing to join blocs, still make a choice which depends on their objective interests. By and large, their positions are closer to those of the socialist countries than to those of the former colonial powers or the United States. This becomes clear at each session of the UN General Assembly.

The closeness of African and socialist antiimperialist interests is reflected in many issues, including, naturally, decolonization, the strengthening of peace and universal security, a curb on the arms race, and disarmament. Essentially, African diplomacy supports Soviet initiatives on these issues at the United Nations and welcomes the Soviet policy of detente. The confession of *The Diplomatist*, a British periodical, is especially revealing: "Whether knowingly or unknowingly, whether with determination or reluctance, Africa both Arab and black is now as solidly behind communist diplomacy as any third party could possibly be."²⁵ With very few exceptions, African diplomacy does not side with aggressive imperialist action and is quite critical of imperialist diplomatic initiatives.

The essence of nonalignment is the same in Africa and in the developing countries of other continents. Young sovereign states belong neither to the imperialist nor to the socialist system. Meanwhile, most of them have not yet broken free of the world capitalist economy, although they occupy a special place in it. Hence the certain duality in the policy of African and other nonaligned countries, their limited antiimperialism in nonalignment, the obvious contradiction between their radical demands proclaimed publicly and the moderate course in their actual implementation. Coupled with nationalist views,

this allows for different interpretations of nonalignment in different African countries—from decisively antiimperialist to those based on “complete neutrality”, “equidistance” and even the notion of “neither left nor right nor in the middle”.

In fact, however, nonalignment is often seen in Africa not as a foreign policy principle but rather as a tactical diplomatic method, when contradictions between the socialist and the capitalist system are deliberately downplayed, the world is divided into “rich and poor nations”. The “rich” group is treated as comprising the imperialist and the socialist countries, including the USSR, while all the “poor nations”, Africa included, are opposed to this group. Attempts are intensifying to make the concept of dividing the world by wealth an ideological foundation of the nonaligned movement. African and other nonaligned countries use it especially widely in their “economic diplomacy”, making the same demands on all “rich nations”. But Africa’s nonaligned countries also use this approach in their political diplomacy. For example, initially, in November 1975-January 1976, precisely half the OAU members advanced demands that foreign intervention in Angola cease and made no distinction between the racist aggressors with their sponsors from overseas and the Soviet Union together with Cuba who had been requested by the Angolan government to assist the country in repulsing these aggressors.

In assessing the correlation between the issues of peace and decolonization, the diplomacy of many African countries somewhat underrates the former. In this connection certain OAU countries refuse to take part in the principal international treaties and conventions on disarmament signed over the past decade and designed to ensure universal security. Besides, Africa, not so long ago a victim of a European conspiracy on the partition and re-partition of the continent, to a certain degree distrusts detente among the great powers, fearing that it might damage the interests of African nations. Obviously, this approach is prejudicial to the unity and opportunities of the world antiimperialist forces in their struggle for peace and security.

To complete the assessment of certain features in African nonalignment one should mention that many African leaders openly acknowledge their pragmatism in international relations. The ousted emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire (now Republic) was apparently the most outspoken in this regard: explaining his vacillation during the Angolan crisis, he said in January 1976 that before taking a definite position in relation to any country he always “itemized” the assistance it provided.

Obviously, distinctive features in the diplomacy of individual African countries affect all-African diplomacy too. However, the latter levels out, as it were, the sometimes conflicting positions of individual countries and arrives at a common, generally acceptable position. That is why African nonalignment is, on the whole, more stable and clearly follows trends that are most typical of Africa.

Of special interest in this connection is the question of the limitations and trends in the development of antiimperialism in African nonalignment, especially concerning non-African international problems and conflicts. The record tells us that a selective approach to such problems and conflicts is typical of African diplomacy; the degree of its activity is in direct proportion to the immediate interest Africa displays in their settlement, and its antiimperialism has definite limitations. This is borne out by the fact that the OAU (unlike some of its members) never came out against the US aggression in Vietnam and that it regularly condemned NATO not as an aggressive imperialist bloc per se but merely for its support of colonial and racist regimes in Africa.

Gradually, however, the antiimperialist element in African nonalignment is expanding and becoming one of its foremost trends. Especially typical in this regard is the evolution of African diplomacy vis-a-vis the Mideast conflict.

Initially, in June-July 1967, most countries of Tropical Africa, invoking the principle of nonalignment, tried either to completely avoid expressing their attitude to the conflict and the parties to it, or make public statements only from positions of neutrality, which in actual fact played into the hands of Israel and those who sponsored its aggression. At that time African diplomacy split between its Arab and non-Arab parts.

However, from 1968 on, each session of the OAU Assembly has confirmed the growth of antiimperialist, anti-Israeli and anti-American feelings in Africa, bridging the gap in African diplomacy. The Mideast problem began to be viewed as concerning all of Africa, and today OAU decisions unequivocally condemn Israel as the aggressor, demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and express solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine. The 1980 OAU Assembly in Freetown came out in support of preserving the historical status and character of Jerusalem and against separate accords on the Middle East. The Mideast conflict is the first issue on which African diplomacy as a whole, and at its own initiative, pursues a resolutely antiimperialist course.

Gradually, a trend is emerging in African diplomacy toward close involvement in questions of peace and universal security, fuller and direct African participation in their solution, and greater democracy in international relations. African diplomacy is becoming active in all issues of world politics. This new development is typical of the entire nonaligned movement and bears out its fundamental evolution. Today, African countries attach increasing importance to the nonaligned movement and its role in international affairs. For example, Christian Alusip Kamara-Taylor, Vice-President of Sierra Leone, has noted that his government pursues a foreign policy of nonalignment and positive neutrality, based on the principles of respect for national independence, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and equality.

Accordingly, he has added, Sierra Leone has for many years maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union and experienced the beneficial impact of Soviet foreign policy. The Vice-President has reiterated his country's desire to strengthen the already existing fraternal friendship between the two nations.²⁶

The so-called African solutions to African problems are another distinctive feature of African nonalignment. This term, widespread and accepted in Africa, implies the striving of its diplomacy to settle various conflicts within and among the OAU countries under its own power, without assistance from the UN or any non-African country. The search for and implementation of "African solutions to African problems" are aimed, first and foremost, at preventing interference, covert or open aggression by the imperialist powers. This approach proved especially effective in settling inter-African conflicts.

In recent years, especially during and after the events in Angola, "African solutions to African problems" became the subject of extremely heated debate in the OAU. To a large degree this was the result of a change in the African tactics of neocolonialism which is today trying to turn this antiimperialist method of African diplomacy against the Soviet Union, Cuba and the socialist community as a whole. In the course of its new counteroffensive against the forces of national liberation and social emancipation in Africa, imperialism has begun to lend widespread support to this method in order to camouflage its interference in African affairs.

However, recent developments prove that, in the final analysis, most African countries do arrive at a correct solution to this question and rebuff all those who distort the antiimperialist content of nonalignment. For example, the debate in the Security Council in early 1976 and in the autumn of 1981 over the question of the South African aggression against Angola turned into a real battle of African and other nonaligned countries against imperialist and reactionary forces. The attempts by the advocates of an anti-Soviet view of "African solutions to African problems" to prevent Ethiopia from using the assistance of socialist countries in its struggle against the Somali aggression of 1977-1978 also ended in political failure. At the Khartoum Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, in 1978, progressive African forces substantiated and asserted the right of newly independent countries to internationalist assistance from the socialist community. Most OAU countries refused to follow the Western lead, thus reaffirming their antiimperialist choice in nonalignment. They held a similar position at the 16th Assembly session convened in Monrovia (Liberia) in July 1979 and at subsequent sessions.

Nonalignment is a long-term course of African diplomacy. Like the nonaligned movement in general, so far it cannot be recognized as fully established; the durability of the trends emerging in nonalignment is yet to be tested by time. But each of these trends is now an important variable, not to be overlooked in the algebra of international relations.

Chapter Three

INDEPENDENT AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY

1. A New Type of International Relations

For many decades colonial African countries were not subjects of international relations. Apart from Ethiopia and Liberia, nominally sovereign but actually colonially dependent states, and South Africa, all others were ruled by imperialist powers. Everything relating to their contacts with the outside world was decided in European capitals.

African peoples launched their courageous struggle for the right to take their destiny into their own hands before the Soviet Union was born. But it is historically incontrovertible that only with the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 and later with the defeat of the fascist aggressors in World War II in which the Soviet people played the decisive role, and with the emergence and development of the socialist community that the national liberation movement in Africa began its vigorous struggle to destroy the foundations of colonial rule. "The October Revolution and the changes in the global alignment of forces," former President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria said at the Algiers Nonaligned Conference, "have made a historic contribution to creating favorable conditions which ensured success in the struggle for national independence waged by the countries under imperialist domination."¹

Having won political independence, African countries emerged on the international scene as sovereign states, joined the United Nations and established diplomatic relations with most countries. But the strengthening of independence remains a topical issue with Africa. The main reason is that imperialism, using the previously established system of inequitable relations with the now independent countries, and their backwardness, economic dependence, lack of social advancement, as well as resorting to new means of subjugation, is trying to turn their independence and sovereignty into empty words and continue to exploit them through allegedly equitable relations.

The socialist community plays a great role in strengthening Africa's independence and in its struggle against exploitation. As the Soviet government said in its statement on the restructuring of international economic relations, "but for the Soviet Union, socialism and the reliable support it provides, imperialism would have nipped in the bud

all attempts by the now free countries at attaining genuine national independence.”²

The new type of international relations promoted by socialist countries is diametrically opposed to the system of relations typical of imperialist countries. Marx and Engels proclaimed that the mission of the working class was to make international relations democratic, to establish the “simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount to the intercourse of nations”.³ They linked the emergence of a new, just system of international relations which would rule out exploitation to the victory of socialist revolutions. “In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to,” the *Communist Manifesto* said, “the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to.”⁴

Analyzing the new historical conditions brought forth by the victorious socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin concluded that socialism establishes “completely different international relations which make it possible for all oppressed peoples to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke”.⁵ What, then, are the main principles of this new type of international relations which encourage an overwhelming majority of independent African countries to develop and strengthen friendly cooperation with the socialist nations?

The content and principles of the foreign policy pursued by socialist countries are determined by their social system which has eliminated exploiter classes and handed power over to the people who are building developed socialism and communism. This social system is organically incapable of launching wars or aggression. The very nature of socialism makes it imperative to fight for peace, against aggressive imperialist policy, for peaceful coexistence among nations. Foreseeing a future world system of socialist countries, Marx and Engels displayed their brilliant vision when they wrote that “in contrast to old society, with its economical miseries and its political delirium, a new society is springing up, whose International rule will be *Peace*, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same—*Labour!*”⁶

The enemies of socialism, imperialist and revisionist propaganda are trying to deceive the nations, including Africans, by spreading inventions about the “communist menace” and the “aggressive nature” of socialist countries. However, facts prove that since its inception not a single member of the socialist community has ever taken any aggressive action against other countries. On the contrary, this community has always vigorously rebuffed aggressions and wars launched by imperialists, racists and chauvinist reactionaries; it has always extended all-round support to the victims of aggressive policies. This is true of Africa too: take Egypt in the latter half of the 1950s, Nigeria in the 1960s, Guinea, Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s. “The fight against freedom and justice by retrogressive forces is ... stepped up,” Shadreck Joshua Soko, member of Zambia’s UNIP CC, justly observed

at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. “The intentions of those forces are obvious: to divide the African people; to weaken the march to freedom and independence; and to buy time for the continued exploitation and plunder of black workers’ efforts and natural resources in Southern Africa. In the same vein, racism, torture and exploitation of the majority by the minority continue in Southern Africa. Therefore, I should like to reiterate my country’s long-standing view that the Soviet Union ... must continue with the commendable work it is doing in exposing and condemning the complicity of the racists and imperialists for perpetuating exploitation of the majority by the minority and depriving the majority of workers of their efforts’ worth.”⁷

Together with the struggle for peace, internationalist support for the peoples opposing imperialists and bellicose reactionaries is among the foremost principles of the new type of international relations. Earlier, when imperialism held sway throughout the world, African peoples had no one they could rely on for support in their liberation struggle. Today, the world socialist community is an ally of peoples both already independent and those still fighting for their freedom, of the national liberation movement. For example, the Declaration by the Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee of November 23, 1978 says: “The socialist states resolutely support the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia in their selfless struggle for the earliest possible attainment of national independence. They express their solidarity with the just struggle of the people of South Africa for the elimination of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination. They condemn attempts to impose on the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa neocolonialist solutions which are alien to them and can threaten this region with new conflicts.”⁸

The internationalist foreign policy pursued by socialist countries enhances Africa’s desire to cooperate with the socialist community on the basis of peaceful coexistence. In March 1978, while on a state visit to the USSR, Prime Minister Ahmed Osman of Morocco said: “We know ... that the USSR, proceeding from an underlying principle of the Decree on Peace, the first legislative act of the Soviet Republic adopted at Lenin’s initiative in 1917, strives for peaceful coexistence among nations, and that the new Constitution has again reiterated it now, 60 years later, having proclaimed that the Soviet Union ‘steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace’.”⁹

Today, almost all independent African countries cooperate with the socialist community, precisely on the basis of the principles inherent in the new type of international relations, born of and enhanced by socialism. In all the joint documents of African and socialist countries these principles are proclaimed as the basis of international relations.

The socialist type of international relations is genuinely democratic. It really establishes the foundations of cooperation with African and other developing nations: sovereign equality, mutual renunciation of the threat or use of force, inviolability of borders, territorial in-

tegrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, the right of nations to be masters of their destiny, support of the struggle for national liberation and social progress. Besides, socialist countries look for no unilateral advantages in Africa, do not strive for political or economic domination. They do not have companies in Africa which operate for the sake of securing maximum profit. The cooperation between socialist and African countries is based on full equality, and socialist countries treat African problems with understanding.

The essentially new type of relations between socialist and developing countries exerts a progressive impact on the entire system of international relations and its legal basis. The principles of noninterference in internal affairs, the inviolability of borders, respect for sovereignty and others, formalized in the OAU Charter, have become norms of international law. African countries proceed from them in their efforts to strengthen their independence, and in advocating peaceful settlement of conflicts, including those stemming from territorial claims.

An analysis of the new type of international relations should stress another important aspect: understanding and trust between African and socialist countries. This is very topical because those who oppose friendship between socialist and African countries resort to various slanderous inventions and try to undermine their cooperation and isolate African states from the socialist community. Socialist countries have never exploited anyone. They have been creating their national wealth by their selfless and increasingly efficient labor, by taking fully into account, and using sparingly and on a planned basis, their domestic resources. Social property in the means of production and the consequently planned basis of the economy which rules out crises and anarchy in production, the democratization of economic and social management—these are the principal factors ensuring the success of the socialist community in all economic and social spheres.

Socialism does not permit any country to develop by exploiting another—this fundamental principle is especially important for developing African countries. Hence the new type of socialist international relations which makes any forms of exploitation or subjugation of other nations impossible. Hence the expanded, equal and friendly cooperation between socialist and African countries.

Naturally, relations between African and socialist countries do not always develop smoothly. Reactionary nationalist quarters still exert considerable influence both in the social sphere and on the foreign policy of a number of African countries. Allying themselves with imperialism and often directly dependent on it, these quarters use chauvinism to launch aggression and conflicts in Africa.

Socialist countries have never supported and will never support such reckless moves and conflicts. The new type of international relations is incompatible either with reactionary nationalism or with

chauvinism, its extreme manifestation, or with aggression. Typical in this regard is the statement by the Soviet government of June 23, 1978 concerning the aggravation of African tensions due to the aggressive moves by the leading NATO countries headed by the United States. The statement noted that international imperialism had recently started an offensive against the national liberation forces in Africa in order to again impose its diktat on African peoples. The document also exposed the forms and methods of joint action by imperialist countries.

The socialist nations develop their relations with African countries on the basis of internationalism, one of the foremost principles of the new type of international relations. Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU: "Together with the other socialist countries, we are also helping to strengthen the defense capability of newly free states if they request such aid. This was the case with, say, Angola and Ethiopia. Attempts were made to crush the people's revolutions in these countries by encouraging domestic counter-revolution or by outside aggression. We are against the export of revolution, and we cannot agree to any export of counter-revolution either."¹⁰ Africans themselves say that the internationalism of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has won them great prestige in Africa.

On the whole, cooperation between African and socialist countries is advancing, demonstrating a new type of equitable relations previously unknown in Africa.

2. Distinctive Features in the Political Relations Between Socialist-Oriented African Countries and the Socialist Nations

In our revolutionary era of worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism a large group of socialist-oriented countries has emerged in Africa. They have proclaimed socialist construction as their future goal and are carrying out progressive transformations in the interests of the working masses. These countries are Guinea, Ethiopia, Algeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Madagascar and others. The Institute of African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences has calculated that the zone of socialist orientation in Africa and Asia today comprises over 12 million square kilometers and about 150 million people.

The intensity and scope of socio-economic transformations are different in different socialist-oriented countries, depending on specific conditions, the alignment of class forces, the degree of cultural and educational development, the growth and the political consciousness of the working class, etc. But what is common to all socialist-oriented African countries is their consistent and resolute struggle

against imperialism, for the elimination of the relations of exploitation, for peace, social progress and stronger multilateral ties with world socialism.

Socialist-oriented countries lead in the national liberation movement, dealing powerful blows at the imperialist system. That is the reason why imperialists and reactionaries use various means to divert them from the chosen path and undermine their independence and sovereignty.

Faced with incessant neocolonialist subversion on the part of imperialism, several socialist-oriented countries consolidate their international positions with support from the Soviet Union and other socialist nations. Let us consider, as an example, the principles underlying relations between Angola and the Soviet Union. They are formalized in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Angola, signed in Moscow on October 8, 1976.

Article 1 deals with the generally accepted international legal norms of relations among countries: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and equality. These principles are typical of the Soviet Union's relations with all countries, irrespective of their systems. Article 2 reads: "The High Contracting Parties declare that they shall exercise close and all-round cooperation in ensuring conditions for the preservation and further development of the socio-economic gains of their peoples and for respecting the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources." Article 5 reiterates that "the Parties shall cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just fight of nations for sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress". Angolan leaders have noted that Article 10 is especially important for their country. This Article stresses: "In the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the High Contracting Parties, they shall continue to promote cooperation in the military field on the basis of corresponding agreements concluded between them."¹¹

The people and the government of Angola value highly their treaty with the Soviet Union and their relations with other socialist countries. In the hour of trial, when independent Angola fell victim to racist and imperialist aggression, the socialist community helped this socialist-oriented African country. "In the face of the new threats of imperialist circles, particularly of the United States of America," José Eduardo Dos Santos, President of the People's Republic of Angola and Chairman of the MPLA—Party of Labor, said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the peoples are rallying for new battles, confident that they will be backed by the aid of the socialist camp and in particular of the Soviet Union, bastion of world peace... In this context cooperation with the socialist camp is acquiring more and more dynamic forms corresponding to the will of our parties and peoples to tighten their mutually advantageous ties in all fields." He specially stressed

the "important contribution of the very capable Cuban internationalists who, side by side with MPLA's fighters, made sacrifices and died so that Angola could safeguard its independence and create the conditions for building a new society".¹²

With the help of the socialist nations another African country, Ethiopia, crushed Somalia's chauvinist aggression which was supported by imperialist and reactionary forces. During his official friendly visit to Moscow in October 1980, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia, expressed the profound gratitude of his people to the Soviet people for their crucial assistance to the Ethiopian revolution. Speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU he said: "At present, Ethiopia is one of the developing countries that attract the special attention of the forces of imperialism and reaction... Our revolution is a target of constant hostile attacks, because Ethiopia occupies an important strategic position. But our revolution will stand its ground, for it enjoys the internationalist support of the world's progressive forces... Our struggle and our victories are the struggle and victories of all the forces of socialism. We are firmly convinced that, relying on the internationalist support of these forces, revolutionary Ethiopia will erect a solid foundation of freedom, justice and prosperity, and will in turn honestly fulfil its internationalist duty."¹³

The socialist nations invariably support the firm course of those African countries who see their foremost mission in ensuring conditions for building socialist society and strive to strengthen their cooperation with the socialist community.

Marx and Engels argued that the victory of socialism in the more developed capitalist nations would also considerably influence countries with precapitalist economies, would "completely change and greatly accelerate their previous manner of development"¹⁴ and would act "as a powerful means of considerably shortening their advance to socialist society".¹⁵

This was the idea of noncapitalist development, specified and developed by Lenin after the victory of the October Revolution in Russia. In the July 26, 1920 report of the Commission on the National and the Colonial Questions to the Second Congress of the Communist International he said: "The question was posed as follows: are we to consider as correct the assertion that the capitalist stage of economic development is inevitable for backward nations now on the road to emancipation and among whom a certain advance towards progress is to be seen since the war? We replied in the negative. If the victorious revolutionary proletariat conducts systematic propaganda among them, and the Soviet governments come to their aid with all the means at their disposal—in that event it will be mistaken to assume that the backward peoples must inevitably go through the capitalist stage of development... With the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and,

through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage.”¹⁶ Today, we see the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin about noncapitalist development realized successfully in socialist-oriented African and Asian countries.

And now about the conditions the founders of Marxism-Leninism considered paramount for building socialism in any country.

First, it is the elimination of private property in the means of production and the establishment of social property in them. Marx and Engels wrote that “modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few”.¹⁷

Second, the strengthening of the international alliance among the working people of different countries, above all of the alliance with the people of the countries where socialism has won. Marx stressed that “disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggle for emancipation, will be chastised by ... discomfiture”.¹⁸

The social development of socialist-oriented Afro-Asian countries fully bears out these conclusions. There is broad democratization of political and social processes in an overwhelming majority of countries which are working steadily and resolutely to do away with exploiter relations based on private property. These countries are effectively advancing toward their proclaimed goal—socialist construction, and this helps them to strengthen their internationalist unity with the USSR and other nations of existing socialism.

At the same time, facts prove that when a country turns private enterprise loose, succumbs to nationalist ideas and ignores the alliance with the socialist community, this gravely damages the cause of socialist orientation. Progress toward socialist construction is suspended—suspended because sooner or later all Asian and African countries will attain socialism, the most progressive and just social system.

This shapes another distinctive feature in the cooperation between socialist-oriented African and Asian countries and the socialist nations. The latter have accumulated a wealth of theoretical knowledge and practical experience in building socialism. Hence the Africans’ desire to extract from the experience of the socialist nations all that is necessary, that meets the distinctly African conditions of their development and would help them build socialism. In the message of greetings from the Tanzanian people on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, Kigoma Ali Malima, member of the Central Committee of the United Republic of Tanzania Revolutionary Party, said: “In Tanzania we are building socialism in accordance with the specific conditions of our country. We have set ourselves this goal and are working to attain it. Ten years have passed since we took the road of building socialism making maximum use of our own resources.

During this time we have applied and studied your 60-year experience. Your achievements have strengthened our faith in the enormous potential of the collective efforts of the nation in building socialism, which corresponds to the radical interests of the masses.”¹⁹

Each year the Marxist-Leninist parties of the socialist nations and the revolutionary-democratic parties of socialist-oriented African and Asian countries expand their contacts and exchange delegations. This is typical of relations between the two groups of countries, and it helps create a climate of trust and foster friendship between them.

Today, socialist orientation is gaining worldwide recognition as a scientific concept of social development for many Asian and African countries. Revolutionary democrats are at the head of this trend, and their more advanced elements are gradually turning to scientific socialism. This is an additional factor in the understanding which is developing between Marxists in the socialist nations and revolutionary democrats in African and Asian countries.

Relations between socialist-oriented African countries and the socialist states take different and constantly improving shapes. These include economic and scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, assistance by socialist countries in creating a public sector, expanded contacts in the fields of science, culture and art, etc. We will discuss these questions in detail further on.

Analyzing capitalism at its final, imperialist stage, Lenin concluded that the collapse of imperialism through revolution would not be simultaneous throughout the world. “Uneven economic and political development,” he wrote, “is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone.”²⁰

History has borne out this scientific forecast Lenin made. In October 1917 socialist revolution won in Russia, the weakest link in the imperialist system and the focal point of its contradictions. However, it was a country where the necessary conditions for the victory of socialism had arisen (the proletariat was revolutionary, organized, greatly experienced in the class struggle and led by a Marxist-Leninist party, the Russian bourgeoisie was weak, etc.). Before World War II Mongolia embarked on the socialist road. After the war a number of East European countries and China broke away from the system of imperialism. Socialist revolutions won in Vietnam, Korea and Cuba, and recently in Laos and Cambodia. A world socialist system has emerged, and socialist-oriented countries are growing gradually closer to it.

A socialist principle of vital importance for developing countries is that socialism eliminates the causes condemning backward peoples to still greater backwardness in antagonistic societies. The socialist mode of production and mutual assistance among socialist nations overcome the legacy of backwardness and level out the socio-economic development of backward countries and regions.

The record of the world socialist system demonstrates to developing countries the dynamic economic growth of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries, the steady rise in their peoples' material and cultural standards. The report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of Soviet Communists stressed that "in the past ten years the economic growth rates of the CMEA countries have been twice those of the developed capitalist countries".²¹

Several African countries have proclaimed socialist construction as their goal. The struggle for socialist ideals in these countries proceeds in distinctive historical conditions. Socialist orientation has emerged in countries that have not yet broken free of the world capitalist economic system. The proletariat does not play the leading role in carrying out socio-economic transformations there. Leadership in noncapitalist development is in the hands of revolutionary democrats represented by the more revolutionary, politically conscious and patriotic workers, peasants, radical intellectuals, craftsmen and students. But revolutionary democrats are heterogeneous in their social origin, and some of them at times vacillate in reaching their objectives and are not fully free of nationalist prejudice.

The socio-economic backwardness of African countries, the pre-capitalist relations dominating in many of them, the difference in the specific historical conditions in which socialist orientation has emerged from those in which socialism was built in the USSR, the fact that developing countries belong to the world capitalist economic system—all these factors are taken into consideration by bourgeois science. For example, maintaining that today developing countries lack technological, economic and socio-political prerequisites for socialist construction, certain bourgeois scholars claim that their social development will not lead to socialism. Professor Elliot Berg of the University of Michigan says that "for a number of reasons ... the socialist path to modernization is not likely to bring success in this sense, for the major elements of socialist policy are ill-suited to present African circumstances".²² Similar assertions are made by Willard A. Beling and George O. Totten, editors of *Developing Nations. Quest for a Model*.²³

The progress of the world revolutionary process shows that a country's economic level is no obstacle to a socialist revolution. In all socialist countries it began with the establishment, in various forms, of the dictatorship of the proletariat which entered into an alliance with other strata of the working people. However, winning political power is not an end in itself for the working class; it is merely a means for discharging its chief mission, socialist construction. It also calls for a far-reaching revolutionary transformation of the economy and the entire system of social relations in the interests of the working masses.

It is precisely socialist perspective which enables developing countries to break free of the world capitalist economic system and switch

over to socialist development. There exist today objective and subjective conditions, both theoretically and in practical terms, for developing countries to attain a future transition to socialism bypassing capitalism or stemming its development in the initial stages. These conditions include the growth and strengthening of the world socialist system, its steadily increasing influence on all social developments worldwide, the change in the world balance of forces in favor of socialist and developing countries, revolutionizing processes among the popular masses of developing countries, the growth of revolutionary-democratic parties in these nations, and a number of other factors producing revolutionary transformations. The 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow stressed: "Under the impact of the revolutionary conditions of our time, distinctive forms of progressive social development of the newly free countries have appeared, and the role of revolutionary and democratic forces has been enhanced. Some young states have taken the non-capitalist path, a path which opens up the possibility of overcoming the backwardness ... and creates conditions for transition to socialist development".²⁴

This means that Marxists see noncapitalist development not as identical to the socialist path but as a transition to socialism—in Lenin's words, "a state of transition ... from the old to the new—a state of growth of what is new".²⁵

Noncapitalist development, or socialist orientation, is an entire period of transition in which socio-economic, political, ideological and other prerequisites for socialist construction are created. In historical terms, the duration of this period depends on a broad set of factors, but the socio-political orientation of the government is the decisive element here. A study and summing-up of the noncapitalist experience in Africa shows that successful socialist orientation calls for the following:

- a consistent and resolute struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, against dependence on capitalist monopolies, for a progressive transformation of unjust relations within the world capitalist economic system;

- a steady expansion of multilateral cooperation with the world socialist system, the international mainstay of the development and strengthening of socialist orientation.

These factors have not yet emerged as dominant in all socialist-oriented countries. Rather, one can speak of this or that trend as growing or prevailing. It is obvious, however, that the more revolutionary and far-reaching the anticapitalist transformations in some African countries, the less these states depend on the world capitalist economy and the greater their contribution to the restructuring of the international capitalist division of labor.

Lenin wrote that the road to socialism "will never be straight, it will be incredibly involved".²⁶ Noncapitalist development in Africa

proceeds amid an acute class struggle between progressive and reactionary forces. It can be interrupted when the ruling revolutionary-democratic quarters vacillate in solving the key problems of noncapitalist development, when petty-bourgeois and nationalist sentiment sweeps the country, when the course aimed at strengthening international ties with the world socialist system is undermined, the way it happened in Ghana and then in Egypt and Somalia. However, isolated deviations from socialist orientation or departures from it as a result of reactionary counterattacks supported by imperialism do not at all detract from the profoundly revolutionary nature of the Marxist concept of noncapitalist development. This trend is advancing irresistibly. Developing countries are increasingly attracted to socialism. This is rooted in objective realities, above all in the growing strength of the socialist community, its economic successes and many-sided ties with socialist-oriented African and Asian countries.

3. Cooperation Between Independent Africa and the Socialist Countries at the United Nations and in Other International Organizations

The increase in UN membership brought on by the entry of developing countries has begun to reshape the situation in this organization in keeping with the overall radical changes that have been occurring in the world since independent African, Asian and Latin American countries became active politically. These nations, and especially African countries—because of their numerical strength at the UN—increasingly influence international affairs and the struggle against imperialism, for the complete eradication of colonial and racist holdovers, for disarmament and stronger international security. That is why in the early 1980s the impact of the imperialist powers on UN policies is weakening while the international solidarity of developing and socialist countries is growing stronger.

The foundation for cooperation between independent African countries and the socialist nations at the UN was laid at the time of the United Nations' inception. The Soviet Union did much to make the new organization an effective instrument of international security and to ensure practical realization of its purposes and principles.

The Soviet Union worked vigorously to secure clear-cut formalization in the UN Charter of the key democratic principles of international law: respect for the sovereignty and political independence of all nations, their sovereign equality and self-determination, a ban on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, noninterference into the internal affairs of any nation, and peaceful settlement of international disputes. These principles of the Charter have emerged as the basis of the growing

cooperation between the African group and the socialist countries at the UN.

The Soviet Union's peace initiatives advanced at the UN over the past few years have won broad support on the part of most African countries. These initiatives include, first and foremost, proposals on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, on convening a World Conference on Disarmament, on preventing a nuclear catastrophe, on eliminating all forms of racial discrimination, and the like.

The Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the problems of raw materials and development (April-May 1974) gave an impetus to the anti-imperialist activity of newly independent countries at the UN. The session was convened at the initiative of the developing—above all African—countries supported by the socialist states. At this special session, the political aspects of economic issues (the demand for equality in international relations, the struggle against the imperialist policy of diktat and coercion, the need to comprehensively strengthen the sovereignty of developing countries over their natural resources, etc.) were actually at the heart of all the debates and the decisions adopted.

The Sixth Special Session fully highlighted the cooperation between African and socialist delegations on most questions under discussion. This was reflected in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Among other things, the Declaration recorded their common view, essentially maintaining that the new international economic order should be based on justice, the sovereign equality, community of interests and cooperation of all countries irrespective of their socio-economic systems. It should put an end to inequality and injustice, create conditions for bridging the gap in economic development levels, and ensure rapid social progress. The Declaration also focused on the problem of strengthening national sovereignty over natural resources. The common position held on this question by developing African states and socialist countries is very important for UN efforts to aid in the practical implementation of this right.

The problems of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid are an important sphere of cooperation between independent African and socialist countries at the UN. African countries, supported by other nonaligned and socialist states, increase their pressure on the imperialist powers in order to accelerate the decolonization process and ensure effective implementation of all UN decisions on Southern Africa.

At the same time, effective cooperation with the socialist nations is affected by the inconsistency displayed by some African countries on certain issues and their inclination to act, at times, in isolation from other African and developing countries. For example, at the 30th

UN General Assembly session considerable differences emerged within the African group on a draft resolution concerning the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. The West pressured the Central African Republic, the Ivory Coast and Liberia into joining it in voting against the draft, and Ghana, Upper Volta, Zaire and several others into abstaining. Besides, some African countries at that session tended to agree to a "dialogue" with the racist regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

African countries highly value the United Nations and the opportunities it offers for coordinating action with the socialist states within the world organization. That is why joining the UN has been the first step of each new independent African country on the international scene. Most African nations regard the very fact of their acceptance into the United Nations as a final and decisive form of international recognition. Together with their new national flag and anthem, membership in the UN has become for many of them a symbol of independence, sovereignty and national dignity.

The considerable expansion of new African countries' political and diplomatic cooperation with the socialist community did much to enhance their role at the United Nations and in other international organizations.

African countries are increasingly supporting the policies of the socialist community aimed at strengthening universal peace, curbing the arms race, expanding equitable cooperation among countries with different social systems and development levels. At the 35th session of the UN General Assembly, Elisio de Figueiredo, permanent representative of Angola at the UN, said that Soviet initiatives encompassed questions of military alliances, political and legal steps to strengthen national security, as well as issues of reducing and limiting armed forces and conventional armaments. Angola, he added, appreciated efforts to strengthen security safeguards for the non-nuclear countries.

African countries acted virtually in unison with the Soviet Union at the 36th UN General Assembly session too. They supported the Soviet-sponsored Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, the Soviet initiative on concluding a treaty to ban the deployment of any weapons in outer space, on the appeal to the nuclear powers to abstain from the further stationing of nuclear weapons in other countries. At the initiative of the socialist countries the General Assembly took a decision aimed at banning neutron weapons. Most African countries voted in favor, and there was not a single negative African vote on this or any of the other resolutions.

One should stress that almost all joint official documents on talks between independent African states and socialist countries note the great significance of the United Nations as an instrument of peace and greater international security. For example, a Soviet-Ethiopian communique says that "stressing the important role of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining universal peace and security and for

the promotion of international cooperation, the two sides consider that this organization should continue to be strengthened and made more effective on the basis of respect for the UN goals, principles and Charter".²⁷

The United Nations is not the only organization in which African and socialist countries cooperate. They are members of many UN specialized agencies dealing with various spheres of activity—economics, politics, ideology, culture, science, workers' rights, public health and the like. Let us consider the three largest such agencies where cooperation between Africa and the socialist community is easily traceable: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

The role of these specialized agencies was also enhanced in the 1960s and 1970s due to the fact that many newly liberated countries joined them and many acute issues of social and international scientific and technical cooperation emerged.

Cooperation between socialist and African countries within UNESCO was furthered, first and foremost, by the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations to help eliminate colonial vestiges in developing countries' social and economic spheres, preserve peace and ease international tensions. In the mid-1960s UNESCO's position in relation to the peace drive became the key factor shaping the overall direction of its activities.

The imperialist countries paid lip service to the general need for action to preserve peace, arguing that this was outside UNESCO's sphere of competence. For example, the US government maintained that UNESCO should merely encourage intellectual cooperation among specialists in various countries. In close cooperation with African representatives, Soviet and other socialist delegates succeeded in demonstrating that efforts to strengthen peace were an urgent mission for UNESCO. The 1968 UNESCO General Conference decided to include in its program a special section, "UNESCO's Contribution to Peace". This determined the position of most delegates vis-a-vis this issue.

Earlier, at the 14th session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1966, socialist representatives waged, in close cooperation with African and other delegates from the developing world, an intense campaign against the advocates of colonialism and racism. An item "UNESCO's Tasks in the Light of the Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at Its 20th Session on Questions Relating to the Liquidation of Colonialism and Racism" was inscribed on the session's agenda. The debate condemned all forms of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid. The Director-General was requested to continue studying the adverse impact of colonialism and racism on the development of science, culture and education and to extend no assistance to South Africa, the regime of

Southern Rhodesia and the then government of Portugal. From the mid-1960s the question of colonialism, racism and apartheid has been debated at each session of the UNESCO General Conference. The 16th session, held in 1970, adopted a resolution condemning all forms of colonialism, racism and apartheid, as well as cooperation with the reactionary racist regimes.

UNESCO does much to study various issues of culture and cultural cooperation. In this, African and socialist representatives pay special attention to the ideological aspects of such questions as the interrelationship between the national cultures of developing countries and those of the former colonial powers amid the struggle against neocolonialism and the vestiges of imperialist colonial rule. In 1967 UNESCO launched a universal program to study the cultures of all nations, and this exerted considerable positive influence on the rise of national cultures and on international contacts.

Representatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries contributed significantly to a better understanding of what content education should have and how it should be planned. The dissemination of peaceful ideals through education was of enormous significance for raising the younger generation in the spirit of peace and international friendship. Soviet representatives also took part in drawing up UNESCO's experimental program to eradicate illiteracy and then rendered considerable practical assistance in implementing this program in Ethiopia, Algeria, Guinea, Kenya and other African countries.

In October and November 1976 the 19th session of the UNESCO General Conference was held in Nairobi, Kenya. At the initiative of socialist and African delegations, supported by representatives of developing countries, the conference adopted resolutions on the role of UNESCO in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and transition to disarmament, on UNESCO's contribution to peace and its tasks with respect to the promotion of human rights and the elimination of colonialism and racialism, and a long-term program of UNESCO measures to aid in strengthening peace.

An analysis of the subsequent sessions of the UNESCO General Conference and of its various committees makes it possible to conclude that cooperation between socialist and African countries is growing each year in this organization.

The second largest UN specialized agency where socialist and African countries cooperate on social, labor and political issues is the International Labor Organization. Here, debate is especially acute on relations among classes and the struggle of the working people for their rights and better economic conditions. Sessions of the ILO Governing Body and General Conference pay close attention to decolonization and the struggle against racial discrimination and apartheid.

The 48th session of the ILO General Conference adopted a Declaration Concerning the Policy of "Apartheid" of the Republic of

South Africa. The session also adopted an amendment to the ILO Charter which made it possible to expel South Africa from the ILO for violating that declaration. To avoid that, South Africa withdrew from the ILO at the 50th session of the General Conference in 1966.

Socialist and African representatives at the ILO harshly criticize the leading imperialist powers for their policy of violating the freedom of trade unions and the employers' onslaught on the workers' vital interests. The domestic and foreign policies of the United States have been subjected to particular criticism in recent years. Essentially, representatives of US employers and mercenary labor elite found themselves profoundly isolated in the ILO and were forced to withdraw from it in 1977.

Imperialist ideologists are trying to use the International Labor Organization to hamper the development of class consciousness among the working people and to play down the influence of socialism. They resort to demagoguery about the "transformation of capitalism", "social partnership", "social symmetry", "participation policy" and the like, thus trying to undermine working-class positions, slur over class contradictions and save capitalism's face, if only in developing countries. However, it is precisely in the ILO that the imperialist powers are losing ground each year and antiimperialist cooperation between socialist and African countries is growing stronger.

Acute social problems, like the realization of the right to education and work, also include the question of providing the working masses with medical care. This is what the World Health Organization (WHO) deals with. Socialist representatives in the WHO are active in tackling complex medical and sanitary questions and pay constant attention to the socio-economic aspects of health care, especially the training of medical personnel and the building of medical facilities.

The shortage of medical personnel and facilities in African, Asian and Latin American countries is the infamous legacy of colonial rule. The ratio of one doctor per 25,000 and sometimes 100,000 of the population is typical of many African countries. In this connection, representatives of socialist countries always stress at WHO conferences the need for newly independent countries to embark on stable national planning of medical care, train indigenous medical personnel and build medical facilities.

The Soviet Union and other socialist nations regularly second doctors to work in African countries and send medical supplies and drugs there. African students receive WHO scholarships to study in socialist countries. Such relations foster understanding and cooperation between socialist and African nations in the WHO.

To sum up, the United Nations does and will retain its role as a forum of political struggle for strengthening international peace and security, for arms limitation and disarmament, for eradicating the holdovers of colonial and racist rule and furthering equal and versatile cooperation in solving important economic and social issues.

UNESCO, the ILO, WHO and other UN specialized agencies will play a similar role in their own spheres of competence. Cooperation between African and socialist countries on key international issues will also develop and grow stronger in these organizations.

4. The Socialist Community Supporting Africa's Struggle to Overcome Economic Backwardness

The winning of political independence by colonies does not yet free them from imperialist exploitation or the sway of foreign monopolies in their economies. Political independence is only the first, although important, step on the road to eliminating colonial oppression and backwardness. The next stage—of which fighters for national liberation are well aware—deals with no less difficult tasks of extirpating the very roots of imperialist exploitation, ousting foreign monopolies, developing an advanced national industry, abolishing feudal structures, carrying out radical agrarian transformations in the interests of working people and democratizing the social system.

Thus, having fought their battles for national liberation and having won sovereignty, African peoples today continue their struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. They have embarked on the road of complex internal economic and social transformations. In the final analysis, this determines the outcome of the fight for complete decolonization. "Economic liberation," Lenin stressed, "is the chief thing" in ensuring genuine independence for the peoples who have won political power.²⁸

The shift of the struggle to the economic sphere objectively prompts newly liberated countries to be more active in international economic affairs, helps them realize the need for changing their status in the system of the capitalist division of labor and, most importantly, helps improve their trade and economic cooperation with socialist countries.

Economic ties with the socialist countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) have a direct bearing on economic development in independent Africa. These countries account for 10 percent of the world population, one-third of the world industrial output and 25 percent of the world total of national incomes. The establishment of trade relations and economic cooperation with the socialist community has opened great opportunities before developing countries for solving many economic problems.

Africa is attracted to cooperation with socialist countries because their policy toward the newly liberated nations is based on "a complete break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilisation, which has built the prosperity of the exploiters belonging to a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries".²⁹

The establishment and expansion of economic ties between socialist and African countries is an important factor contributing to the normalization of international trade as a whole and the establishment of new principles for it. Profiteering, price fixing and the use of trade as a means of economic pressure and political interference in other nations' internal affairs are typical of imperialist powers and transnational corporations but completely alien to the socialist countries. "We are developing wide-ranging mutually beneficial economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the newly free countries," Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress. "The building of large projects in these countries with some form of Soviet participation figures prominently in our relations with them."³⁰

Significantly, it was actually only after winning their independence that African countries were able to establish trade contacts with the socialist nations. While in the late 1940s the foreign trade of socialist countries with Africa was confined to accidental transactions, and those mostly through West European middlemen, trade relations between them began to improve and grow more stable from the late 1950s. From 1960 to 1981 the volume of trade between the CMEA countries and independent African states increased approximately eightfold. Foreign trade has become an effective incentive to economic development. A salient feature of socialist exports to Africa is that a large part of them is represented by machines and equipment necessary for developing national economies. According to UN figures, the exports of machines, equipment and means of transport from the European socialist nations to African countries grew more than 850 percent from 1960 to 1975 alone.

The exports from developing African countries to socialist countries are still largely made up of traditional commodities: cotton, hides, cocoa, coffee, citrus fruits and minerals. In recent years, deliveries of industrial goods and semifinished items have been growing. Over the period from 1960 to 1981 purchases of these by the socialist countries increased almost twelvefold. The role of socialist countries as big importers of certain African goods rose considerably. For example, in 1975 alone these nations purchased almost 42 percent of all African-exported cotton, over 22 percent of cotton fabrics and yarn, and 17 percent of raw phosphates.³¹ These figures demonstrate that African countries have gained a powerful friend: supported by the socialist community, they can dispose of their resources as they see fit and work with greater confidence to improve their position in the international system of the capitalist division of labor.

One should also note the essence of cooperation between the socialist community and African countries in implementing appropriate agreements which envisage equal participation by the signatories in tackling specific economic tasks with due regard to the economic and technical opportunities available to each side. Taking into consideration their partners' wishes, socialist countries usually undertake the following

obligations in economic and technical assistance they provide:

- to carry out surveys;
- to deliver equipment in sets, components, spare parts and stock not produced locally;
- to second specialists to aid in the construction of projects, the installation of equipment and the operation of completed projects;
- to assist in the creation of national geological services, design, construction, research and other agencies;
- to assist in training national personnel in the process of constructing and operating completed projects, in the building, equipping and organising of educational institutions in African countries, in addition to the training of specialists in educational institutions of developing countries and at enterprises and educational institutions of socialist countries;
- to dispatch advisors and consultants to government agencies and organizations in African countries.

For their part, African countries are to perform the following functions:

- hiring workers locally;
- purchasing building materials locally;
- paying for the delivery of equipment and stock from ports of arrival to project sites;
- paying various organizational costs in the local currency.

Cooperation along these lines allows a more rational use of material, technical and manpower resources, makes it possible to develop economic relations on a long-term basis and aids in the solution of key problems in building the national economies of African countries.

The socialist community displays understanding of the difficulties African countries encounter in developing their national economies, and its economic, scientific and technical assistance to them includes credits on preferential terms. Socialist countries deliver machines and equipment against these credits, design and build industrial and other projects, dispatch specialists, etc. Speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Sierra Leone Vice-President Christian Alusip Kamara-Taylor said: "Africa ... is presently grappling with the teething socio-economic problems which beset our continent which has suffered centuries of colonial exploitation and plunder. In our endeavors at providing for the spiritual and material needs of our peoples through achieving social progress, we in the developing countries appreciate the fraternal solidarity of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We have every reason to safely rely on their continued assistance for they are the allies of all oppressed peoples."³²

It is important to remember that the resources earmarked by the socialist countries for economic and technical assistance are an integral part of the accumulations created by hard work. These resources, aimed solely at aiding the newly liberated states in developing their national economies, can in no way be described as surplus for the

socialist nations and they are not used to ensure profits from abroad. "The socialist states' assistance to developing countries is no compensation for damages or atonement for past sins; it is the help of a friend and ally in the struggle against a common enemy—imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism."³³

In their economic and technical assistance, the socialist countries proceed from the assumption that newly liberated countries secure most of their development funds from domestic sources. External aid as a source of investment into the development of the national economy can be effective only if newly free countries fully mobilize their own resources.

The success in the decolonization and independent development of African countries hinges, to a great degree, on who manages the economy, on where and why capital is invested. In solving this cardinal problem of the struggle for independence, African countries are unwaveringly supported by the socialist community which accords priority to assistance in developing the state sector. The creation and consolidation of this sector is at the heart of Africa's struggle to strengthen its economic independence. Large-scale state property facilitates progressive socio-economic transformations and makes it possible to withstand the pressure of foreign capital and shield the economy from adverse external influence. That is why the economic, scientific and technical assistance provided by socialist countries offers considerable advantages over the "aid" of the imperialist powers. The cooperation offered by the socialist community, including assistance in the construction of large projects of nationwide importance, helps newly free nations tackle key economic tasks—industrialization and the elimination of economic backwardness.

The contribution of each CMEA country to Africa's economic development depends on its economic capabilities and development level. We estimate that efforts by the CMEA member nations have created, in cooperation with African countries, at least 1,500 various economic projects.

The industrial and other enterprises built by African countries in cooperation with CMEA are, as a rule, among the key projects featured in the economic development plans of young African countries. These projects symbolize industrialization of independent Africa, resolved to eliminate its backwardness and poverty. The socialist community leads in assisting the development of African steel and non-ferrous industries and contributes substantially to the creation of national oil refineries and engineering industries. Cooperation with CMEA has enabled many African countries to start developing their textile, leatherworking, footwear, flour-and-cereal industries, canneries and the like. Relying on the assistance and support of the socialist nations, some African countries (Algeria, Ethiopia and others) have laid a firm foundation for a state sector in their economies and certain modern branches of material production employing advanced technol-

ogies. The results of economic relations with socialist countries demonstrate the tangible progress African developing countries have made in their socio-economic transformations. Here are several examples.

Algeria's industrialization is now unthinkable without the Al-Hajar steel works or many other large industrial projects which the Soviet Union is helping construct, modernize or expand. The country has launched consumer goods, food and other industries: Bulgaria has helped in the construction of a textile complex in Batna (15,000 spindles and 470 looms), a leather factory in Jennjeli (annually producing 500,000 dm of full-grain leather and 400 tons of sole leather), a brandy distillery, a cannery, and is now taking part in the construction of a woodworking complex in Bougie; Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have put into operation a heat and power plant in Skikda and are building six footwear factories; new agreements have been concluded on cooperation with Bulgaria in creating agroindustrial complexes, irrigation systems and a veterinary college; with Poland in the shipbuilding, petrochemical, engineering, woodworking and food industries; the GDR was active in the construction of the Berrouaghia industrial complex; Hungary will supply sets of equipment for canneries, food and other factories; Czechoslovakia, for the power engineering, steel, chemical and food industries.

Supported by the socialist countries, Algeria has established and strengthened a state sector in the mining, oil and gas industries, carried out effective nationalization in key economic branches, and consolidated its sovereignty over its natural resources. Today, Algeria is progressing steadily in the solution of the difficult and complex problems it inherited from its colonial past.

After their abrupt turn from progressive development to the course of truckling to imperialism, Egypt's leaders prefer not to recall the economic assistance of the socialist countries. However, the fact remains that CMEA cooperation with Egypt has helped commission about 650 major economic projects. Cooperation with socialist countries in many fields has enabled Egypt to considerably expand its industrial capacity within a relatively short period. Today, enterprises of joint Soviet-Egyptian construction alone produce 10 percent of the country's gross industrial output, including all the metallurgical coke, sinter, cold rolling stock, forgings and metalworking machine tools, over 60 percent of steel, 53 percent of electric power and 30 percent of oil refinery products.³⁴

Other CMEA countries have also contributed significantly to Egypt's industrialization. Bulgaria took part in the construction of a factory for manufacturing sleeves for concealed wiring and supplied the equipment for the calcium carbide and ferrosilicon factory, built with Soviet assistance in Aswan and yielding 5,000 tons of carbide and 3,000 tons of 75-percent ferrosilicon annually.³⁵ Hungary has built mills, pumping stations, a sluice and a bridge in Abū Ali; the

GDR aided in the construction of a cement factory and a printing house in Cairo, about 70 transformer substations, two power lines 348 kilometers long, 46 automatic telephone exchanges, and several textile factories, including one of the largest textile complexes in Shibin-el-Kom. Poland extended economic and technical assistance in the building of factories producing cutting tools, anodic mass and aniline dyes and is now aiding in the construction of concrete mixing factories. Romania is helping assemble industrial acids factory and build projects producing sodium carbonate and phosphate fertilizers. Cooperation with socialist countries has made Egypt the third country in the world (after the Soviet Union and the United States) to use power lines with a voltage of 500 kilowatts.

Despite their short history, economic relations with Angola are progressing smoothly. The Soviet Union provides comprehensive assistance to this country in ensuring normal operation of the state apparatus and reorganizing the financial and banking system. The USSR is helping develop the power engineering industry, including the drawing up of the national electrification plan, establish a national oil industry and expand the geological service. Cooperation is also under way in industry, agriculture, transport, fisheries, shipbuilding, etc. For example, Soviet experts have helped launch a shipyard in Lobito, one of the largest industrial projects in Angola. Shipbuilding engineering plants in Benguela are being overhauled. New large bridges are under construction over the Cubango, Cuilo and Cunene rivers. Soviet experts have drawn up a technical and economic plan for developing Angola's fishing industries. Angolans are being trained on board Soviet fishing vessels. A joint Soviet-Angolan fisheries committee has been established to promote cooperation in this field. Angolan trainees went to Poland to acquire various fishing industry skills. The country is working hard to train its own personnel. Technicians are being trained at an industrial school and at vocational training centers with the help of the Soviet Union, Cuba, the GDR and other CMEA countries.

"Our country," Agostinho Neto said, "appreciates the friendly fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This internationalist assistance has helped people's Angola to win an impressive victory over foreign invaders, imperialist mercenaries and secessionist gangs of domestic reactionaries. In peacetime, the Soviet Union's internationalist assistance plays an important part in implementing national rehabilitation plans."³⁶ This support on the part of the socialist community is aiding the People's Republic of Angola to consistently nationalize banks, insurance companies, enterprises in the metalworking, cement and food industries, coffee-growing plantations, etc. A state auto transport organization and a national oil company, SONANGOL, have been established. All this firmly guarantees economic improvement.

The all-round support the socialist community extends to develop-

ing African countries in strengthening their economic positions is reflected not only in bilateral cooperation; it is well known throughout the world as a fundamental policy of the socialist community in the field of foreign economic ties. The socialist countries vigorously support newly independent nations in their efforts to secure sovereignty over their natural resources and their right to nationalize foreign property and control the operations of the multinationals.

There are numerous cases of African countries, supported by the socialist community, effectively frustrating the pressure and blackmail on the part of West European monopolies which refused to give up their policy of neocolonialist exploitation of liberated countries' mineral resources. That was what happened in Algeria, when it nationalized the mining industry in 1966 and the oil industry in 1971.

The CMEA countries not only advocate unqualified respect for each country's sovereign right to manage its own resources but also prove their commitment to this principle by the way they practise cooperation to strengthen the state sector. Under international agreements they help in the exploration and management of natural resources so that they could be used to further the national interests of African countries. The socialist community participates in geological surveys and prospecting in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique and several other countries. Mutually beneficial cooperation is in the making to establish national mining industries in Africa. For example, Bulgaria and Romania are helping Tunisia to prospect for and extract phosphates: they have provided this country with credits for building new phosphate mines and enterprises to produce phosphate concentrate. This is a case of long-term cooperation which ensures a stable market for phosphates. The Bulgarian-Tunisian agreement alone provides for annual deliveries of one to 1.5 million tons of phosphates to the processing chemical complex in Povelyanovo.³⁷ The Soviet Union has helped Guinea build its first bauxite-mining project in Kindia with a yield of 2.5 million tons, and the People's Republic of the Congo a complex for mining and concentrating polymetallic ores.

Trade and economic cooperation cements relations between Africa and the socialist community. It accelerates the development of the productive forces, helps overcome economic backwardness, lays the basis for raising living standards, and provides a valuable channel for the transfer of technical and administrative expertise and knowhow and the theory and practice of state organization. Besides, it strengthens the positions of African countries in their struggle against the dictatorial arbitrary action by imperialist monopolies, and enhances the resolve of the newly free nations to establish a new international economic order and eliminate inequalities in the international capitalist division of labor.

Now that world historical initiative has passed to the socialist com-

munity and the advantages of socialism are becoming increasingly impressive in all spheres of international affairs, domestic and external reactionaries are stepping up their efforts to prevent socialism and the national liberation movement from growing closer to each other. This demonstrates that the completion of decolonization in Africa and the solution of urgent socio-economic problems are linked closely to the further strengthening of the alliance between newly liberated countries and the socialist community.

The socialist countries' position of principle was reflected in their joint statement at the Fourth session of UNCTAD. They said they intended to continue their policy of expanding mutually beneficial trade with developing countries and forging stable economic ties based on both the traditional bilateral and promising multilateral forms of trade and economic cooperation in the spirit of UNCTAD and UN General Assembly recommendations, particularly the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNCTAD resolutions and progressive provisions in the decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Special sessions of the UN General Assembly.³⁸

Obviously, the socialist countries act on this policy if the developing nations are equally interested in normalizing international economic relations and if *détente* takes firmer root. Cooperation brings certain difficulties to the socialist nations, not only because developing countries still lack an effective state apparatus capable of controlling all foreign economic operations of their organizations, are short of skilled personnel and sometimes fail to effectively settle the questions of the local costs of cooperative projects, credits, etc. Influenced by various capitalist trade groups and associations, some developing countries refuse to extend to the socialist nations a regime as favorable as that in their trade with developed capitalist countries. Another obstacle to the development of trade between African and socialist countries is the fact that the business interests of the developing world are still insufficiently informed about the advantages of trade with the socialist community. They know little about the distinctive features of its markets and foreign trade, and tend to favor the already known partners and their goods, etc. There is also the legacy binding the entire economic activity of developing countries to capitalist economy. Conversely, the planned nature of the socialist countries' foreign economic ties calls for more stable exchange, agreed on in advance and free from market fluctuations.

Aware of the complex problems facing newly independent nations, the socialist community is constantly improving the mechanism of cooperation with them. For example, bilateral intergovernmental commissions on economic, scientific and technical cooperation are to play an important role, looking into specific cooperation questions and long-term forms of economic relations. Currently, the CMEA countries have set up such commissions with Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, the Congo and other states.

The advance of socialist economic integration opens up new prospects for cooperation with the developing world. Several socialist countries pool and coordinate their efforts to extend economic assistance to this or that nation, making it possible to tackle major economic problems. There have already been cases of such joint assistance by several socialist states to African countries.

One recent example is the involvement of several socialist countries in the construction of a steel complex in Nigeria. The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR are taking part in building this project, the largest in Tropical Africa. Bulgarian organizations are aiding in the creation of a transport infrastructure and the construction itself, while Czechoslovakia and the GDR are helping to design and manufacture several elements of the steel-producing equipment.³⁹

Over the past years, cooperation in production began to take shape between socialist and African countries and is now developing as a priority task. This type of cooperation creates a mutually beneficial basis for long-term economic relations and, what is particularly important, makes economic ties stable.

Today, when African countries have launched a resolute effort to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources, promoting production cooperation with the socialist community can contribute greatly to the establishment of national mining industries and help independent African countries increase their deliveries of products manufactured at new enterprises to the socialist market (the demand of that market is not always met fully due to the traditional ties linking Africa to the capitalist world). This could put an end to the still existing instability in trade relations between the two groups of countries.

Production cooperation will bring good results as far as raw materials are concerned: the socialist community is against perpetuating the specialization of developing countries in agricultural produce and raw materials, and the aid it extends in the exploitation of natural resources, including those destined for export, is part of the integrated assistance to overcome backwardness. In future, cooperation in developing national manufacturing industries in Africa will continue to be a top priority task. However, it will acquire new features and forms. Among them, the trend toward a well-established division of labor and close industrial cooperation between socialist and African countries is already emerging especially clearly. Furthering production cooperation in the manufacturing industries is important for gradually accelerating industrialization in Africa. The socialist countries have already become large-scale purchasers of African-made industrial finished and semifinished products. Promotion of production cooperation ties, already pronounced in relations between several countries, can expand the mutually beneficial exchange of industrial goods.

Cooperating with developing countries in the construction of various enterprises which can produce items for export and thus earn foreign exchange, the socialist countries aim at making these projects

an organic element of national economies. At the same time, the compensatory nature of cooperation, which makes it possible to establish mutually beneficial ties and plan the exchange of goods on a long-term basis, creates favorable conditions for furthering the more promising form of external economic cooperation in production and trade with a high efficiency potential for both parties.

The development of cooperation and specialization can proceed, first and foremost, from the production experience available to this or that country. For example, Bulgaria is studying the possibilities of a cooperative effort with Algeria in the production of non-ferrous metals, and with other countries in the manufacture of battery-operated trucks, telphers, small Diesel and motor trucks. Hungarian economists hold that cooperation with developing countries could be particularly effective in the pharmaceutical and aluminum industries and certain branches of food production.

Production cooperation in industry can be accompanied by coordinated development of certain branches in agriculture.

Organizationally, conditions for production cooperation stem from the development of the cooperative and specialization effort within an industry by assisting in the construction of progressive assembly projects or enterprises manufacturing new products independently. The record confirms the future efficiency of cooperation in which socialist countries act as a general contractor in the construction of projects jointly with the competent organizations in developing countries—when socialist countries' organizations are in charge up to the moment of commissioning—and also in the form of joint companies which some countries prefer.

The choice of this or that form of cooperation with African countries will depend on specific conditions. However, it is already clear now that they will not remain unchanged. Their evolution will be influenced above all by integration within CMEA, by the economic rapprochement of the two groups of countries both bilaterally and multilaterally, and by direct CMEA participation in assistance to developing countries. Among other things, the Special Fund for Financing Programs of Economic and Technical Assistance to Developing Countries contributes to the expansion of multilateral cooperation opportunities. The fund was established under the International Investment Bank (IIB) to develop and strengthen the national economies of newly independent countries and expand stable economic ties between them and the Special Fund members.

The fund's total assets are one billion convertible rubles (the collective CMEA currency).* The fund provides credits to central and other banks in developing countries, enterprises and economic organizations of the state and cooperative sectors and, occasionally, private companies and organizations, for a period of up to 15 years. These

* The convertible ruble contains 0,987412 grams of pure gold.

credits are for constructing new and recouping and modernizing existing industrial, agricultural and other economic projects in developing countries.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has taken practical steps toward establishing multilateral cooperation with developing countries, specifically, this type of cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical field with the People's Republic of Angola.⁴⁰ The emergence of direct relations between CMEA and developing countries means that the alliance between the socialist system and the national liberation movement Lenin dreamed of is now turning into a powerful and continuously operating factor of historical development.

It is important to note that this factor is growing increasingly effective largely because developing countries welcome the strategic direction of Leninist foreign policy aimed at ensuring closer relations with the liberation movements. Specifically, this point was made by Abdel Salam Jalloud, a Libyan leader, when, during his visit to the Soviet Union, he said: "The Arab peoples and all the progressive forces in the Arab world understand full well that they should follow one road—that of friendship, stronger friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We hold that true friendship is not subject to ad hoc changes, that it is firmly based on mutual respect and common goals."⁴¹

Further development of detente is an important objective factor shaping the prospects of trade and economic cooperation. Detente makes it possible to forge a firmer link between all economies and the world market and facilitates transition to large-scale forms of economic, scientific and technical cooperation. Detente's tangible results open additional opportunities for developing countries to expand their trade and for interested nations to join in the cooperative and specialization effort and multilateral investment projects. It would be difficult to overestimate the overall importance of detente for the socio-economic restructuring of today's world and for putting an end to any forms of injustice, diktat and discrimination in international economic relations. Hence the indelible link between improving the prospects of economic relations and a more vigorous drive to deepen detente, improve the international climate and strengthen peace and international security.

Chapter Four

INTER-AFRICAN RELATIONS

Any analysis of the foreign policy pursued by independent African countries should take into consideration two simultaneous processes in inter-African affairs. First, the trend toward unity, concerted action and comprehensive cooperation on the continental scale. Second, the socio-economic and political polarization of these countries.

These centrifugal and centripetal trends affect the policies of each independent African country. Consequently, the emergence and development of inter-African relations favors both African unity, reflected, since 1963, in the activities of the OAU, and division. The dialectical contradiction between consolidation and differentiation is reflected in the emergence and rivalry, within the OAU, of a group of progressively-oriented countries and a group which has rejected this course and, outside the OAU, in the establishment of various groups and alliances. These developments are determined historically and cannot be viewed as a transient phenomenon in the shaping of modern inter-African relations. They extend to all spheres of multilateral and bilateral relations and perceptibly affect the future of the continent's comprehensive decolonization and the positions of African countries with regard to world politics.

1. Differentiation and Consolidation

Independent Africa has never been fully homogeneous. We have noted earlier that there remain objective and subjective differences among its countries. From the very first steps of their independence, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, newly emergent countries have been divided into several political and economic groups. The division was largely along the lines which had recently separated the British and French colonial empires; it was geographical, linked to different subregional African organizations, like the Concord Council and the Customs Union in West Africa, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), or the East African Common Services Organization.

However, at that time there were already signs of differentiation among African countries along socio-economic and political lines. The difference in the platforms of the Casablanca Group and the Afro-Malagasy Union was a case in point. Today, social orientation has emerged as the decisive factor in this differentiation. This is especially evident in the choice of socialist or capitalist socio-economic orientation. At the same time, traditional ties and contradictions in inter-African relations still play their part.

Consequently, the trend toward forming different, relatively small political alliances and groups of both neighboring and non-neighboring countries is gaining strength in Africa. These alliances and groups are set up either by several countries concluding special multilateral agreements and treaties or elaborating joint programs of action at OAU forums or other international conferences. The unifying factor can be progressive or otherwise; sometimes without a clear-cut common socio-economic platform but on a compromise basis of common political interests. One example of the way countries of different socio-economic orientation pool their efforts to solve a common problem is the group of Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), particularly interested in the earliest possible elimination of the colonial and racist regime in Southern Africa.

Differentiation in Africa is perceptibly gaining speed and depth, thus pushing the question of the alignment of forces to the foreground. In international politics, this division depends not only on the polarization between antiimperialist and collaborationist policies but also on the fact that many countries have taken a centrist, vacillating stand.

Generally, the very fact that national liberation in Africa is still unfinished invigorates the antiimperialist forces which continue to be the vanguard of Africa. But they have to constantly fight against African—and not only African—reactionaries to retain this role. This struggle was especially aggravated in the latter half of the 1970s, when the former colonial and other imperialist powers, above all the United States, launched their greatest counteroffensive against national liberation and social emancipation in Africa. In that period, the rivalry between the two camps in dealing with fundamentally important issues often ended in a "draw". This was especially obvious in the way the OAU Assembly assessed, in January 1976, Cuba's assistance to Angola and, in July 1978, the armed interference by NATO countries in Zaire.

Still, this impasse is not permanent. In the final analysis, those who relied on alliance with imperialism and worked to undermine the foundations of the OAU lost. The June 1978 Khartoum Assembly of the OAU denounced and rejected the idea and practice of setting up, outside and without consultation with the OAU, the so-called Inter-African Peace-Keeping Forces, formed at the initiative and with

the support of NATO from contingents of several OAU countries and sent to Zaire to carry out punitive operations in the Shaba Province.

However, the differentiation of independent African countries does not at all rule out joint action on problems concerning all of Africa. They are still interested in preserving continental unity within the OAU framework. But another question is becoming increasingly acute: which is stronger, the common interests binding African countries together in the OAU or the differences brought on by polarization. Participation in OAU activities and in the implementation of its decisions is instrumental in answering this question.

Some bourgeois political scientists—for example, Klaus Ropp¹—and sometimes even certain African politicians refer to failures to carry out many OAU decisions and claim that the OAU lacks efficiency and authority. However, given the intensifying differentiation in Africa, it would be unrealistic to expect all African countries to voice identical views in the OAU or implement its decisions scrupulously and without reservation. The record shows that not all African nations observe these decisions, and the OAU has no authority to impose such observance. On the other hand, no African country could escape attention while it violated OAU decisions without sufficient reason. There is clearly a moral incentive operating here. Significantly, an African country prefers absence from an OAU session to criticism leveled at it for noncompliance with decisions taken.

Facts prove that there is a general readiness to follow OAU decisions when they concern key aspects of antiimperialist struggle, the confrontation with the racist and colonial regimes, or equality on the international scene. OAU influence on African foreign policy is especially great in this field, although it has to surmount obstacles in its antiimperialist drive too.

As a continental regional intergovernmental organization acting in the spirit of the UN Charter, the OAU is a collective representative of African countries and their common interests. The OAU members often charge the General Secretariat, the OAU Chairman or the Liberation Committee with taking foreign policy steps on their behalf—speaking at the UN or in its specialized agencies on specific questions of the struggle against racism and colonialism or to support liberation movements—and with aiding inter-African cooperation. In these cases African countries transfer, as it were, some of their foreign policy prerogatives to the OAU, thus planning and acting on the continental level.

Among the political aspects of African differentiation and consolidation, one of the foremost—if not the foremost—is the question of whether Africa is to become a continent of peace and peaceful coexistence among the newly independent countries or a "continent in flames", with frequent outbreaks of armed conflicts over territorial and other disputes. The gradual spread of military treaties throughout Africa has been alarming, particularly since the late 1970s, when

imperialist interference in African affairs increased and inter-African tensions mounted. This means that Africa's future will increasingly depend on whether the OAU breaks up into hostile military and political blocs or survives and develops as a collective security organ of young African countries.

It is recognized that long after the OAU was established, African regimes supported by their former colonial powers tried to preserve the groups that united them not only for purposes of economic co-operation but also as political alliances, often contrasting themselves to and even competing with the OAU. It was only the pressure from Africa's progressive forces fighting unwaveringly for African unity which secured a relevant OAU decision and put an end to this political separatism; alliances like the Afro-Malagasy Group officially renounced their political functions. Africa recognized the OAU as the only body entitled to act politically on its behalf.

However, it proved impossible to completely eliminate political separatism in Africa. Moreover, African reactionary forces, instigated by imperialism, have recently embarked on setting up their own political alliances. Besides, a trend toward military and political co-operation of reactionary regimes has emerged. This is borne out by the formation, in 1977, of a military and political "minibloc" of seven countries—the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta—on the basis of the West African Economic Community; the organization in 1978 of the so-called Inter-African Peace-Keeping Forces by a group of countries (Morocco, Egypt, Senegal, Gabon, etc.) to perform police functions in Zaire; and the plans to set up a Red Sea Security Pact with Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and some other Arab countries of the Middle East as members.

In the spring of 1980 the plans to establish a military alliance within the ECOWAS framework (Economic Community of West African States, the French acronym is CEDEAO) took definite shape. ECOWAS comprises 15 countries with a total population of about 140 million (Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegambia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta).

Since neocolonialist powers can influence these limited-membership groups more easily than the OAU, the trend toward conferring political and military functions on them can prove quite dangerous both to African unity and to peace in Africa. Given that it is the West which instigates and supports the emergence of African military and political "miniblocs" bound, to varying degrees, to NATO policies, this trend, if developed, would pose a threat to African nonalignment, the cornerstone of the continent's collective security system. Steps in this direction could also threaten and contradict *détente* in general.

Again, as it had happened in recent past, Africa's progressive forces blocked this trend. They rallied together to preserve antiimperialist unity and peace. Their meetings (specifically, the May 1978 conference

in Madagascar attended by the parties of Algeria, Angola, Benin, Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe and the Seychelles and the liberation movements of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) helped African unity withstand the new test of its strength. The OAU's viability was reaffirmed at its Assembly summit sessions in Khartoum, Monrovia, Freetown and Nairobi in 1978-1981. These sessions decided in favor of upholding African unity and peaceful coexistence.

However, in the autumn of 1982 the OAU again encountered a serious problem: the 19th Summit Assembly could not be convened because the quorum was lacking. In August the reason was the difference of opinion on the OAU membership of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and in November, the disagreement over who was to represent Chad at the session—either the current head of state or the deposed president. The leaders of over 30 OAU member countries saw this crisis as resulting from imperialist subversion of African unity and collective security.

This makes it important to determine which principles the OAU favors in ensuring collective security in Africa.

Since the maintenance of peace and the territorial status quo in Africa is among the OAU's tasks, it strives to safeguard not only the existing borders of African countries but also their territorial integrity against separatism. Despite the resistance of some African states, the OAU supported Nigeria's unity when that question was at issue. Subsequently, it ignored or rejected all attempts by separatists (in Sudan, Cabinda and Eritrea) to secure OAU recognition. It has supported all efforts aimed at preserving the territorial integrity of African countries and the principle of the inviolability of borders. The OAU regards self-determination not as a right to secede from the existing states but as a right to freely choose the political status of a given country.

The OAU is unanimous with regard to the principle of noninterference into the current political and social developments in African countries. As a rule, the organization accepts political and social changes occurring in different states. To act otherwise would spell its disintegration. One should also stress that the OAU aims above all at ensuring peaceful settlement of inter-African disputes without—this is especially important—extracontinental interference. The 1978 Khartoum Assembly of the OAU adopted a principle proclaiming the defense of Africa, its peace and security as an exclusively African affair. The Assembly recommended that the OAU members settle their disputes by peaceful means within the African context with OAU mediation. Inter-African armed forces, the Assembly emphasized, could be created only within the context of the purposes and priority tasks of the OAU concerning the eradication of racist regimes, complete liberation of the continent and the preservation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the OAU nations.

The problem of mercenaries is closely connected to issues of African security and cooperation. The struggle against the use of mercenaries as a neocolonialist weapon for the suppression of national liberation movements is an integral part of Africa's antiimperialist struggle. Anti- and proimperialist forces clash over this problem in the OAU. The issue involves primarily white mercenaries, but in recent years it has been increasingly acquiring an "African slant" too, in connection with the refugee problem.

A legal basis for peacefully settling inter-African disputes linked to refugee activities is provided in a convention, adopted by the OAU Assembly in 1969 and in force since late 1973, to regulate specific aspects of the refugee problem in Africa. The convention guarantees the right of political asylum and stresses that the granting of asylum *per se* does not constitute an unfriendly act *vis-a-vis* any African country.

At the same time, host countries are forbidden to use refugees for political ends while the refugees are not to engage in activities hostile to any OAU member nation. The convention stipulates that in order to prevent possible border incidents, refugees are to be resettled in the interior of the host country. This means that the convention reiterates the OAU principle proclaimed in Khartoum and condemning subversive activities against neighboring or any other OAU member nations. It is on the basis of this convention that the governments of Angola and Zaire succeeded in normalizing their bilateral relations in 1978.

2. Economic Aspects of Centripetal and Centrifugal Developments

There are not only political but also economic aspects to African differentiation and consolidation. Remaining within the capitalist economic system, independent nations are subject to the law of uneven development. Some of them are far ahead the rest of African countries in the rates and level of industrialization—both thanks to their abundant natural resources and due to progressive orientation in development—and have already become a sizable economic force in Africa. At the same time, all newly independent African countries are vitally interested in improving their mutual trade and economic ties and building up their collective economic capability in order to achieve economic emancipation and progress. Hence the constant striving by neighboring countries in all subregions to join various economic alliances.

Initially, such alliances sprang up only in areas with certain trade and economic ties dating back to the colonial times; in other words, they comprised only neighboring countries that used to belong to the same colonial empire. As a rule, former colonial powers aided in the emergence of such subregional alliances and continued to control

their operation (for example, customs and monetary alliances in West and Equatorial Africa). Gradually, however, a trend has taken shape in Africa toward setting up more independent intergovernmental economic groups which comprise former colonies of different European powers and on which any of the latter can exert only limited influence. A case in point is the recently established Economic Community of West African States.

One should note that economic integration is a difficult process in Africa. Usually, the subregional groups are of low efficiency and unstable; some of them have already broken up (for example, ideological differences and economic contradictions practically dissolved the East African Community of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the summer of 1977). Still, the process is developing, and the number of general economic and specialized subregional organizations is growing steadily.

This raises the question of the proportion between continental and subregional African cooperation, of relations between the OAU and the subregional groups.

Originally, there were strong feelings within the OAU in favor of disbanding these groups, but this applied mostly to political alliances, viewed as an obstacle to African unity and a hindrance to OAU activities. As to economic groups, the OAU supported them from the very start. Resolutions were adopted as early as the OAU founding conference which recognized the possibility of subregional economic groups existing parallel to the OAU. The first session of the OAU Council of Ministers held in August 1963 drew up and approved criteria these groups were to meet. According to this session's decisions, the Organization of African Unity would recognize any subregional group provided its operation did not contradict the purposes and principles of the OAU Charter, provided its member nations had common geographical, economic, social and cultural interests and, finally, provided the group coordinated appropriate activities typical of these countries.

Today, the OAU views the vigorous emergence of subregional economic groups as contributing to gradual progress toward all-African economic unity. The 1967 session of the OAU Assembly welcomed efforts to create them and recommended that all OAU members do their utmost to aid in the establishment of economic groups, ultimately aiming at continent-wide integration. Several years later the 1973 OAU Assembly urged that the establishment of new and the strengthening of existing economic groups be based on concepts favoring the needs of developing and not West European nations.

This policy has made the question of the continent-wide economic integration of newly independent countries into a permanent OAU agenda item. The issue had been originally raised by Kwame Nkrumah and other progressive African leaders even before the OAU was formed. In May 1973 the conference on trade, development and

monetary problems held in Abidjan jointly by the OAU, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Development Bank adopted a special declaration in which independent African countries proclaimed their intention to cooperate at the continental level in using Africa's manpower and natural resources to overcome its backwardness and win economic independence.

In July 1977 the 14th session of the OAU Assembly in Libreville endorsed a declaration setting forth a program of practical action by independent African states to develop continental economic cooperation, its major principles and goals.

The Assembly linked this program with the need to ensure complete control by African countries over their natural resources. Finally, the OAU emergency assembly on economic issues, held in Lagos in April 1980, adopted a special plan of action to carry out an African development strategy up to the year 2000 on the basis of national and collective self-reliance. It also approved the protocol on the establishment of the African Economic Community.

Naturally, the OAU's capacity for implementing its plans of furthering economic cooperation in Africa is quite limited. There is a wide range of objective economic, geographical and, in the final analysis, political factors which impede such cooperation and preclude an early creation of an African "common market". It will take a long time yet to be able to state that a radical change in the system of inter-African economic relations has occurred.

Still, continental economic cooperation plans are being translated into reality, albeit slowly. Gradually, certain ties and contacts, non-existent only recently, are being forged in Africa. Aided by the ECA, some all-African associations have been in operation for many years: the African Development Bank, the African Civil Aviation Commission, the Pan-African Telecommunications Union and the like. The continent-wide coordination of positions among the OAU countries aids them in the struggle for a new international economic order and for restructuring their economic relations with capitalist nations and their EEC-type associations.

Economic integration within individual subregions and, later, throughout Africa becomes an increasingly urgent task in solving the economic problems of today's Africa. Besides, it is important for the further political rapprochement of independent nations. Its progress is what the future of African unity will depend on after the forthcoming eradication of the last colonial and racist regime in South Africa. To ensure its self-preservation, the all-African organization will probably become the coordinating center for the continent's subregional economic organizations. However, without continent-wide economic integration and interrelations, African political unity in the OAU can become shaky. It appears that the growing internationalization of the productive forces and the objective need for economic integration of independent countries throughout the continent will push

this process ahead slowly but inexorably.

An important step in this direction was the sixth regional conference of African ministers of industry, held in Addis Ababa under the ECA and OAU aegis and with UNIDO assistance in late November 1981. Delegates from 35 African nations attended, as did representatives of over 20 international and regional organizations.

The major accomplishment of the conference was that it developed a program of restructuring inter-African economic cooperation on the basis of self-reliance for 1980-1990. It stressed that progress in the follow-up of the decisions taken would depend on how effectively all the 50 independent African countries would discharge their individual, bilateral and collective responsibility for creating a firm infrastructure of an industrial revolution in Africa.

3. Relations Between Tropical Africa and Arab Countries

Relations between Tropical Africa and Arab countries are a factor of special importance for differentiation and consolidation in inter-African affairs. These relations are developing along a tortuous and conflicting path, both within and outside the OAU. Their evolution is affected by contradictions and ties between tropical African states and the Arab countries not only of North Africa but also of the Middle East.

It is common knowledge that during the first years of independence relations between Arab and non-Arab African countries were burdened with the legacy of colonialist efforts to prevent Arab and African liberation movements from merging. European colonial rulers encouraged hostility to Arabs among Africans, stressing the harm Arabs had done to Africa in the past. Specifically, a propaganda myth was launched claiming that colonization by Europeans had freed Africa from Arab slave traders. Naturally, the irreparable damage the European slave trade had inflicted on Africa was conveniently ignored. Besides, the fact that Europeans had used Arab askaris in their conquest of Africa was presented as proof of a community of interests between Arabs and European conquerors. Another scheme to incite anti-Arab feelings was to harp on the fact that since colonial times people from Arab and some other, chiefly Asian, countries had made up most of the petty bourgeoisie engaged in commerce in Africa.

Israel, too, tried to make use of anti-Arab sentiment. In order to win the Africans' confidence, Israeli "friends" of Africa went to great lengths to propagate the myth that Israel had been born in the struggle against British colonial rule and that the Arabs posed a threat to Africa. This technique was aimed at the same objective—preventing an alliance of Arab and African liberation movements.

In the 1960s the Israelis succeeded in projecting to Africa the image

of a selfless small country tackling the same problems independent African nations were facing. Israel established diplomatic relations with most of them and readily provided modest but timely financial and technical assistance. Against this background, the Arab world looked definitely inferior to Africans since they received no assistance from it. Marginal cooperation between tropical and North African countries was maintained only through the OAU and at its forums.

The turning point in Afro-Arab relations was brought about largely by the Mideast conflict. As it developed, new factors were maturing which led to a new historical stage in these relations. As Afro-Arab solidarity in assessing the 1967 Israeli aggression and on issues of a Mideast settlement grew gradually stronger, conditions were emerging for new forms of cooperation and a political and legal foundation was laid for developing economic ties, for expanding and strengthening regional contacts.

The more general outline of the evolution in Afro-Arab relations can be traced in the change of the OAU attitude to the developments in the Middle East. More specifically, this evolution is reflected in the development of political cooperation between OAU and the League of Arab States members, in the emergence of programs of economic assistance from OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries) to African nations. An analysis of these processes makes it possible to identify some of the more important trends in Afro-Arab intergovernmental contacts.

First of all, one should note that Afro-Arab rapprochement was an Arab initiative. The Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the striving to eradicate its consequences prompted the Arab world to look for political allies in order to broaden the anti-Israeli front. Naturally, Arab diplomacy approached the 30-odd tropical African states vigorously and immediately. But it took several years to turn all of Tropical Africa into an ally of the Arabs. Prior to 1970, only seven African countries fully supported the Arab cause at the United Nations, while 21 African nations usually voted against resolutions which favored Arab interests.²

The Arabs began to complement diplomacy with economic incentives in their effort to win Tropical Africa over to their side. Libya extended financial assistance to Uganda. Algerians became active in the sub-Saharan countries. Arab specialists, used to tackling problems similar to those facing Africa, were as good as Israelis. Arab universities began to admit more African students. Here, Arab assistance had an edge over Israeli aid in the Africans' eyes: Israel preferred to keep as many Africans as possible from receiving a higher education.

Gradually, Africa grasped the true causes behind the Mideast conflict, the aggressive, imperialist and racist essence of Israeli policies. The myth of a "small selfless friend" lost its credibility. Even the most unprincipled pragmatists realized the neocolonialist nature of Israeli assistance, aimed at cementing Africa's dependence on impe-

rialism. African patriots were alarmed at the insistent infiltration of Israeli advisers and experts into the crucial elements of the independent countries' state and social structure—the army, the police, trade unions, the state apparatus and the youth movement. Israel's increasingly open and expanding ties with South Africa, its assistance to various separatist movements, its weapons in the hands of the Southern Rhodesia racists—all that showed whose side Israel was on in Africa.

Israel's self-exposure as an aggressor, neocolonialist and ally of colonialists and racists fostered the growth of anti-Israeli feelings at the OAU. Sessions of various OAU bodies began adopting resolutions to support Arab demands in the Mideast conflict. The 12th OAU Assembly (1970) barred Israeli ambassadors from all OAU forums. The last illusions about Israel were shattered with the failure of the mission of the presidents of Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria and Zaire, sent to Tel Aviv by the 13th OAU Assembly (1971) to search for a settlement to the conflict.

In late March 1972, Uganda, which Israel counted among its most loyal and indebted friends in Africa, declared it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel and demanded that Israeli specialists and advisers leave Uganda immediately. This was followed by a series of similar steps on the part of other African countries. After leaving Uganda, the Israeli had to withdraw from Chad, Niger, Mali, the Congo, Burundi and Togo. During the "October War" of 1973 almost all the other tropical African countries severed their relations with Israel.

Legally, the break with Israel was formalized at the eighth emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa in November 1973. In its resolution on the Middle East the session recommended that the OAU members refrain from restoring relations with Israel until it withdrew from all the occupied territories and the Palestinian people regained their inalienable rights.

Political rapprochement between African and Arab countries was accompanied, already in the early 1970s, by the rise in the prospects for their economic and technical cooperation. And, while before the collapse of the Israeli positions in Africa the Arabs were the party most interested in strengthening Afro-Arab solidarity, the situation changed abruptly after 1974. By that year, tropical African countries had become much more interested in moving closer to Arab countries, especially the OAPEC members, comprising seven out of the 13 OPEC nations.

The point is that the rise in prices for crude oil the OPEC members initiated as a means of economic pressure on imperialist powers and monopolies led to grave consequences for Africa too. According to the data supplied by the OAU Secretariat, 36 OAU member countries produce no oil. These nations require 25 to 30 million tons of crude oil and petroleum products (in amounts equivalent to crude oil)

annually. In 1972 (before the introduction of new oil prices) African oil imports were estimated at 625 million dollars. In 1974 this figure rose to about two billion dollars for virtually the same amount of oil. It turned out that African countries were greatly dependent on the OAPEC members for this raw material of crucial importance to Africa (which meets 92 percent of its energy requirements at the expense of oil and petroleum products).

With due regard to this factor, the eighth emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers attached special attention to cooperation between African and Arab countries in the light of alleviating the consequences of the oil price rise affecting the African countries with no oil of their own. A special Committee of Seven* was established to examine the problem and submit recommendations. It was decided that an OAU oil company should be set up to purchase oil from Arab countries for OAU members. The purchases were expected to be at the 1972 price level or at least cost less than the rates the OPEC had announced in December 1973.

This optimism appeared well-founded: a week after the eighth emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers there was an Arab League summit meeting in Algiers which adopted a declaration mapping out further steps to strengthen and develop Afro-Arab solidarity. These included, as priority measures, encouraging Afro-Arab cooperation by severing Arab diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural and other ties with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; extending the oil embargo to these regimes; adopting special measures to ensure normal oil deliveries to the fraternal African countries; establishing an Arab Bank of Economic Development to aid in the economic and social development of African countries and provide them with technical assistance; and expanding diplomatic and material support for African national liberation movements.

The Algiers Declaration was unprecedented in the history of the Arab League. It confirmed the changes which had already occurred in Arab-African relations and charted specific directions of future cooperation. That is why African hopes for a favorable outcome of the talks between the Committee of Seven and Arab oil ministers on introducing a lower level of oil prices for Africa (compared to the price level for the rest of the world) appeared realistic. However, even before the Committee of Seven opened its first meeting, it turned out that the Arab side had run into difficulties with regard to the actual implementation of the Algiers Declaration economic provisions. For example, it would take three to five years to establish an Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) in order to comply with all the formalities of the Arab League Pact.

The international situation—the shaky military balance on the

* At present, the Coordination Committee of Afro-Arab Cooperation (CCAAC), comprising 12 member countries.

Arab-Israeli fronts and the need for African support at the UN—demanded prompt action from the Arab League members. The emergency meeting of Arab oil ministers (Cairo, January 22-23, 1974) decided on the establishment of a loan fund with assets worth 200 million dollars which later became part of the statutory capital of the Arab Bank for African Economic Development. In August 1974 the fund was put into operation and began providing loans to African countries on favorable terms: 25 years to pay back the loan, annual interest rates of one percent, a deferment period of ten years, and 15 years to pay back annual interest rates. One should stress that Algeria and Libya contributed the largest share—130 million dollars. The Committee of Seven laid down the principles and the maximum amount of credit (14.2 million dollars). Tanzania and Ethiopia were the first recipients.

However, the prompt establishment of the fund could not offset African disappointment with the failure of the talks between the Committee of Seven and Arab oil ministers on the crucial question of oil sales to Africa at reduced prices. The OAPEC members declared they guaranteed oil deliveries to African countries. But, as soon as the question of prices was raised at the very first meeting between Arab oil ministers and the Committee of Seven (January 19-21, 1974), the Committee was told that Arab countries would compensate for the excessive cost of oil to African nations by providing them with hard currency loans.

African countries made several attempts to exert diplomatic pressure. This was reflected especially clearly at the 30th UN General Assembly session in the vote on the resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism: of the 36 African countries only 16 voted in favor while 20 abstained (the total number of abstentions was 35). This show of African indifference to the struggle against Zionism, a foremost issue of Arab foreign policy, alarmed the Arab League: aid and loan compensation programs were promptly upgraded. However, the question of reduced oil prices or compensation grants for excessive oil cost remains the most sensitive issue of Arab-African relations to this day. It was discussed as a matter of priority at all meetings and conferences Arab and African countries held in 1974-1980, but without result. These meetings have shown that the Arab side is firmly committed to the position taken in January 1974 and does not intend to revise it. It was only once that the Arab League leadership appealed to the Arab oil-producing countries to help an African country by selling it oil at reduced prices: that was after the Israeli raid on Entebbe and the country in question was Uganda.³

Aside from that, the OAPEC members prefer to compensate African countries for their excessive expenditures for oil purchases by providing them with credits, loans and financial assistance. The following agencies were set up to channel this compensation: the Arab Aid Fund (200 million dollars of assets); BADEA, the Arab Bank for Afri-

can Economic Development (231 million dollars of statutory assets); the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Africa (25 million dollars); the Arabo-African Fund, operating mostly through the African Development Bank (150 million dollars of assets made up by OPEC contributions and 50 million dollars of donations by various international Arab funds). The banks and various assistance funds of individual Arab oil-producing states also share in the compensation. Arab countries contribute to various international funds and banks: the BADEA, the IBRD, the IMF and other UN agencies and organizations.

Statistically, the pattern of Arab assistance to Africa is extremely confused. The Arabs prefer including this aid in the total OPEC assistance to the developing world as a whole. Particular emphasis is laid on the fact that the aid of developed capitalist nations to developing countries accounts for less than 0.3 percent of their GNP, while OPEC assistance makes up three to six percent of its members' annual GNP. True, this aid covers only 0.1 percent of the excess cost of oil to developing countries at the new prices. As to the assistance the African countries receive from the Arabs, it appears modest compared to the billion-dollar losses Africa is incurring because of the oil price rise. According to BADEA President Chedly Ayari, by May 1980 the bank had provided credits and loans worth a total of 570 million dollars to 36 African countries. Of this amount, 25 non-Arab African countries received over 50 credits and loans worth about 350 million dollars. In 1980 oil purchases cost African countries 7.4 billion dollars—30 percent of their total import costs.

The total amount of Arab assistance to Africa, including all types of aid provided directly by Arab countries and through international funds and organizations in 1975-1979, is estimated at over four billion dollars. Virtually all African countries (except Malawi and the Seychelles) were recipients. However, the African balance of payments deficit reached, according to Secretary General Edem Kodjo of the OAU, 44 billion dollars in 1981, while the currency surplus of the oil-exporting countries was 110 billion.

The question of compensation became especially acute on the eve of the first Arab-African summit conference (Cairo, March 1977). Taking into consideration the growing African disappointment both with the size and with the nature of Arab assistance, the Arab League Secretariat announced the decision to increase the statutory assets of BADEA from 231 to 346.5 billion dollars and of the Arab Aid Fund, to 360 million.* Besides, the OAPEC undertook to finance African development projects worth 1.5 billion dollars.

The Afro-Arab summit conference at which representatives of 20 Arab and 40 tropical African countries founded a large international political and economic alliance was a historic development. It legally

* BADEA's statutory assets are now 740 million dollars. The contributors are 18 Arab League members.

formalized a new stage in Afro-Arab relations by endorsing in its documents the principles and forms of political and economic cooperation.

The political declaration of the conference summed up the record of cooperation and mapped out steps to further consolidate the solidarity between Arab and African peoples. A statement approved at the conference stressed the community of interests of Arab and African countries aimed at enhancing understanding between them, international cooperation and their resolve to use the natural and manpower resources to attain comprehensive progress in all fields of human endeavor. It also laid down the principles of political and economic cooperation between Arab and African countries.

The principles of cooperation set forth in the statement included the five well-known principles of peaceful coexistence and provisions of vital importance for developing countries: on nations' permanent control over their natural resources, on defending their interests through equality and reciprocity, on fighting jointly against the sway of racism and all forms of exploitation. These principles are to underlie bilateral and multilateral ties in the fields of politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, commerce, education, science, culture, technology and information.

In the statement, the sides reiterated their commitment to non-alignment as an important factor in the drive toward freedom, independence and peaceful coexistence. Arab and African countries condemned imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism and racism. They reaffirmed their mutual support and undertook to coordinate their international efforts on issues of common concern, especially at the UN.

They pledged to render political, diplomatic, material and moral support to African and Arab liberation movements. They agreed on the strengthening of ties between their national political and social institutions and on the need for comprehensive economic cooperation and for encouraging trade between them.

A special document on cooperation adopted at the conference envisaged Afro-Arab summit meetings every three years and meetings of ministers every eighteen months. Besides, provisions were made for setting up a standing commission of 24 ministers (12 for each side), a coordinating committee and other bodies.

The Cairo Conference was yet another positive step toward a stronger anti-imperialist solidarity among developing countries. Arab and African states acted as regional and bilateral partners not only in politics but also in the economic and many other fields.

The cooperation principles formalized in the decisions of the Cairo Conference have been included in all the subsequent declarations and agreements on cooperation between Arab and African countries.

At the same time, the assistance certain Arab countries extend to

Africa is aimed at impeding the intensification of the national liberation revolutions and deflecting some countries from their socialist orientation. In this connection, the role some Arab regimes played in the Horn of Africa conflict was especially indicative.

However, it appears one should not overrate the independence of the current African policies of, say, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Along with their own ambitious designs, they also pursue the objectives set before them above all by US imperialism. It is precisely Washington who acts as the foremost political, economic and military partner of both Zionism and Arab reactionaries, using them as tools for reaching its global neocolonialist goals. This is expressed both politically and in the field of financial assistance to Africa.

Other neocolonial powers are also resorting increasingly to the channels of Arab aid to Africa. European capital has found a way to infiltrate Africa through the joint aid fund systems under the pretext of compensating African losses brought on by excessive payments for oil. Over the period of operation of the First Lomé Convention, the European Investment Bank of the EEC and nine Arab financial agencies invested about four billion dollars in various African projects. The ratio between Arab and European contributions is five to three.

The success of Arab-European cooperation in infiltrating Africa through investment has led to the advancement of various, obviously neocolonialist, trilateral Euro-Arab-African cooperation projects. In these ventures, Europeans are to act as technical administrators, Arabs are to finance the projects, and Africans to provide raw materials and cheap manpower. At the seventh conference of French-speaking African countries and France, President Giscard d'Estaing proposed the inclusion of an item of formalizing such trilateral cooperation on the agenda of the African summit conference to be convened in Addis Ababa in 1981. At the 22nd OAU Assembly this proposal was supported by some of the delegates. The victory of François Mitterrand in the French Presidential elections changed France's position on this question. It was virtually removed from the agenda and was not mentioned seriously at the November 1981 conference of African countries and France in Paris.

No doubt, the obstacles to Afro-Arab rapprochement erected by the proimperialist activities of the oil monarchies, as well as the outstanding question of oil, make it impossible to fully implement, in the near future, the plans and measures charted at the Cairo Afro-Arab Conference.

African countries responded passively to such major developments in the Arab world as the signing of the Camp David accords and the peace between Israel and Egypt. Arab attempts to encourage the expulsion of Egypt from the OAU, the way it was expelled from the Arab League, brought no results. The Nonaligned Conference in Havana condemned the Sadat regime only formally, largely due to the position taken by African countries; Egypt retained its membership

in the nonaligned movement. However, the issue of Afro-Arab solidarity cannot be reduced merely to the question of Arab assistance to Africa.

Generally, the OAU still holds an uncompromising view of the Mideast settlement and the Palestinian question. The 35th session of the OAU Council of Ministers (June 1980) again denounced Israel for the policy it pursues in the occupied territories, expressed its support of the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their inalienable rights and stated that partial or separate accords were in glaring violation of Palestinian rights and the UN and the OAU Charters. The final documents of the 22nd OAU Assembly reiterated the decisions of the 35th session of the OAU Council of Ministers.

The 37th session of this body (June 1981) condemned Israel resolutely for persisting in its refusal to respect resolutions on Jerusalem adopted by the OAU, the UN and other international organizations, reaffirmed all the earlier OAU resolutions on the question of Palestine, expressed full support for and solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine led by the PLO, their sole legitimate representative, confirmed the Palestinians' right to wage their struggle by all the means available to them until they liberated all the occupied territories, as well as their right to a state of their own. The session maintained that Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 could not guarantee the future or the rights of the Palestinian people and did not provide a basis for a just solution. Resolutions of the OAU Council of Ministers session noted that Israel's expansionist and racist policies posed a threat to peace both in the Middle East and throughout the world. The session recommended that all OAU members refrain from restoring diplomatic relations with Israel as a natural and obvious accomplice of South Africa. Still, the session failed to accept the proposals advanced by certain delegates on applying to Israel the same sanctions that were in force against South Africa. Pressure from the Egyptian delegate blocked the adoption of an Algerian and Libyan draft resolution to condemn the Camp David accords. The final documents of the 23rd OAU Assembly reiterated the resolutions of the Council of Ministers session.

The 23rd OAU Assembly passed an additional resolution on Afro-Arab cooperation, envisaging the first Afro-Arab summit conference in the immediate future. A proposal by the Coordination Committee of Afro-Arab Cooperation (CCAAC) was also accepted; this concerned a conference of representatives of the private sector in African and Arab countries to examine the opportunities for expanding cooperation and trade in this sector. It was decided that the possibilities of establishing a cultural fund and a joint center for studying Arab and African cultures should be examined and that an Afro-Arab conference of donor countries should be held to draw up a concerted aid policy. OAU Assembly participants requested the Arab League to extend observer status at its sessions to representatives of the OAU

and the national liberation movements recognized by it and to make the question of the liberation of Southern Africa a permanent item on the agenda of Arab League sessions.

Aside from Saudi Arabia and other oil monarchies, Africa also receives aid from countries like Algeria and Libya. This substantially consolidates the position and influence of these two nations in the OAU and enables them to resist the proimperialist activities of Saudi Arabia and reformist Arab regimes on the African and Arab scene. Afro-Arab rapprochement itself is objectively antiimperialist; this is borne out by the documents adopted at African and Arab summit conferences. The paramount aspect in the objective need for cooperation between tropical African and Oriental Arab countries is that they face many common problems.

The Luanda Conference of Arab and African Solidarity was an important step in this direction. Held from December 6 to 10, 1981, it was attended by 200 representatives of political and nongovernmental organizations and liberation movements from over 60 countries, including special delegations from the OAU and the Arab League. The Luanda Declaration adopted at the conference offered a profound analysis of the situation which had arisen in Africa and the Middle East due to, among other things, the policies of the Reagan administration and harshly denounced this course as aimed at suppressing liberation movements and destabilizing progressive regimes under the pretext of a crusade against "international terrorism". African and Arab peoples, the Declaration went on, will, together with friendly countries, attain their goals and secure peace, justice, liberation and progress for all nations. The Luanda forum supported the liberation of all the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, upheld the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and condemned the Camp David accords.

Chapter Five

INDEPENDENT AFRICA AND THE RACIST SOUTH

1. Independent Africa in the Struggle to Liberate the South

The eradication of colonial and racist regimes has been among the key foreign policy postulates of African countries since independence, reflected in the resolutions of all the conferences they have held. After the birth of the OAU and the liberation of most former colonies and trust territories this drive spread throughout the continent and acquired a single coordinating center because the mission of eradicating colonial and racist regimes in Africa was formalized in the OAU Charter.

Support for African national liberation movements has always been the focus of attention at all OAU forums. The moral and political support and whatever material assistance the OAU could muster to aid these movements have emerged as a powerful means of pressure on colonial and racist regimes. The Organization of African Unity has found worldwide recognition as an influential anticolonial and antiracist force.

Joint diplomatic efforts by the OAU members are among the chief tools in solving this task. This is the field where African diplomacy is especially active. Specifically, African diplomacy made its contribution to the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire and the liberation of its colonies.

Significantly, African countries have elaborated and are effectively applying in their joint diplomacy the tactics of "selecting the weakest link" and advancing stage-by-stage to their ultimate objective of ending colonial rule. For example, after the war in Algeria was over, African diplomacy focused its efforts on the liberation of the Portuguese colonies; after that goal was accomplished, action was shifted to Zimbabwe and Namibia. Their liberation was seen as the priority task of all-African anticolonial diplomacy. After Zimbabwe won its independence in 1980, African countries stepped up their struggle for the freedom of Namibia and against the South African apartheid regime.

Let us consider the actual role OAU diplomacy plays in solving the issues of Southern Africa.

Prior to 1980 African countries had organized and long observed a collective diplomatic boycott of the racist regimes in Southern

Rhodesia and South Africa; after Zimbabwean independence they continue their boycott of Pretoria. No African nation except Malawi has diplomatic relations with South Africa. All of them, including Malawi, refused to recognize Transkei and other South African-sponsored Bantustans as independent states. The South African plans for the bantustanization of Namibia failed to generate support in Africa either. Racist Southern Rhodesia which unilaterally declared "independence" in 1965 was kept out of the African community, while the OAU Council of Ministers rejected, in February 1978, the so-called internal settlement Ian Smith was trying to put into effect that year, having denounced it as a conspiracy against the people of Zimbabwe. The collective African boycott of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was not only diplomatic but also commercial and economic.

Simultaneously, the OAU is rendering collective moral and material assistance to liberation movements in Southern Africa. African diplomacy has embarked on the difficult task of unifying the Southern African anticolonial liberation organizations recognized by the OAU. This diplomatic effort helped in the generally successful solution of this problem for Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Finally, African diplomacy provides a powerful catalyst for worldwide protests against colonial and racist regimes. Through the United Nations and other organizations and conferences it succeeded in having the Smith regime isolated internationally, political and economic pressure on South African racists stepped up and the NATO countries condemned for arming and supporting the racist regime by every means available. Acting jointly with the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and nonaligned nations, African diplomacy won a major victory when the UN Security Council imposed an embargo on arms sales to South Africa in the autumn of 1977, the first time the Western powers were forced to agree with this step. Joint diplomatic activity of the OAU countries (specifically, special OAU missions) is effective in mobilizing international material assistance to African liberation movements.

Facts therefore prove that African diplomacy has been and is capable of contributing effectively to the liberation of Southern Africa. The existing opportunities are much greater thanks to international support, above all from the Soviet Union, the rest of the socialist community and nonaligned countries. At the same time, Africa's top diplomats realize that the elimination of colonial and racist regimes depends primarily on the advance of the liberation movement and on African countries themselves. No matter how great the contribution of the international community and the friends of Africa throughout the world to the cause of African liberation, former OAU Secretary General Diallo Telli Boubacar once said, it remains an essentially African affair. Today, the main thing is for Africa to prove its commitment.

The question of "African commitment" has not been raised acci-

dentially. So far Africans have not displayed complete unity or sufficient consistency in this matter. Most African countries failed to observe the 1965 OAU decision on severing diplomatic relations with Great Britain if it did not cut its ties with the Smith regime. In contradiction to the UN and OAU resolutions on economic sanctions against the remaining colonial and racist regime, several African countries continue trading with it, and some have even established economic contacts with South Africa. Progressive OAU quarters have to wage a continuous and unremitting struggle for greater material assistance to liberation movements, since many African countries are behind in their contributions or do not contribute at all to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund which channels this assistance. Moreover, there is a glaring discrepancy between the declarations at the UN and the actual record of some African countries. This gave rise to claims by the Western press that "the mission of African diplomacy at the UN is to furnish an alibi".¹ It is sometimes recognized even in Africa that the anticolonialism of such countries as the Ivory Coast, let alone Malawi, is really quite relative. Several African leaders, including President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast who advanced the idea of a "dialogue" with South Africa as early as 1969-1970, have established and are still maintaining personal contacts with leaders of the South African racist regime.

Generally though, African diplomacy is intransigent to racists and advocates any—both armed and peaceful—means of fighting against them. Most OAU countries reject tricks aimed at "reaching an understanding" with the South African regime. "An African Munich would no more bring peace that did that of Europe in 1938. It would be a betrayal, and as such it would weaken the struggle for justice everywhere."² This quotation from the speech of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania at the 25th session of the UN General Assembly reflects faithfully the attitude of most African countries to imperialist and South African attempts at reaching a so-called peaceful settlement of the crisis in the South of Africa.

Prior to the mid-1970s anticolonial and antiracist forces in Africa were confronted with an alliance of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and fascist Portugal. It was in fact a military bloc aimed primarily at stopping the spread of the national liberation revolution to the countries they controlled. In the overall historical retreat of colonialism, this bloc played the part of a rear guard which fought back furiously and tried to preserve its "empire" in the South of Africa intact at any cost. No wonder that the OAU and its members spearheaded their blow against the triple alliance of colonial rulers and racists. Initially, the focus was on helping the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau to bring to a victorious end their armed struggle against Portuguese colonialists that was already under way.

Naturally, this did not mean that there would be armed conflict between independent African countries and the colonial and racist

regimes, although over the decade from 1960 to 1970 more than 20 of these countries almost doubled their armed forces strength, and some even increased it fivefold. The total strength of their armies was greater than that of the South African, Southern Rhodesian and Portuguese armed forces, but independent Africa was inferior in its military capabilities—given the lack of a munitions industry and the low level of available weapons, equipment and combat training.

Most African countries therefore considered it infeasible to create a "liberation army" of the OAU or wage a war against the colonial and racist bloc, especially since these regimes were rapidly building up their military capabilities with the help of NATO countries. South Africa moved especially far in this direction, having boosted its defense spendings abruptly in the 1960s. It developed a munitions industry of its own, and launched large-scale manufacture of modern weapons. Its constantly growing army received new and better weapons and turned into a factor influencing the political situation both in the South and in some other regions of Africa. The possibility arose that this army could be used outside South Africa. For the first time Pretoria put its army and police into action abroad in Southern Rhodesia and Angola in 1966 and 1976. The South African police units sent to Southern Rhodesia actually remained there for many years.

This prompted Africa's independent countries to concentrate on political and material support for national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, in Southern Rhodesia and South African-occupied Namibia, and on intensifying the international boycott of South Africa. Several countries set up military training camps for freedom fighters from the South; African national liberation organizations began to receive financial and other material assistance; many of them were granted observer status at the OAU in 1967. Radio stations in independent countries launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against the colonial and racist oppressors.

It followed from experience that, unlike the military field, the alignment of forces between liberated Africa and the colonial and racist regimes in the political sphere had been from the very start unfavorable to the latter, and this edge kept growing steadily. This was reflected especially clearly in the outcome of their confrontation at the UN and in other international organizations. For example, at the initiative of African countries supported vigorously by the socialist nations, the UN General Assembly revoked, in 1966, the mandate granted to South Africa for administering South-West Africa. Besides, in the 1960s African countries succeeded in having South Africa and Portugal expelled from UNESCO, the ECA and the World Health Organization (WHO), and South Africa from several international conferences, the Olympics, etc.

Thus, for all the scarcity of the opportunities available to independent African countries in their drive to eliminate the colonial and rac-

ist regimes, their joint action proved largely effective. This forced Pretoria, Lisbon, Salisbury and their NATO allies to abandon their disdain of the anticolonial efficiency of African unity in favor of its recognition. The United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Italy and Japan, constantly condemned at OAU forums for their support of the colonial and racist regimes and interested in having normal relations with independent African countries, had to maneuver and even take part, to a degree, in UN sanctions against these regimes.

This explains why Western powers and the authorities of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Salazar's Portugal went to great lengths to change the unfavorable alignment of political forces in Africa. Naturally, anticolonial African unity became their prime target. They saw their task in bringing pressure to bear on the anticolonial policy of independent Africa, splitting the OAU or controlling its activities.

The West is using political and economic pressure to try to undermine the concept and policy of armed liberation struggle. Besides threatening to use armed force against Zambia, Tanzania and other Frontline States, South Africa's colonial and racist regime has also launched a policy of "building bridges" in Africa. South Africa is stepping up its economic infiltration of independent African countries and, playing on their economic hardships, promises them aid. Also, in their efforts to end Pretoria's isolation in Africa and to isolate instead the national liberation movement inside the country, the South African authorities have taken up vigorous propaganda of "conciliation" with independent Africa. Naturally, South African racists are searching for anticomunist common ground first and foremost with African reactionaries: they have even offered to sign a nonaggression pact with some African countries under the pretext of fighting jointly against the "Communist menace".

Socially and politically heterogeneous, independent Africa has always included forces that pay lip service to the struggle against colonialism and racism but in actual fact resist the overall anticolonial and antiracist trend. The positions held by some of them were passive rather than active; this was rooted in objective causes and was treated with understanding. For example, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana found it impossible to join the trade and economic sanctions against South Africa due to their geographical location and the traditionally close economic ties to Pretoria. But there were also African governments which not only went against the joint anticolonial policy, thus openly violating OAU decisions, but even worked hard to push other African countries into conciliation with the colonial and racist regime. For example, President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi kept up his trade and economic relations with South Africa, established diplomatic relations with it in 1967 and began persuading other OAU governments to "make up" with South Africa and end what he called "useless" armed struggle for Southern African liberation.

This combination of anticolonialism and antiracism with vacillations in practical support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa was fully reflected in the Lusaka Manifesto, adopted at a conference of 14 East and Central African countries in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1969 and then approved as an all-African document at the September 1969 OAU Assembly. The manifesto rejected inventions about the Africans' "black racism" and laid down, for the first time, independent Africa's views of the principles which should underlie interracial relations in the South of the continent: "Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the color of their skins ... the individuals in Southern Africa shall be ... given an opportunity to be men—not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men."³

The manifesto noted that the peoples of South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colonies were forced to take up arms; it stressed OAU support for this struggle and, at the same time, the need for a "minimum of violence": "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill... If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change."⁴

The Lusaka Manifesto notion of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the Southern African problem with the colonial and racist regimes was subsequently used above all by those Africans who had not previously fought against these regimes. Already at the 24th UN General Assembly several African delegations spoke to emphasize that force should not be used against the colonialists and racists and that a "dialogue" with them was in order. Advocates of this policy repeatedly urged African public opinion to end the isolation of South Africa since, they argued, it merely made the racists more stubborn. There were simultaneous appeals to African countries to establish and expand contacts with South Africa; this, the claim went, could alter the stand of the white minority in favor of the majority, while closer economic contacts with South Africa could improve considerably the economic positions of many African nations. In 1971 the President of Malawi visited South Africa and later even tried to call a conference of the African countries who favored a "dialogue" with Pretoria.

These African trends—reflected, apart from the stand taken by Banda and Houphouët-Boigny, in the policies of Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic and Kofi Busia of Ghana—undermined Africa's anticolonial unity and threatened to upset the political superiority of independent Africa over the colonial and racist regimes. The spread of these trends could deprive the national liberation movements

in Southern Africa of reliable fallback positions and slow down the liberation process considerably. Naturally, freedom fighters of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, as well as the progressive African countries supporting them, began a resolute offensive against the conciliatory trends. As a result, while in the years following the Lusaka Manifesto the OAU did not abandon the notion of a "peaceful transition to liberation" by negotiating with the colonial and racist regimes, in 1970-1974 the all-African organization repeatedly and expressly supported armed struggle as the chief and most effective form of the liberation effort. Advocates of a "dialogue" were still in the minority, and their positions were eroded considerably by the ousting of Tsiranana in Madagascar and Busia in Ghana.

But it was the military and political victory of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies which was the best proof that an overwhelming majority of African countries were right to work consistently for the eradication of colonial and racist regimes. The April 1974 fall of the fascist dictatorship and the consequent collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa dealt a devastating blow to the colonial and racist bloc. Also, the elimination of colonial regimes in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe, Mozambique and Angola provided an extra incentive for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

Essentially, the downfall of the Portuguese colonial empire ushered in a new stage in the struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa. This stage has brought new changes in the alignment of forces, making it even more favorable to national liberation movements and African countries. Politically, the fighters against apartheid and racial discrimination gained ground thanks to the emergence of sovereign socialist-oriented Angola and Mozambique—they were backed by the socialist community which expanded its internationalist support of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia—and also due to the considerably increased pressure on the racist regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia from world public opinion, the non-aligned movement and progressive quarters in the West.

African countries demonstrated their political advantage already in the autumn of 1974, when they blocked the South African delegation from attending the UN General Assembly session. But it was not merely that the racist regimes were weakened politically. The defeat of the MPLA armed forces, aided by socialist countries, inflicted on the South African aggressors in Angola in 1975-1976 raised questions about South African military superiority too. After South Africa's military defeat, many African countries concluded that the enemy was not as formidable as it tried to appear. Besides, this imparted greater self-confidence to countries like Nigeria because by that time they had gained considerable military experience and built up large armed forces equipped with modern weapons.

In this new light, African countries focused on expediting the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia without letting up their struggle to bring down the South African apartheid system. The recognition of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia as the genuine representatives of their peoples helped substantially to rally greater moral and material support for them. The emergence of the Group of Frontline States enhanced the positions and opportunities of these liberation organizations significantly: the group provided them with the greatest practical assistance in the African context.

The new situation has also helped to change Africa's view of negotiations with the racist regimes and Western emissaries on the possible peaceful settlement of the Zimbabwe and Namibia problems. The very notion of such talks is now approached from "positions of strength", as a useful addition to the armed struggle which the liberation movements are waging and independent countries continue to support. Naturally, these nations' efforts, including diplomatic ones, to secure a peaceful settlement of the disputes—provided it meets the legitimate interests of the peoples of Southern Africa—are viewed with understanding both in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

The sudden upswing in the Western diplomatic drive in Southern Africa in 1977-1979 and the advancing of various "peaceful settlement" schemes for Southern Rhodesia and Namibia by the racist regimes and Western powers encouraged even some firmly antiracist African countries to support these plans; after they materialized in Zimbabwe in 1980, the hopes that a similar outcome could be ensured in Namibia grew throughout Africa. Still, the shift to an exclusively peaceful settlement of the Namibia problem does not mean that independent Africa is ready to make concessions to the Pretoria racists at the expense of Namibia's indigenous population. The OAU Assemblies in Freetown in 1980 and in Nairobi in 1981 came out firmly in support of the armed struggle of the Namibian people led by SWAPO, their sole legitimate representative. Moreover, African countries, supported by the socialist and nonaligned nations, are working to make the UN mandatory sanctions against South Africa more stringent. The aim is to prevent the South African racist regime from retaining its positions in occupied Namibia under cover of granting it fictitious independence. This stand taken by Africa presages an escalation in its confrontation with the racist regime and its Western imperialist sponsors.

African countries are not alone in their just struggle against colonialism and racism: all freedom-loving forces, above all the socialist community, support them unwaveringly. The comprehensive assistance, including weapons, provided by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has become crucial for African peoples especially because on their way to liberation they have to overcome the resistance put up not only by the colonial rulers themselves but also by their backers—the imperialist powers and their monopolies. This

means that, objectively, African national liberation movements and the OAU countries, supported by the socialist community, the nonaligned movement and other progressive forces, have been clashing with the colonial and racist regimes and their US and other imperialist supporters throughout the struggle for African liberation and independence.

The alignment of forces between these two rival camps is of paramount importance for Africa's complete liberation. The independent camp is clearly in a superior position: the French, British, Belgian, Spanish and, finally, Portuguese colonial empires in Africa have already disintegrated gradually. Of course, any change in this alignment of forces hinges above all on the action and unity of African nations. That was true of the period of the 1960s-early 1970s. This is still more topical for the current decisive stage in Southern African liberation.

2. The Racists in a Political Impasse

The racists of Pretoria and Salisbury were greatly alarmed by the April 1974 revolution in Portugal and the very real danger of losing the cordon sanitaire—Angola and Mozambique—which screened South Africa, Namibia and partly Southern Rhodesia from independent Africa.

Immediately after April 25, 1974 Defense Minister Pieter Botha of South Africa declared combat alert in the country's areas bordering on Angola and Mozambique; the police units stationed there were replaced with regular army troops. Besides, the first large-scale "counterinsurgency exercise" involving South African and Southern Rhodesian ground troops and air force was staged along the Mozambique border. Also, top brass in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia coordinated their plans of military operations for the so-called contingencies. The South African Prime Minister threatened an invasion of Mozambique if a hostile government took power there; in 1975 such an armed invasion was carried out against Angola to prevent the consolidation of the MPLA government.

For Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the victory of national liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique was a call to arms. Now, face to face with the African countries who, brooking no form of racism, firmly supported Southern African freedom fighters, the racist regimes worked feverishly to bolster their police, security forces and armies. From 1975 to 1980 the strength of South African armed forces almost tripled from 120,000 to over 400,000 servicemen. Its military expenditures grew at an increasingly higher rate: from 472 million rands* in the fiscal year 1973/1974 to over two billion rands.

* One rand equals 1.15 US dollars; the South African fiscal year is from April 1 to March 31.

in 1980/1981. Aside from conventional weapons (75 percent manufactured domestically and the rest purchased in the West), the South African army started preparations for gearing itself to nuclear weapons, by no means a type of arms for "internal consumption". South Africa repeatedly launched aggressive forays into Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique and went on with its saber-rattling to intimidate all of independent Africa. Significantly, former Defense Minister Pieter Botha became head of the South African government in 1978.

Simultaneously, Pretoria launched an all-out diplomatic drive, boosting publicity of a "dialogue" with African countries, promising to correct its domestic and foreign policies. Already in October 1974 Vorster announced in the South African parliament that his government was in favor of replacing the military and political confrontation in Southern Africa with steps toward detente. Meeting President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast in Abidjan in November, he called on independent Africa to "give South Africa a chance", pledging his government would "surprise the world" by certain political steps within the coming six to twelve months. From 1975 on the South African Prime Minister repeatedly contacted Houphouët-Boigny and President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, advocates of "dialogue", to enlist their aid in influencing other African leaders. The South African government pinned great hopes on the interest independent African countries would show in trade with and economic assistance from Pretoria. South Africa showed off its high level of industrial development and was lavish with promises of such aid.

Let us see whether racist South Africa has kept its word, whether anything has changed in its domestic and foreign policies.

Undoubtedly, circumstances—including resistance abroad and at home—did force South Africa to somewhat modify its formerly intransigent position with regard to preserving racism in its "pristine form". Soon after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, Vorster declared a program of controlled easing of racial barriers. In 1975-1978 South Africa gave up some of the more notorious elements in social discrimination and segregation and presented these steps as a beginning of "constructive" socio-economic modifications aimed at radically changing the apartheid system.

Meanwhile, Pretoria embarked on a course of setting up, within South Africa, 13 "independent" Bantustans by the early 1980s. All the African population was to be concentrated there, deprived, however, of South African citizenship and reduced to the status of a foreign labor force in South Africa's "all-white" economy. Racist leaders claim this would solve the problem of the black majority. Some Bantustans were granted "internal self-government" in 1963-1974, and later, political "independence". On October 26, 1976 the Vorster government proclaimed the "sovereignty" of Transkei, the "national home of the Xhosa", and on December 6, 1977,

the "independence" of Bophutatswana, the "national home of the Tswana". Later, Venda and other Bantustans were granted "independence".

Bantustanization creates merely an illusion of independence; this gives rise to protests throughout Africa. First, Bantustans are formed within the confines of overcrowded and poverty-stricken native reserves. Second, these "homelands" are set up in areas which cannot support independent economic development. Third, the racists still control the Bantustans through the black bureaucracies they set up.

Pretoria has refused to completely dismantle the apartheid system and stepped up reprisals against its opponents. The racist authorities brutally suppressed the outbreaks among young Africans in Soweto and elsewhere in South Africa and the strikes and antigovernment manifestations which occurred in 1976-1979. To crush the growing opposition in the country, the racists redoubled their persecution of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) and banned legitimate African organizations that opposed apartheid. Severe restrictions were also imposed on the Colored political organizations and on the Indian National Congress of South Africa which expressed its solidarity with the actions of Africans. The government did all it could to forestall the emergence of a united antiracist political front representing all nonwhite population groups.

A similar course was also noticeable in South Africa's policy toward Namibian independence. Prior to 1975 Pretoria categorically rejected any real prospect of change in the status of this territory or of the African majority in this "fifth province" of South Africa. They merely wanted bantustanization for Namibia—dividing it into formally independent homelands actually under complete South African political and economic control.

Later, however, the racist regime altered, to a degree, its position vis-a-vis the Namibia problem. Under pressure from the liberation movement, the United Nations and world public opinion and taking into account the forced maneuvering and shifts in the Western attitude, Pretoria gradually recognized the inevitability of at least a formal withdrawal from Namibia—after ensuring a neocolonialist solution and securing its own positions there. The scenario for Namibian "independence" envisaged a formal transfer of power to reactionary tribal chiefs, long in close collaboration with the South African regime. In actual fact, the white minority and the powerful South African capitalists would retain full control of the country.

With this end in view, a conference of representatives of Namibia's ethnic groups was convened in Windhoek in September 1975. SWAPO, recognized by the OAU and the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, was barred from this conference. Predictably, the Windhoek talks participants approved the government version of the draft Namibian constitution in March 1977. The

draft was later endorsed by the South African parliament; for this reason Pretoria treated it as official Namibian legislation. To demonstrate its "goodwill", the Vorster government abrogated the Namibian passbook laws, a clear case of discrimination against Africans, in October 1977. In November Pretoria announced that elections to the future National Assembly of Namibia would be prepared and held, so that the territory could be declared independent on December 31, 1978. In 1978 the South African government went to great lengths to place its army in complete control of these elections and to prevent UN troops from entering the country, the way it was envisaged in UN decisions. The "elections", held in early December 1978, expectedly ended in a victory of South Africa's puppets and preserved the political and economic positions of the West and of South Africa in Namibia, although they did nothing toward solving the Namibia problem.

Meanwhile, SWAPO influence was growing nationwide and its armed forces were expanding operations. In November 1980 Pretoria was forced to agree to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's proposal about holding a Namibia conference in Geneva from January 7 to 14, 1981. According to South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, his government agreed to take part in the talks to ward off the sword of Damocles hanging over South Africa.

The Geneva Conference was convened but failed. In fact, the talks on the UN plan (the granting of independence to Namibia before the end of 1981) never got off the ground. Instead of discussing the plan, the South African delegation demanded that the United Nations withdraw the recognition of SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people and that it support the Windhoek puppets. Finally, the racists said they thought it was "premature" to settle the Namibia question altogether.

Indignation swept throughout Africa at the wrecking of the conference. African countries demanded comprehensive sanctions to be applied to South Africa.

Initially, a roughly similar situation emerged in Southern Rhodesia too. Supporting, as before, the white minority there, South Africa displayed a more flexible approach in its dealings with the Smith regime.

As in Namibia, the goal was the same—to preserve, together with the West, the political and economic positions of the white minority, South Africa and the West in Southern Rhodesia; to find a neocolonialist solution to the problem. In the final analysis, this was what all the versions of the plan for a Southern Rhodesian settlement elaborated jointly by Washington, London and Pretoria amounted to. That was also the aim of the proposal US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made in 1976 about providing the future independent Zimbabwe with financial assistance to the tune of 1.5 to 2 billion dollars if power in this country were transferred to the traditional

tribal chiefs, the national bourgeoisie and some liberation movement leaders.

The steadily mounting liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe forced Ian Smith to make a show of abandoning his rigid racist stand. In March 1978 he signed a constitutional agreement on the so-called internal settlement with a group of African collaborationists. The agreement was signed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the United African National Council, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the so-called internal faction of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and Mashona chief Jeremiah Chirau, head of the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO). The Salisbury agreement envisaged the creation of an African majority government within two years, but with the white settlers and monopoly capital retaining virtually complete control of the country's economy and politics. Obviously, this could not satisfy the Zimbabwe liberation movement or solve the problem. The Patriotic Front stepped up its liberation struggle and forced Great Britain to convene a conference on Southern Rhodesia in London in the autumn of 1979. The conference and the outcome of the subsequent elections in the country were a clean victory of the patriots of Zimbabwe, the 50th independent African state.

Thus, despite all their efforts to offset the impact of the victories in Angola and Mozambique on the peoples of Southern Africa, the racists and their supporters are incapable of stemming the tide of liberation. Their domestic and foreign policy maneuvers have reached a dead end. The struggle to dismantle the apartheid system in South Africa is intensifying, gaining in scope and increasingly acquiring a social as well as a racial angle. In Namibia, SWAPO has rejected Pretoria's election scheme and is intensifying its political and armed struggle for independence and territorial integrity.

The peoples of South Africa enjoy firm worldwide support in their fight for genuine liberation. Pretoria has failed to pass off its domestic maneuvering as steps to meet African demands. Even countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi who are economically dependent on South Africa, resisted its pressure, rejected the bantustanization of South Africa and refused to recognize the "independence" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Moreover, Botswana has joined the Group of Frontline States who form the rear base of the Southern African liberation movements.

Of course, this does not mean the racist regime is no longer capable of effectively resisting, together with world imperialism, the liberation forces and their supporters. At the current stage in Southern African liberation, this resistance is taking new forms and is generally on the rise. Pretoria, imperialist powers and monopolies, and the reactionary social strata in independent African countries fear that progressive, socialist-oriented forces favoring friendship with the socialist community may come to control Southern Africa, the way it

happened in Angola and Mozambique. Hence the priority objective of reactionaries throughout the world—to prevent this from happening and preserve their political, military-strategic and economic positions in Southern Africa. One can therefore conclude that the current struggle within and outside the OAU over the problems of Southern Africa is, in a way, a struggle over the future of all Africa and African unity.

Chapter Six

INDEPENDENT AFRICA AND DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The pattern of relations between independent African countries and the former colonial and imperialist powers, above all the United States, is among the more important elements in African foreign policy. In this field, the foremost objective is to secure equality and fight against all forms of neocolonialism. However, far from making the foreign policy of independent African countries merely defensive, this means that in its bilateral relations with developed capitalist nations Africa both resists neocolonialist forays and is on the offensive.

Obviously, independent countries differ in their attitude to imperialist powers, displaying common and distinctive features, both on the all-African level. It is therefore best to analyze this aspect of independent Africa's foreign policy from the viewpoint of its reaction to the policy of each capitalist nation and to identify the motives behind this or that action taken by a given African country.

1. Afro-American Relations

For a long time, US imperialism, which had not been involved in the colonial partition of Africa, did not directly exploit the continent's natural resources or cheap manpower. The situation changed after Africans gained independence. The former colonial powers were gradually losing their exclusive hold on Africa, and the monopolies of all imperialist countries rushed in. Amid fierce competition multinational corporations reshaped their spheres of influence in Africa. US state-monopoly capitalism was especially successful in bringing its economic might to bear on its West European competitors so as to weaken their positions.

In the 1960s and 1970s the United States became the third largest trading partner and investor of government and private funds in Africa, after Great Britain and France. Each year, Afro-American economic ties expanded, especially in areas of particular importance to US industry and agriculture (primarily mining).

The growth of political relations followed economic contacts (not

vice versa, the way it happened in international relations previously), with the US ruling quarters claiming a position of particular political influence in Africa. However, this special status has so far failed to materialize, for various reasons. Efforts to put the mechanism of neocolonial domination into operation have not been fully successful, even in countries that are especially dependent on the United States economically and would like to strengthen political ties with Washington, like Zaire. Still, the US ruling elite persists in its search for free access, both in political and in economic terms, to African oil, uranium, cobalt, manganese, chrome and diamonds.

Interimperialist rivalries are forcing the United States to look for allies in Africa, while at the same time it seeks to coordinate, to a degree, its action with that of its imperialist competitors, especially to fight the growing prestige of the forces of peace and socialism in Africa. This dual aspect of the United States' foreign relations explains both the zigzags of US policy in Africa and the African response to it.

Since African countries gained independence, the scope of Afro-American relations has enlarged steadily, although US political prestige has fluctuated considerably. From the mid-1970s the United States intensified its efforts. The new general upsurge of African national liberation which followed the disintegration of the Portuguese colonial empire, as well as the fact that more countries were choosing the noncapitalist road of development compounded the fears among the US ruling quarters for the future of capitalism in Africa and prompted them to escalate their resistance to progress there. Naturally, this US policy leads African countries to take countermeasures, affecting the overall picture of Afro-American relations.

In 1977-1978 the Carter administration mapped out new directions for the United States' African policy.* Its chief objectives remained unchanged—to keep independent countries within the world capitalist economic system, dampen the liberation struggle, put obstacles in the way of socialist orientation, and gain ground for US monopolies in Africa. But the methods were somewhat updated to comprise the following: broadening economic cooperation, above all with the countries rich in mineral resources; trying to improve political relations with socialist-oriented countries; building up a peacemaker's image for the United States as a nation favoring peaceful settlement of African disputes; and expanding arms sales and military assistance to African countries.

At first, some African leaders gave credence to Carter's assurances of understanding "Africa's needs". However, as the new US administration pursued its policy, African leaders and public opinion realized that the broadening of "equitable" economic cooperation with the United States remained an empty phrase, while in actual fact the

* The previous period in Afro-American relations has been the subject of several studies. See, for example, Stewart Smith, *U.S. Neocolonialism in Africa*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974.

Americans were boosting their trade and investment expansion, aimed at draining a limited number of African countries of strategic raw materials. Notably, even these countries failed to make this trade genuinely equitable. They and the United States clashed with particular violence in Paris, at the final stage of the abortive North-South Conference in May and June 1977, when US diplomacy tried to manipulate the participants into accepting decisions which favored the West and conceded a "stabilization fund" to adjust prices for strategic raw materials.¹ After African delegates tried to defend their national interests at subsequent negotiations and bring about a change in the discriminatory Western policies, Washington ordered its diplomats to cut off the talks.

Pledges of greater US economic and technical assistance also failed to evoke the desired response in Africa, since it is assistance with strings attached and cannot, as a rule, be used the way African leaders want it to be used. In fact, it is not financial assistance that Africa receives, but US-manufactured goods on credit (sometimes in the form of grants) under intergovernmental agreements. Africans then have to pay for this "aid" both in equivalent deliveries and by making political concessions.

The US government provides financial loans usually in the interests of the US companies operating in Africa. For example, such loans were used in Akasombo, Ghana, for building a power station to supply electricity to the US-owned aluminum factory in Tema.

Thus Carter's new economic policy in Africa failed to pay off politically. An overwhelming majority of African countries are in a state of confrontation with the United States, understandably seeing the position of the US government as a prime obstacle to just and equitable international economic relations.

Those African countries with which the United States tried to improve political relations generally responded favorably to these overtures. At the same time, these countries displayed no readiness to waive their principles in foreign and domestic policies in the name of normalizing relations with Washington.

Understandably, the socialist-oriented countries were first to adopt this stand. Angola has repeatedly stressed that better relations with the United States should not be seen as a surrender of the fundamental principles of Angola's domestic and foreign policy. Agostinho Neto, the country's first President, agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the United States but warned that his government would never agree to unwarranted political concessions. The only viable basis for such relations, he said, was in recognizing the equality of the established state and social systems. Angola followed this basic guideline in the autumn of 1979 too, when the United States was again sounding out the possibility of talks on normalizing relations. In 1980 the general rise in US aggressiveness made its position more rigid with regard to diplomatic recognition of Angola. The

United States insisted that all Cuban military personnel be withdrawn and that military cooperation between Angola and the Soviet Union be restricted.²

Nigeria offers another example. The leadership there responded coolly to US advances about normalizing relations which deteriorated after the Nigerian government refused to receive the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976 because of conflicting views of the US role in the Angolan events.

President Carter's visit to Lagos in April 1978 highlighted the reluctance of Nigerian leaders to play the part of a political ally of the United States in Africa and revealed a number of serious differences in the way the two countries approached key African and world problems. General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's head of military government, demanded "resolute measures" to transfer power to the African majority in Southern Rhodesia, while President Carter insisted on a compromise. Also, Lagos refused to strike separate deals with the United States to the detriment of Nigeria's obligations to OPEC. Discussing the presence of Cuban servicemen in Africa and the consequent issue of Africa's relations with the socialist community, the Nigerian side said it did not consider contacts with socialist countries a threat to Africa.

The negative reaction of the Nigerian government to the obvious discrepancy between US words and deeds was also reflected in the assessment of the position taken by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the then US President's national security adviser, concerning key African problems. The Nigerian press noted that the high-handed disdain he displayed toward African nations called for a reappraisal of US actions in Africa. Nigeria approached consistently the question of improving relations with the United States when, after the civilian government took over in October 1979, President Shehu Shagari declared that US-Nigerian relations could be good only if the US ruling quarters respected the needs and aspirations of Africans, above all in the South of the continent.

The Nigerian position clearly alarmed Washington, and the Carter administration took steps to improve relations between the two countries, particularly in the economic field. During the visit to Lagos of US Vice-President Walter Mondale, in July 1980, it was decided to balance Nigerian-US trade. However, on his official visit to the United States in October 1980, President Shagari stressed that broader economic ties should also aid in solving the key issue in US-Nigerian relations: Washington's approach to the struggle of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa.

US attempts at interference in the internal affairs of African countries under the pretext of "peaceful settlement of disputes" do nothing to improve Afro-American political relations either. Besides, independent countries failed to be impressed by the fact that the Carter administration coupled these attempts with anti-Soviet and

anti-Cuban rhetoric (for example, on his visit to Senegal in August 1978, US Under Secretary of State Richard Moose spoke of the need to "keep the Russians and the Cubans from interfering in Africa"³).

Most African leaders made it plain to Washington that they would not waive their right of taking foreign policy decisions independently, without bowing to any external pressure. Moreover, despite Washington's diplomatic efforts, representatives of several African countries voiced their intention to appeal for aid to the socialist community in rebuffing aggression by US-backed regimes.

Pursuing its neocolonialist goals, the United States is trying to develop military cooperation with independent Africa. Typically, few African leaders respond favorably to these US schemes which are realized in arms sales and military and technical assistance. An overwhelming majority of independent governments reject the idea of broad military contacts with the United States. They also condemn the policy of some African states (Kenya, Somalia and Egypt) who have allowed the United States uncontrolled use of military installations on their territory.

Realistic African leaders are aware that military cooperation with the United States can turn them into pawns in the US foreign policy strategy in Africa. They have not overlooked the fact that Washington also draws African countries into its political orbit under the pretext of "defending Africans from outside forces". In actual fact this means, among other things, the issuing of US-supplied weapons to special troops whose mission it is to fight against progressive African movements. For example, the inter-African peace-keeping forces (plans to establish them appeared in the spring of 1978) were to be equipped with Western, primarily US weapons. Only the governments of Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Togo, Gabon and Zaire supported this plan, and for different reasons. Most African leaders categorically opposed this imperialist conspiracy to make Africans fight Africans.

The danger this design poses is obvious. It is aimed at splitting Africa into opposing political groups, not at bolstering its defense capabilities. The formation of such forces can only undermine African unity in the struggle against imperialist aggression and the racist regime in the South. That was why the OAU Summit Assembly in Khartoum rejected the neocolonialist plan and entrusted the OAU Defense Commission with elaborating underlying principles for inter-African armed units under OAU control and submitting these principles for approval. The Commission held its regular meeting in April 1979, and the OAU Assembly in Monrovia approved its recommendations. The purpose of the inter-African forces is to aid in the peaceful settlement of inter-African disputes and in freeing Africa of the apartheid regime.

The United States' Southern African policy put Afro-American relations and their future to a severe test. The intention to support national liberation in Southern Africa the Carter administration

proclaimed immediately put the leaders of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, SWAPO, ANC and most independent countries on the alert. After all, Washington had long essentially ignored the national aspirations of the Southern African peoples. The misgivings proved quite justified: the US steps that followed were in glaring contradiction with its high-sounding promises. It turned out that the Carter administration was in fact trying to have the power transferred "peacefully" to an alliance of pro-Western African collaborationists and racists, not to the genuine patriotic forces.

The "peacemakers' image" of the United States lost even more of its sheen after the March 3, 1978 "internal settlement" agreement between Ian Smith and the African defectors—Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau. The settlement demanded unacceptable concessions from the Patriotic Front leaders. Meanwhile, the US Congress decided, in July 1978, to lift the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if a transitional government were formed in which either leader of the Front participated.⁴ Agreement between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo at the conference of all parties to the conflict meant that the US diplomatic ruse to split the national-patriotic forces of Zimbabwe was doomed. Another attempt to reach this goal failed again when the US-mediated talks between Smith and Nkomo fell through in August 1978.

The invitation of Muzorewa and other collaborationists to the United States in July 1979 set off yet another outbreak of indignation in independent Africa. Their talks with President Carter, State Secretary Vance and other officials paved the way to the virtual recognition by Washington of the so-called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and sought to completely exclude the Patriotic Front leaders from the settlement. The United States interfered in the settlement process even during the "Constitutional" Conference in London in the autumn of 1979. Although officially not a party to the talks, Washington used its unofficial representatives to monitor the conference and to repeatedly bring pressure to bear on the Patriotic Front leaders. It was only the firm yet flexible position of Mugabe and Nkomo which made it possible to frustrate the imperialist conspiracy to charge them with being "intractable" and wishing to "wreck" the talks. As a result, the collaborationists suffered a political defeat. Later, the Carter administration clearly distorted facts in an abortive bid to prove that it, too, had a hand in the victory of the national-patriotic forces and in the emergence of independent Zimbabwe in April 1980.

Independent Africa responds similarly to US maneuvers on the Namibia problem. SWAPO leaders have long been negotiating with the United States and other Western powers on ways to secure independence for their country, illegally occupied by South Africa. However, each time agreement was in sight, South Africa, encouraged by Washington, sabotaged the talks. SWAPO leaders have repeatedly

urged the United States, the initiator of the negotiations, to make Pretoria comply with its international obligations. But US connivance actually made the South African position only more intransigent. SWAPO rejected the results of the "elections" staged by South Africa in Namibia in December 1978, denounced the US policy toward Namibia and declared that it would begin military operations throughout the country.

This led US diplomacy to take a new turn, this time within the so-called contact group, comprising, besides the United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG and Canada. In the autumn of 1979 a plan was announced envisaging withdrawal of SWAPO armed units from Namibia, their stationing in neighboring countries and disbandment after new elections were held in Namibia. Evidently with US approval, Pretoria demanded "absolute guarantees" giving it control of the bases in Angola and Zambia.

Africa responded with apprehension to the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan's administration, especially the part dealing with African policy. This program is clearly disdainful of independent Africa's interests and increasingly favors the racists in the South.

The negative reaction of most African countries to the prospects of US African policy mounted abruptly after US Secretary of State Alexander Haig equated national liberation with international terrorism. Independent Africa had good reason to regard it as a direct threat to its progressive gains, encouraging South Africa and other newly emergent imperialist mercenaries to commit aggression.

These misgivings, it turned out, were fully justified. The African policy the new US administration pursued during its first year in office not only gave rise to anti-American feelings throughout the continent. Independent countries focused their efforts on resisting this policy, aiming above all to make the Reagan administration give up its plans of "strategic cooperation" with South Africa. It had been a long time since there was such unity in Africa as in the spring, summer and autumn of 1981, when campaigns to resist Washington swept through most countries of the continent. Prominent statesmen, public activists, representatives of political parties and religious organizations kept urging an end to the development of military and political ties between the United States and South Africa. Especially harsh words were addressed to US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker who toured the continent for two weeks in the spring of 1981 to sound out the African reaction to the new US "initiatives". Still, despite all this, the South African military made their posture more aggressive immediately after Crocker held talks in Pretoria. Logically, this led to a war against Angola, launched in late August 1981. One should note that the Angolan government did everything in its power to induce the Reagan administration to prevent South Africa from committing aggression. Specifically, two days before the hostilities erupted, President José Eduardo Dos Santos

told Rep. Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the Africa Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who was visiting Angola, that his country was ready for talks with the United States on normalizing relations.⁵

Predictably, Washington saw Angola's reasonable initiative as a sign of weakness and tried to push through a US plan for a Namibia settlement, essentially echoing the demands of South African racists—to guarantee special constitutional privileges to Namibia's whites after independence.

But the Namibia problem is not the only stumbling block in the Afro-American relations of the early 1980s. The United States instigates South African subversion of the Frontline States, while in North Africa it is setting Somalia against Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan against Libya, and Morocco against Algeria. Bright Star II, the military exercise which the Pentagon staged in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia in November and December 1981 and in which US rapid deployment forces took part, demonstrated the military self-interest of US policy to independent Africa. Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique understandably described this policy as "extremely dangerous for peace in Africa and peace in the world".⁶ Summing up the foreign policy record of 1981, the *Nigerian Observer* wrote that the US administration was pursuing a fallacious and aggressive course and that Africa should rebuff it in 1982 as a matter of priority. Even *The Washington Post* admitted that "the United States" and "enemy" were fast becoming synonyms in Africa.

2. Africa's Relations with Great Britain

The policy of independent African countries toward Great Britain is influenced to a large extent by the fact that many of them used to be part of the British colonial empire and later, of the British Commonwealth—the Commonwealth now has 16 African members. Another important factor is British foreign policy with its contradictory impact on Afro-British relations.

While still bound firmly to African members of the Commonwealth by trade, economic and political ties, London is also trying to expand its contacts with other developing African countries, especially in North and West Africa. The reasons for it are mostly economic. Britain's industrial, financial and business interests see Africa primarily as a huge mine containing 30 percent of the world's mineral resources. These geographically close deposits make Africa Britain's largest and most profitable source of raw materials.

Afro-British relations have always been affected by the dual nature of Britain's African policy, with its hedging between South Africa and the continent's independent countries. There are both political and economic motives behind this course. This dual policy

also reflects the discrepancies between Britain's political interests and the self-interest of the monopolies, leading the British government to equivocate and hesitate in choosing the more promising direction: either continuing to develop trade, economic and political relations with South Africa whose economy has absorbed private investment to the tune of over three billion pounds paying handsome returns, or concentrating more on economic and political ties with independent African countries—ties which pay less now but are preferable from the viewpoint of not too distant future.

Assistance from the British government also affects Africa's policy toward London, although this aid is supplied primarily to Commonwealth members and mostly on a bilateral basis. For example, in 1978 assistance to developing countries amounted to 743 million pounds, including 555 million on a bilateral basis and 188 million through international organizations, with 74 percent (401 million pounds) of the bilateral aid going to Commonwealth members. One-third of that amount was supplied to African countries, mostly Zambia (33 million) and Kenya (29 million).⁷

London's White Paper announced a gradual reduction in government assistance to developing countries: 794 million pounds in the fiscal year 1979/1980, 779 million in 1980/1981, 730 million in 1981/1982, and 680 million each for 1982/1983 and 1983/1984.⁸ The reduction is due to the monetary and financial problems brought on by the deteriorating economic crisis.

African countries—even Commonwealth members—approach their political relations with Britain and London's African diplomacy differently. These differences were especially pronounced in the way African countries assessed the British-US plan for a Southern Rhodesian settlement and in their current evaluation of Britain's position on Namibian independence and imperialist interference in Africa's internal affairs.

Naturally, socialist-oriented countries pursue the most independent policy of principle toward Great Britain. The economically more developed nations, like Nigeria and Zambia, follow a similar course: using their mineral wealth as a lever, they are working to wrest control of their natural resources from foreign monopolies, to establish a new international economic order and equitable international relations.

For example, in 1977-1979 it was the socialist-oriented countries together with Nigeria and Zambia, Commonwealth members, who opposed vigorously British policy in Southern Africa and the British-US plan for a Rhodesian settlement, justifiably seeing London's action as an attempt to secure above all the interests of the white minority and British monopolies.

In 1978 Brigadier Jolin Garba, the then Foreign Minister of Nigeria, summed up succinctly the position of most African countries vis-a-vis the policy of Britain and other imperialist powers when he

spoke about independent Africa's desire to ensure normalization and stability of the situation in the continent. He stressed Africa's resolution to fight against attempts at partitioning it anew, against the policy of Britain and other Western nations who were forever trying to exert economic, political and military pressure on African leaders, for solving African problems only under OAU auspices and, finally for establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa.⁹

Virtually all African Commonwealth members condemn the British government for its failure to effectively prevent British oil and other monopolies from defying the UN embargo against oil and petroleum products deliveries to South Africa. London was similarly denounced for condoning breaches by British munitions concerns of the embargo on arms sales to the Smith regime. According to press reports, British monopolies have repeatedly violated UN sanctions: armored cars, planes and other military hardware have been supplied in exchange for broad opportunities to extract great profits from the mining of chrome ore, copper, gold and other minerals.

At the same time, some African countries—for different reasons, including their economic dependence on the leading imperialist powers—are eager to establish closer political and economic ties with Great Britain. These nations include Kenya, Egypt, Somalia and Sudan. As to Kenya and Egypt, this is rooted not only in Kenya's traditional orientation and Egypt's about-face, but also in the considerable economic difficulties and the desire to bolster these nations' economic potential with the help of British companies.

Somalia's diplomacy is showing signs of closer political contacts with Britain. Having severed its ties with the CMEA nations, Somalia has switched its foreign policy toward the West and the wealthy oil producers of the Persian Gulf. Somalian President Siad Barre paid an official visit to London in June 1978, in the hopes of securing economic, military and technical assistance and trade concessions as payment for the foreign policy turn. The talks centered on British arms deliveries to Somalia. The Labour government said it was ready to consider the question in the context of the situation in the Horn of Africa and close friendship with neighboring Kenya. Since Somalia has territorial claims on Kenya, the British government has decided to provide only economic and technical assistance.

Sudan is visibly stepping up its effort to develop political and economic relations with Western countries, including Britain, counting on their assistance in overcoming economic difficulties. On an invitation from President Jaafar Nimeiry, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Edward Rowlands came to Khartoum for official talks in June 1978. A British military delegation has also visited Sudan and held secret consultations there.

On the whole, however, independent African countries today shape their political relations with Great Britain paying close attention to the realities of the contemporary world and to their aspirations for

economic independence. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania put it aptly. Proceeding from the underlying principle of the independent development strategy—meaning that any African state can maintain the type of relations it chooses with capitalist countries and to turn to them for economic or military assistance—he stressed the purpose of his statement: "To make it clear that we reject the right of Western European countries to dominate Africa."¹⁰

Britain's entry into the EEC and the signing of the Lomé Conventions (1975 and 1979) increased the number of its African economic partners by adding the former French and Portuguese colonies who are interested in improving trade and economic relations with Britain and attracting British industrial and finance capital. Even Zaire, which maintains most of its economic ties with Belgium, the United States, France and the FRG, has repeatedly requested financial aid from the British government.

In West Africa, the largest trade and economic partner of Britain is Nigeria, where British commercial, industrial and finance capital is represented widely to this day. Subsidiaries of large British banks, industrial firms and trading monopolies operate in Nigeria. As the biggest oil producer in Africa (and the sixth biggest in the world), Nigeria increases its oil exports, including those to Great Britain. In 1976 Nigeria overtook South Africa and emerged as London's largest African trading partner. In 1976 British exports to Nigeria were worth 774 million pounds. The figures for its other big partners in Africa were 645 million to South Africa, 135 million to Libya, 102 million to Algeria and 172 million to Egypt.¹¹

Nigeria's underdeveloped finance and banking system is another link binding it to Britain: Nigerian industrialists and other businessmen traditionally keep their money abroad, mostly in Britain. For example, Nigerian deposits in the Barclays Bank reached 900 million pounds in 1978.¹² It is a huge sum, and its sudden withdrawal could play havoc with the economy of the United Kingdom. At the same time, British banking capital is represented extensively in the Nigerian branch of the Barclays Bank.

Although in recent years Nigeria has been expanding its trade with the United States, the FRG and Japan, it remains Britain's chief trading partner and provides the largest market for its goods in Africa. Judging by the intensive exchange of trade delegations, Nigeria attaches considerable importance to the British market and to the improvement of the pattern of trade between the two countries.

The second most important economic partner of Great Britain in West Africa is Ghana, also bound closely to the British economy. For a time, Ghana restricted its contacts with Britain. However, monetary and financial difficulties, especially in the 1970s, forced Accra to adjust its relations with its former colonial power. In a bid to attract British capital, Ghana introduced preferential conditions for British investment in export industries and reduced taxes on com-

mercial and production operations.

Ghana conducts a lively trade with the United Kingdom and readily uses the latter's government export loans to purchase industrial goods and agricultural produce in the donor country. Loans to finance imports of industrial products (mostly consumer goods), raw materials, spare parts and the like from Britain help expand trade between the two nations.

Among East African countries, mostly Commonwealth members, the former British colonies of Zambia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda are interested, although in different ways, in improving their economic contacts with Great Britain. While Kenya is steadily cementing its ties with London, Uganda and Tanzania have restricted the scope of relations with their former colonial power, and Zambia and Sudan are undecided and marking time.

Kenya is Britain's largest trade and economic partner in this area; its domestic and foreign policy is quite in keeping with the interests of the British ruling quarters and monopolies. Although upgrading its ties with the United States, the FRG and France, the Kenyan bourgeoisie is nevertheless happiest to collaborate with British capital which is represented broadly in all leading industries, commerce and transport. Kenya is among the foremost recipients of the British government's financial and technical assistance.

Zambia, too, would like to expand its trade with the United Kingdom. British industry is the chief buyer of Zambian copper and cobalt, the main sources of foreign exchange for Lusaka. For example, out of the 1977 total export earnings of 95.3 million pounds, copper accounted for 90 million, or 99.4 percent. Zambian imports from Britain were worth 80.2 million pounds that year.

Although a Commonwealth member, Tanzania is striving to pursue an independent foreign policy and to restrict the influence of British capital on its economy. In 1977 relations between the two countries became even cooler. This was due to Tanzania nationalizing 18 subsidiaries of Lonrho, a British concern. Still, the country is tied closely to the British market.

In North Africa, Britain enjoys particularly vigorous economic relations with Egypt, Algeria and Libya and, to a lesser degree, with Morocco and Tunisia who lean toward France and the United States. A thaw in the previously frozen relations between Egypt and Britain began with President Sadat's visit to the United Kingdom in 1975.

Egypt is trying to use British assistance (and that of other imperialist powers, especially the United States) in order to launch a munitions industry of its own. With this end in view, President Sadat invited British military delegations and representatives of industrial monopolies for talks on establishing, jointly with British capital, enterprises to produce antitank missiles, ship-to-air missiles and the Hawk supersonic training aircraft under British licenses. The United Kingdom has already agreed to sell 200 modern supersonic training

planes, 400 Lynx helicopters and other materiel to Egypt.

On his visit to Britain, Sadat tried to persuade its government to lift the embargo on the exports of military hardware to Egypt. Cairo has induced several companies owned by British munitions concerns to collaborate in joint companies. British firms have also agreed to cooperate in starting civilian industries.

Algeria is in fact only beginning to shape its economic ties with Great Britain. Trade between the two countries began to pick up only in the late 1970s. Algeria exports mostly oil and petroleum products to Britain, in exchange for machinery, equipment and industrially-produced consumer goods.

Recently, Morocco has also been showing particular interest in broadening economic cooperation with the United Kingdom and securing British government export credits to purchase industrial goods. The Moroccan government has offered several British oil firms a share in joint companies to prospect for oil and gas in Western Sahara.

In the early 1980s British economic difficulties forced the Tory government to adjust its African policy better to the role newly independent countries play in world affairs. First and foremost, this was due to the pressure from Britain's trade, industrial and banking interests alarmed by the rising competition on foreign markets, including African ones. These interests insist that British diplomacy should gain access to new regions and countries and improve relations with key African members of the Commonwealth.

Thus the early 1980s witnessed efforts by the British government to normalize and strengthen economic and political contacts, above all with its traditional African partners: Nigeria—relations with which had deteriorated after the nationalization of British Petroleum assets—Ghana, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Uganda and others. Simultaneously, British diplomacy embarked on a drive to normalize relations with Portuguese- and French-speaking African countries outside the Commonwealth. Visits by British government delegations to Algeria, Angola and Mozambique and the summit talks held indicate a willingness to broaden ties with socialist-oriented countries too. The consolidation of these countries' sovereignty is making the Tory government relinquish its traditional policy of ignoring progressive African regimes and pay due attention to the flexible position they have been recently displaying with regard to attracting foreign capital and relaxing the financial and tax arrangements to ease the flow of capital and dividends.

For example, British diplomacy has been increasingly active in Algeria, a country of economic and political stability and well-earned international prestige. The British government is thus continuing its search for ways to revive the dialogue with the Arab world: this could strengthen Britain's political prestige in these countries and make it possible for British companies to expand their exports there, primarily of civilian and military industrial products.

Britain's business interests recommend that London's diplomacy should focus on strengthening ties with Tropical Africa; this is clearly linked to the issue of balancing trade, economic and political considerations and priorities. British business believes that long-term prospects should be decisive in choosing between South Africa and Tropical Africa. Since the South African apartheid regime limits the profit-making prospects of British companies, business interests advise that London should update its position and display more realism and initiative in expediting efforts to grant independence to Namibia and liberalize the South African regime. They hold that potentially, developing countries, especially Tropical Africa with its natural resources and markets, will play a greater part in trade and economic relations than South Africa.

An analysis of Africa-Great Britain relations today leads to the general conclusion that London is pursuing two chief objectives—cementing its relations with Commonwealth members and expanding ties with all the other African countries. For their part, while independent African states maintain their trade and economic cooperation with the United Kingdom, they take a patently negative view of the continued collaboration on the part of Britain's government and monopolies with racist South Africa.

London's increasingly pro-US stand does little to preserve its influence in Africa. There are also the constant imperialist rivalries for leverage in African affairs. But the decisive factor affecting independent Africa's policy toward Britain is the awareness that the former colonial power still sees Africa as a major source of raw materials, an important sphere for capital investment, and a profitable market for British goods. Obviously, this course runs counter to the task of attaining genuine economic independence and social emancipation.

3. The Evolution of African Ties with France

France's ruling quarters proclaimed a policy of "assistance and cooperation" toward and "privileged relations" with their former colonies in Africa after their independence. Paris retains close political, economic and cultural ties with these countries and has signed military cooperation agreements with many of them.

At the same time, most of the newly independent French-speaking states opposed France's intention to act as a guardian of its former colonies and force them to adopt policies it advocated. The new governments forced France to revoke earlier unjust agreements and replace them with new ones, more favorable to these countries. France also agreed to withdraw or reduce the strength of its troops stationed in several African countries (Niger, Senegal and others). The concessions are aimed at picturing present Afro-French relations as cooperation of equal partners. Actually, however, France was trying to pre-

serve pro-French regimes in its former colonies and other French-speaking countries. Progressive forces in Africa criticized this policy sharply. Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique said in this connection that France "has never completed the decolonization of its former 'possessions'".¹³ The new French leadership under President François Mitterrand is striving to establish equal partnership with French-speaking countries, although without renouncing all the agreements previous French governments concluded with them.

France has repeatedly sent its troops to African states in order to help its puppets (to Gabon in 1964, to Chad in 1968-1971). Africans denounced the dispatch of an expeditionary corps to aid President François Tombalbaye of Chad, and the criticism was the main reason for its withdrawal. It looked like the French ruling quarters grasped the situation and concluded that armed interference in the affairs of a foreign country brought no results. However, after an interval of several years France reverted to the use of its troops for interfering in the internal affairs of African states on the side of reactionary, pro-Western forces.

In 1977 the French monopolies with important interests in Morocco and Mauritania actually supported the unlawful partitioning of Western Sahara and sent French air force units to help the tottering Mauritanian regime. As a result, France's relations with Algeria, Libya and other African countries favoring Western Saharan self-determination deteriorated abruptly. Arms deliveries to the Mauritanian regime and direct involvement of French planes in action against POLISARIO troops failed to keep President Mokhtar Ould Daddah in power: he was ousted on July 10, 1978.

Having analyzed the situation, France adopted, for tactical reasons, a policy of noninterference and advocated a peaceful solution to the problem of Western Sahara. Progressive Africa welcomed the new French position. The talks on the issue have shown that many factors are involved. If it contributes to reaching a just solution of this question, France can enhance its prestige and largely restore its relations with such influential states as Algeria and Libya. In the autumn of 1981 President Mitterrand visited Algeria and the talks he held there brought about a rapprochement between the two countries, although differences remain on certain questions (gas prices, a transfer of archives to Algeria).

The spring 1978 sending of French troops to help the Chad government of General Malloum, who was fighting a ruthless civil war against FROLINAT, the National Liberation Front, exacerbated the conflict in the war-torn country. The French intervention was viewed with hostility by Libya, Nigeria and many other African states who held that African problems should be settled by Africans without outside interference.

Having failed to assist in the settlement of the Chad conflict, France had to recall its troops from that country in April and May

1980. French prestige was dealt a severe blow: all the rival groups blamed most of Chad's sufferings on French interference. Libyan aid to President Goukouni Oueddei was instrumental in bringing the civil war to a close in December 1980, and the prestige of the Libyan leadership grew in Chad. Paris reacted sharply: aside from launching an anti-Libyan campaign, France dispatched additional contingents to the Central African Republic, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Commenting on the increased French military presence in Africa, the Algerian National Liberation Front newspaper *El Moudjahid* wrote that Africans flatly rejected the French plans to establish neocolonialist rule and subvert the national liberation movement in the continent.¹⁴

In November 1981, upon request of the Chad government, Libya withdrew its troops from the country. They were replaced by inter-African forces comprising contingents from Nigeria, Zaire, Senegal and some other countries. France pledged to help finance maintenance of these forces. Relations between Chad and France normalized; the latter promised to take part in rebuilding N'Djamena, Chad's capital, provide the country with economic and technical assistance, and help in organizing a new Chad army.

While France's military intervention in Mauritania and Chad was to some extent a regional affair, its interference in Zaire was a matter of different scope. In 1977 the population of Zaire's Shaba Province, driven to desperation, started a rebellion. The French ruling quarters helped suppress it by supplying planes to airlift Moroccan troops to Zaire. Pressure from France and other Western powers went a long way to persuade Morocco to commit its armed forces.

In May 1978 unrest in Shaba broke out anew. The insurgents quickly drove out Mobutu's regular troops. Then, on request from the Zaire President, France sent its paratroopers there in US Air Force transport planes. It was a case of joint interference by NATO in the internal affairs of an African country.

France's armed intervention in Zaire was welcomed by those French-speaking African countries whose leaders had always collaborated with Paris (Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Togo, Morocco, Tunisia and others). Progressive African states, including French-speaking ones, condemned it as an attempt to resurrect colonial practice. Many participants in the May 1978 French-African conference in Paris refused to approve the intervention in Zaire (the People's Republic of the Congo, Benin, Niger, Guinea-Bissau and others), while Algeria and Libya denounced it.¹⁵

The French attempt to set up inter-African interference forces—that is, armed forces manned by Africans and ready to do the bidding of their imperialist sponsors—also fell through. Socialist-oriented countries in Africa exposed the true aims of this attempt and those who stood behind it. "We condemn," Mozambique's Foreign Minister Chissano said, "any allegedly African forces organized and inspired

bypassing OAU structures and, especially, with the help of an imperialist power..."¹⁶ At the OAU summit conference in Khartoum the plan to establish inter-African forces with the aid of any imperialist power was buried for good.

Giving the lie to the former French ruling quarters' preposterous claims that Angola had helped the invasion of the Katangues into Shaba, Angolan President Neto noted that France was increasingly striving for domination in Africa. Stressing the danger the French military presence in various African countries posed for independent Africa and especially for Angola, he rejected arguments in favor of an inter-African force under the aegis of France.¹⁷

Under pressure from most African countries who enjoyed the support of the socialist community, Paris abandoned, at least temporarily, its scheme to set up an inter-African force.

However, there are other ways to meddle in the internal affairs of African countries apart from direct use of regular troops. For example, in May 1978 a band of foreign mercenaries overthrew President Ali Soilih of the Comoro Islands, seized power and helped the emigre ex-President Ahmed Abdallah to return from Paris to the Comoros. The mercenaries were led by the notorious Bob Dénard (the alias of Gilbert Bourgeaud) who had collaborated with Tshombe, Mobutu and Bongo. According to *Afrique-Asie*, "France's responsibility for his doings is considerable".¹⁸

The overthrow of a progressive government, the assassination of Soilih and blatant interference by mercenaries in the affairs of a sovereign state evoked vigorous protests among many African countries, aimed above all against France. Besides, guided by strategic considerations and acting through its puppets, Paris succeeded in having Mayotte, an important part of the archipelago, break away from the Comoran State and thus heightened tensions in the region.

African supporters of France worked hard to prevent expulsion of the Comoran delegation from the OAU summit in Khartoum, but they failed. Only this and other clear-cut demonstrations of Africa's position prompted the new Comoran leaders to dismiss the French mercenary who had been in charge of the country's armed forces up to late September 1978. The new government of the Federal and Islamic Comoran State (a newly adopted name) is completely dependent on France.

Many African countries charge that France was largely to blame for what happened in Benin on January 16, 1977, when a gang of mercenaries tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the progressive government and turn the country back to the capitalist path of development. Investigations indicate that the heads of several states very friendly to France were involved in preparations for this abortive attempt (again, the mercenaries were recruited by Dénard).¹⁹

Another example is the landing of French paratroopers in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Empire, in September 1979. They

brought with them David Dacko who proclaimed himself President. This operation ended the almost 14-year-long rule of Jean-Bédel Bokassa who had previously been in favor with Paris. The French military intervention was also to keep unrest from spreading because this could topple the neocolonialist regime in the Central African Republic. In August 1981 a military junta ousted Dacko's regime. The French troops stationed in the country kept neutral and took practically no part in the coup, planned in advance with French consent.

A distinctive twist in France's African policy—its striving to act as a spokesman for all West European countries, specifically the EEC—is an important factor affecting Afro-French relations. French leaders hoped that closer relations between the EEC and Africa would further the interests of French monopolies. As an addition to the arrangements between the EEC and most African countries under the First Lomé Convention, President Giscard d'Estaing of France proposed, on June 26, 1977, a solidarity pact between "lesser Europe" and Africa. This move was discussed at length during Giscard d'Estaing's talks with President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. The idea behind it was the conviction Giscard d'Estaing voiced to the effect that Europeans and Africans should pool their efforts to "map out a middle road" allegedly necessary for prosperity in both Europe and Africa—"a middle road for the middle continents of Europe and Africa". This statement arbitrarily excluded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries from Europe, presenting the EEC members as the only Europeans.

The pact was to provide a political and legal basis for restructuring the economy of Western Europe by relocating industrial enterprises showing a small profit to Africa and reserving the latter's huge raw material and fuel resources for the EEC.

Some African leaders, like Léopold Senghor and Félix Houphouët-Boigny, supported Giscard d'Estaing's plan without reservation, seeing the "solidarity pact" as a way to prevent scientific socialism from taking root in Africa. However, most African countries did not show much interest in the idea. According to the Belgian press, Africans know that the direct danger they are facing is the racist policy of South Africa and that Western Europe is doing nothing to bring about change in that part of the continent.²⁰

In February 1979 Giscard d'Estaing enlarged his proposal and advanced the idea of a "trialogue"—a conference of West European, African and Arab states. Paris wanted France and other West European countries to use the petrodollars of the oil-producing Arab states to find a way out of the economic crisis and entrench their positions in Tropical Africa.

Besides, independent Africa did not lose sight of the fact that France remained a valuable trading partner of South Africa, that it was the foremost foreign participant in Johannesburg trade fairs, that French companies failed to revoke the contract to build atomic

power stations in South Africa. Up to late 1977 France had been the major supplier of arms to South Africa. It was only the unremitting protests of world public opinion against Western patronage of the apartheid regime that forced France to accept the UN Security Council decision imposing an embargo on arms deliveries to Pretoria.

The Mitterrand government has come out in support of a cutoff of new capital investment in South Africa (totaling eight billion francs by 1981), a complete cessation of armed deliveries to Pretoria, support for the Frontline States and humanitarian assistance to the fighters against apartheid.

One should note that France's ruling quarters do display a flexible African policy when circumstances demand it. A case in point is relations between France and Guinea, which deteriorated swiftly when the Guinean people came out in favor of full independence. France hastened to recall all its specialists from Guinea and brought great financial and trade pressure to bear on its economy. Even diplomatic relations were severed in 1965. This policy posed severe difficulties before Guinea but failed to break it. At the same time, this course was also detrimental to the economic interests of French monopolies, since they were unable to take part in the development of this country's enormous natural resources. The political damage it did to France was no less severe: its position vis-a-vis Guinea was a typical case of attempting to force an African country to abandon the path it had chosen. Therefore France moved gradually away from its intransigent stand and contributed to the restoration of diplomatic relations with Guinea in July 1975, and later, of economic ties. President Giscard d'Estaing visited Conakry in December 1978 to make cooperation between the two countries closer.

François Mitterrand's government began to improve relations with Africa's socialist-oriented countries. In October 1981 the President of Angola visited Paris, and representatives of Angola and Tanzania were for the first time invited to attend the Eighth French-African Conference.

Paris has also decided to give in to the insistent demands of African and world public opinion and granted independence to Djibouti, the last French colony in Africa. The French government ceased its persecution of advocates of independence for that territory and supervised elections there. However, before transferring power to Djibouti's moderate leaders, France secured a Saudi Arabian promise that the oil-rich Arab countries would provide financial and economic assistance to the new state. France also left a sizable military contingent in Djibouti (4,500 men) to "maintain order" and "assist" in the establishment of a national army. Still, Africa welcomed Djibouti's independence.

Paris acted cautiously during the Somali aggression against revolutionary Ethiopia. Paris tried to rescind its earlier promises of arms deliveries to Somalia for fear of a new wave of protests after the OAU

Conference in Gabon reaffirmed the principle of inviolability of African borders.

Taking into account the negative past record, the Mitterrand government which came to power in the summer of 1981 promised not to interfere, militarily or otherwise, in internal African affairs.

The attitude of African countries to France, like to other imperialist powers, depends to a large extent on the amount of economic assistance these countries receive from it—only 0.3 percent of its GNP in 1977. Most of this aid is cultural and technical. This figure also includes loans at relatively high interest rates and military aid.

The actual French assistance to Africa is therefore worth considerably less than official sources indicate. However, on the whole it is growing. More than 60 percent (64.1 percent in 1977) of its aid to developing countries is destined for Africa. In 1977 French assistance to Africa amounted to 3,160 million francs (2,864 million for civilian and 296 million for military purposes). The 1978 total was 3,619.5 million, and it was 4,089.7 million in 1979. The current government has announced its intention to increase its economic aid to 0.7 percent of the GNP and to 0.75 percent of the GNP for the least developed countries by 1985.²¹

The sending of various specialists, advisers and other experts is taking on considerable proportions as an element of French aid. In 1977 31,350 such specialists were working in Africa under technical assistance programs (including teachers—64 percent of the total). Add to that the 220,000 French nationals in Africa and the 38,700 African students in France, and it becomes clear that France can affect the policies of many African countries—naturally not to the detriment of its own interests. The French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs once said: "Serious studies estimate that 80 percent of the aid to third world countries returns to the donor country in the form of salaries, payments for orders placed with its enterprises, reinvestment of personal savings [of French nationals.—Auth.] and profits of enterprises."²²

The interest African countries display in developing trade with France enables French monopolies, supported by the state, to feel confident and try to push ahead and expand. For example, considerable French investment has been registered recently in Nigeria and Zaïre.

The press in many African countries has stressed in this connection that the dynamics of France's penetration into Africa reflect the particular danger inherent in French neocolonialism, above all its "cultural aspects". For example, France spares no effort to create in its former colonies a uniform educational system based on French culture and, obviously, designed to ensure appropriate influence on the training of indigenous personnel.

Socialist-oriented countries (the People's Republic of the Congo

and Benin, among others) oppose the French ruling quarters' attempts to use their policy of "aid and cooperation" in order to exert political pressure on these states. However, while independent African countries, especially French-speaking ones, continue their cooperation with France, they increasingly refuse to submit to its pressure or to its schemes which run counter to the interests of Africa and the world as a whole.

4. Independent Africa and the FRG

The policies independent Africa pursues toward the FRG graphically reflect the far-reaching changes that have recently occurred in Africa and the world. The beneficial impact of the socialist community's foreign policy on the international situation, the intensification of the national liberation revolutions, the upswing in the non-aligned movement have enabled independent African countries to become more active in their foreign policy and more resolute in their struggle against imperialism. These countries reject neocolonialist attempts to make them follow policies that contradict their national interests.

A notable failure in this regard was the collapse of the FRG effort, supported by other imperialist countries, to impose the notorious Hallstein Doctrine, aimed at isolating the GDR from developing states, on African countries. Despite Bonn's pressure and its promises of increased economic and technical assistance to countries that would support its course, this doctrine was rejected by Africa and consigned to oblivion. The same happened to the Scheel Doctrine, a modification of the former, which demanded that recognition of the GDR be withheld pending the "settlement" of FRG-GDR relations.

Today, the rulers of the FRG have to recognize independent Africa as a real and significant political force. The words of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the FRG about developing countries having started to play an important part in international relations apply to Africa fully. "The third world," he said, "is today an independent factor and champion of its own causes in world politics. Proceeding from its own ideas and demands, relying on its own power, it affects international relations."²³ Simultaneously, the West German press voices alarm over the way developing countries are gaining ground and ousting imperialism from its positions. For example, there is particular concern about the West losing control of the decision-making process in big international organizations.

While young countries shape their foreign policy to meet the requirements of antiimperialist struggle and their national development which call for closer cooperation with the socialist community, the FRG's African policy proceeds from the objectives of West German state-monopoly capitalism. Foremost among them are to gain a

firm foothold in Africa, establish its own spheres of influence, and secure free access to sources of raw materials and a chance to exploit manpower for FRG corporations.

West German monopolies vigorously rebuff the legitimate striving of independent countries for genuine national sovereignty and equality in political, trade and economic relations. Unwilling to lose their positions in Africa, the FRG ruling quarters resist nationalization of foreign capital, try to influence national development policies and insist on their own foreign trade conditions. Despite temporary compromises on certain matters, permanent contradictions permeate the FRG's bilateral relations with newly independent countries.

These differences comprise a wide range of issues concerning, above all, detente, peaceful coexistence, international cooperation and all aspects of the policies the FRG and other imperialist powers pursue in Africa and the rest of the developing world. The contradictions rooted in the differences of position and opinion with regard to the principles and content of the course taken by each side have gone so far that the FRG's relations with independent African countries often reach a crisis point. African foreign policy attaches great importance to the struggle for eradicating all vestiges of colonial oppression and eliminating the racist regimes in the continent. At the same time, West German monopoly capital maintains close military, political and economic ties with South Africa and has interests in common with its regime. This explains why many elements in the antiracist struggle of the independent states carry over to their relations with the FRG. These countries cannot disregard the fact that, say, 15 West German research institutes, including the Max Planck Nuclear Physics Institute, are helping to implement the South African military program. The largest industrial concerns—like Siemens, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, AEG—Telefunken, Blohm und Voss A.G.—are aiding South Africa in the aircraft- and shipbuilding industries and electronics. The FRG and South Africa have carried out a big military project code-named "Advokaat"—a system of electronic surveillance over large ocean areas.²⁴ Cooperation between Bonn and Pretoria in nuclear research is also well known. The two countries maintain broad military ties through NATO. Their trade and economic relations are also well developed. Over 400 West German firms operate in South Africa; the total of their investments there exceeds 12 billion deutsche marks. South Africa accounts for 20 percent of the FRG's African trade, with the exports of high-technology goods growing rapidly. For example, in the first half of 1981 alone West German exports to that country increased by 38 percent compared to the same period of 1980. According to figures released by the South African-Germany Chamber of Trade and Industry, deliveries of electrotechnical equipment and motor-vehicle components made up most of the total costs (890.9 million out of the 1,066 million rands).²⁵ Africa's progressive forces have repeatedly protested against economic contacts between

West German monopolies and South Africa, since this bolsters the political and economic potential of Pretoria and the positions of the racist regime.

Besides, FRG-South African relations directly affect another extremely important issue of Southern Africa—the liberation of Namibia. As far back as the mid-1960s West German capital directly and indirectly controlled 70 percent of that territory's economy. Its domination is especially great in commerce, handicrafts, agriculture and the banking and finance system. As much as 25 percent of all the profits multinational monopolies make here are channeled to the FRG; 25 Namibian workers are paid less than one West German worker.²⁶

Pressure from its own monopolies and multinational capital naturally accounts for the dual stand of the FRG government with regard to Namibian independence. For example, Bonn does not recognize SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people and does nothing to end the hostile reaction to SWAPO on the part of Namibia's 30,000 ethnic Germans, many of them West German nationals. No wonder the SWAPO Central Committee has named the Federal Republic of Germany among the chief allies and accomplices of South Africa in Namibia.²⁷

Working to secure complete liberation of Southern Africa from racist and colonial oppression, independent African countries are exerting political and moral pressure on the FRG ruling quarters to make them abandon their collaboration with the racists. As early as 1970 a delegation led by President Kaunda of Zambia visited Bonn and, acting on instructions from the OAU countries, lodged a protest with the FRG government against its policy in the South of Africa.²⁸ African nations denounce these aspects of West German policies at the UN and in other international organizations. This also happened at the 1977 OAU Assembly in Gabon where, *Der Spiegel* notes, Bonn "landed in the dock".²⁹

The situation was similar at important international forums—in Maputo in May 1977 and in Lagos in August 1977. Africa demanded that the FRG government impose an embargo on trade and economic relations with South Africa, recognize and support the legitimate rights of the indigenous population to rule the country. West German compromise policies were also condemned. Specifically, during FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's visit to Lagos and Lusaka in June 1978, Nigeria's and Zambia's heads of government told him that these compromises were virtually helping preserve the status quo.³⁰ This visit failed to resolve the differences which separated these countries from the FRG on a number of issues, above all those concerning the situation in the South of the continent. The Nigerian press noted in this regard that the FRG's relations with Nigeria could lead to an open conflict over West German policies in Southern Africa.

Faced with the firm position of most African countries and

fearing a conflict with them, Bonn had to declare that it condemned the policy of apartheid and intended to suspend further expansion of ties with South Africa. Free Africa scored another significant victory when in September 1977 Bonn took another forced step—it closed its consulate in Windhoek, Namibia, actually a consular office of the FRG embassy in South Africa. This decision was taken after a long period of struggle between independent Africa and the FRG. The former insisted on the closure of the consulate because both actually and officially its retention meant recognition of South Africa's rights to Namibia.

The notable success of independent Africa has not kept it from continuing its pressure on the so-called contact group—of which Bonn is a member—to expedite the solution of the region's foremost problems. However, hand-in-hand with their NATO partners, the West German ruling quarters have no intention of surrendering their positions without a fight. They are trying to obstruct and delay the solution in order to prolong direct and indirect pressure on independent African countries, especially the Frontline States. At the 1974 and 1979 UN General Assemblies the FRG voted against depriving South Africa of UN membership as an illegal and racist minority regime. When this question was debated at the UN in the spring of 1981 the FRG could no longer afford to openly oppose the renewed African proposal on South Africa's expulsion and so it abstained. However, at the April 1981 session of the UN Security Council on Namibia it came out against the proposal on severing diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa and ending all oil and arms sales to it.³¹ Military strategists in the Bundeswehr stress that the NATO countries cannot allow South Africa to be weakened in any way because of its extremely important role as a Western bulwark in the continent.³²

The events connected with the liberation of Angola from colonial domination also testified to the considerable contribution many independent African countries made to the wrecking of imperialist plans for launching a civil war in Angola. Their timely efforts exposing subversion, including that by the FRG who supported factionalist UNITA, aided in the victory of the progressive forces in this region.

The Fifth UNCTAD session in Manila in 1979 was yet another indication of the grave contradictions plaguing trade and economic relations between developing African countries and the FRG. These differences were aggravated still further after newly independent states began a broad offensive against the positions of foreign monopoly capital in Africa. West German monopolies vigorously resist the striving of newly emergent countries to strengthen their sovereign rights to mine and market mineral resources. Together with other Western countries, the FRG opposes the main provisions of the new international economic order, advanced by the developing nations and supported by the socialist states, with the doctrine of the so-called free market economy. It centers on the alleged need to observe the

principles of free enterprise and competition on world commodity and industrial goods markets and of free withdrawal of profits from capital invested. Essentially, it means freedom of action for the monopolies in the markets of developing countries and a chance for imperialist powers to dictate their own trade and economic conditions.

Proceeding from the requirements of their own economy oriented toward foreign markets, the FRG ruling quarters are interested in expanding trade with developing countries and are ready to support certain proposals aimed at boosting it. While they agree to make some concessions to developing countries, these quarters are nevertheless essentially against agreeing in advance on world market prices. They maintain that a fair price can only be set by the very mechanism of the market which rules out outside interference. West German experts assert that the existing pattern of trade between capitalist and developing countries needs minor alterations and corrections of occasional flaws, not a radical change. This is the approach, Bonn claims, to be followed in elaborating the principles of the new international economic order. For example, the prominent member of the SPD Board Egon Bahr stressed, while he was Minister for Economic Cooperation, that the demands developing countries advanced concerning the new international economic order were neither feasible nor acceptable for the FRG. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has made a similar statement.³³

At the Fourth and Fifth sessions of UNCTAD the FRG was among the few Western countries whose spokesmen persisted in defending the free market economy doctrine. Their rigid position evoked harsh criticism on the part of developing countries; this wrecked the plans of Western diplomacy to exploit the economic difficulties of these states and break their solidarity. Despite the differences in their socio-political regimes, they were united in upholding their demand for radical changes in the unjust relations in world capitalist trade.

West German attempts at encouraging developing countries to accept compromises in exchange for promises of broader assistance and compensation funds to offset the damage they suffered from inequitable trade are not very successful either. During his visit to Bonn in the spring of 1976 President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania said in this regard that African countries reject the "entire concept of development aid" since it did not solve their development problems. Renunciation by the West of the policy which hampered the establishment of equitable economic relations, he stressed, could do much more for development than all this "aid" had done.³⁴

Common tasks of antiimperialist struggle do not rule out differences in the approach of African countries to political and economic relations with the FRG. The level of these relations often depends on their national development conditions, requirements in capital and technological knowhow, and the existing economic ties. Naturally, of decisive

importance here is the type of class forces in control of this or that country. The countries where power is in the hands of revolutionary democrats shape their relations with the FRG in the interests of progressive development and national sovereignty. These countries are less inclined to compromise with the West German ruling quarters. For example, in 1965 the government of Tanzania rejected West German economic aid in response to attempted pressure aimed at forcing the country to change its foreign policy. The government of Guinea severed diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1971 in protest of gross interference in its internal affairs by West German nationals. The government of Ethiopia was no less resolute in defending its revolutionary gains in the autumn of 1977. Rebuffing the campaign of slander and attacks against its socialist course launched in the FRG, Ethiopia demanded that Bonn recall its ambassador and warned that diplomatic relations would be cut off if the subversion did not stop.

Several African capitalist-oriented countries also react sharply to infringements of their sovereignty. In the spring of 1974 Chad suspended diplomatic relations with the FRG. In 1971 the government of the Central African Republic warned it could take similar measures against the FRG. Despite the fact that they urgently need capital and economic contacts, African countries, as a rule, refuse to go against their principles and political interests.

While developing economic ties with the FRG and allowing West German capital access to their economies for the sake of development, African socialist-oriented countries are fighting vigorously against imperialist and neocolonialist forays. The policies of Libya and Algeria, respectively the second and fourth largest repositories of West German private capital investment in independent Africa, are a case in point. The government of Mozambique, extremely weakened after the long war of independence, cut off all talks on economic cooperation with the FRG as soon as Bonn diplomats demanded, in 1978, that the planned agreement apply to West Berlin as an integral part of the FRG, in contradiction to the existing international accords.

Capitalist-oriented countries maintain a different type of relations with the FRG. Their ties are shaped by the bourgeoisie which is in control in these countries and which is interested in close relations with the FRG because of the profits they bring it. The narrow, self-serving interests of the indigenous bourgeoisie presented as national interests often prompt this class to agree to compromises with foreign capital. Naturally, this restricts the objectives and erodes the effectiveness of national programs of antiimperialist struggle. Suffice it to recall Zaire's decision to hand over a vast area to the West German OTRAG company as a proving ground for OTRAG missiles. The damage this deal inflicted on the cause of African national liberation and on the prestige of Zaire itself far exceeded the short-term advantages the country's ruling group counted on. Kinshasa itself arrived at this conclusion and revoked the agreement two years after it had been con-

cluded. This was additional proof that African countries were inclined toward solidarity and committed to defend all-African interests which, in the final analysis, prevailed over expectations of possible economic advantages from deals struck with Western countries.

This explains the ineffectiveness of the attempts by the FRG ruling quarters to secure concessions on the part of these states in important political issues. Particularly significant in this regard was the conference of prominent representatives of Bonn and 19 African countries, convened at the initiative of the West German Foreign Ministry in Arusha, Tanzania, in January 1979 to discuss the key problems of bilateral relations and major African issues. Despite the thorough preparations for the conference and heavy pressure on its African participants, the sponsors failed to secure approval of the FRG's African policy. As they themselves admitted, apart from considerable differences of opinion on the problems discussed, the conference demonstrated above all a "lack of credibility" in West German policies.³⁵

Relations between independent African states and the FRG reflect not only the level and character of antiimperialist struggle in the continent but also the main trends in its development on the international scene. Proceeding from these trends and the rich experience of the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism one can safely forecast the futility of all future imperialist attempts to resist Africa's complete liberation from all forms of dependence on foreign powers and from exploitation by monopoly capital.

5. Independent Africa and the Smaller Countries of Western Europe

Another element in Africa's foreign policy is its relations with the smaller countries of Western Europe which have no colonial record—Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland. The scope of these relations is still small because they started to develop mostly after African independence. Nevertheless, over the past two decades the two sides have intensified their efforts to strengthen their relations both bilaterally and through international organizations.

Many African countries believe these relations can enable them to use the positive experience of the smaller countries in the field of development. Many African leaders reject the experience of the great powers as unacceptable because of the considerable discrepancies in numerical criteria (the size of the territory and the population, etc.). Meanwhile, the smaller developed countries attract them by their closer parameters, by evidence that a small country, too, can reach a high development level.

Besides, Africans are impressed with the fact that this group of European capitalist countries was not involved in the colonial parti-

tion of Africa, as well as with the policy of neutrality in international affairs pursued by Sweden, Austria and Switzerland.

For their part, the smaller Western countries also strive to develop their relations with Africa, mostly in order to gain access to its markets and rich natural resources. So far, "the new states may have little that is tangible to offer for the present", Bo Huldt, a specialist on Scandinavian policy in decolonization questions, stressed, "but they constitute future markets as well as possible allies needed for the realization of other 'milieu goals' ".³⁶ Other smaller West European countries are drawing up similar plans with regard to African countries.

It appears that the policy of independent Africa toward the smaller West European countries is best viewed through their specific course of action in this continent. Response to this course both shapes African policies and reflects their essence.

The closest ties to Scandinavian countries have been established by those African states who are major recipients of their development aid. Social-reformist ideologists explain assistance to developing countries by a "moral responsibility" to and "humanitarian solidarity" with the "poor" nations. Naturally, these assertions fail to reveal the true motives behind the aid rendered by the smaller capitalist countries, the aid called by former Foreign Minister Sven Andersson of Sweden as "one of the foremost tasks of Swedish foreign policy".³⁷

An analysis of this aid shows that it is aimed above all at facilitating the access of companies from the smaller West European countries to African markets, mostly dominated by the former colonial and other imperialist powers. A parliamentary commission's report which was behind the new 1978 law on Swedish aid to developing countries stated expressly that government subsidies should be a means of increasing Swedish exports and investment in developing countries. This is also the objective of Sweden's foundation for industrial cooperation with developing countries. Its mission is to supply Swedish industry with contracts financed from government appropriations for aid.

In Denmark, a similar organization—the foundation for the industrialization of developing countries—has been in operation since 1968. The foundation, financed by the government—actually, by the taxpayers—provides considerable material support for Danish investors in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Government assistance to Africa by the smaller West European countries uses both bilateral and multinational channels. Today, a trend has emerged toward bilateral aid growing more rapidly at the expense of multilateral assistance. This is explained by the desire of the smaller countries' private capital to use it more broadly for its own economic interests. Government aid from the smaller countries of Western Europe is mostly in the form of grants.

A typical feature of Swedish and Norwegian aid is that it is largely conditional on purchases in the donor country. The share of condi-

tional aid is about 25 percent of the total for Denmark, one-third for Switzerland, and about half for Austria.

The smaller West European countries use several criteria in selecting African recipients of their aid. Sweden allots a sizable share of its funds to the countries the United Nations has classified as the least developed.* Historical ties** and the contacts established by some liberation movements during their struggle for independence also play a part in allocating aid. Africa's English-speaking states are major recipients of technical assistance from the Nordic countries, while Switzerland mostly supplies aid to the French-speaking nations. Demonstrating their solidarity with the struggle to eliminate colonialism and racism in Southern Africa, the Nordic countries channel a considerable part of their assistance to independent Southern African countries. In the fiscal year 1979/1980 Sweden provided them with 720 million kronor—about 25 percent of all appropriations for aid to developing countries.

Each year, however, monopoly interests increasingly influence the distribution of government assistance from the smaller West European countries to Africa. The report of the Swedish parliamentary commission mentioned above expressly advises preference for those countries which are likely to favor trade and economic ties with Sweden.

Under these principles, the Nordic countries mostly channel their African assistance to Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Botswana, Tunisia and Ethiopia; and Switzerland, to Tunisia, Rwanda, Cameroon and Zaire. Unlike the other smaller capitalist donor countries, Austria earmarks most of its government aid to non-African countries; Tunisia is the only African state which can be singled out as a recipient of Austrian assistance.

The economic destination of aid to Africa from the smaller West European countries is mostly determined by their own development level in this or that branch of the economy and by the requirements of African countries. Assistance centers on forestry, fisheries, agriculture, cooperative construction projects, the woodworking and food industries, infrastructure, education, medical care and family planning.

Assessing the assistance of the smaller, especially Scandinavian countries, many African leaders note its favorable economic conditions and the absence of direct political strings attached to it. Combined with appropriate social-reformist propaganda, this creates the illusion with some of these leaders that assistance from the smaller capitalist countries differs essentially from that of the leading imperialist powers and is completely selfless. This view is, of course, reflected in African policies toward this group of European countries.

* Sweden has cancelled the debts incurred by the "least developed" countries.

** In the colonial period Scandinavian countries had their church missions in North-East, East and Southern Africa; and Switzerland, in West and Southern Africa.

Side by side with government "development aid" the smaller Western countries also channel private investments, export credits and loans to Africa. The degree of activity of these countries' private capital in Africa depends on two factors. On the one hand, the smaller countries' companies consider independent Africa a zone of "high risk" (the threat of nationalization) and "insufficient returns" (high production costs). This explains why Africa lags behind Asia and Latin America in the amount of private investment from the smaller capitalist countries. On the other hand, their investors are unwilling to give up the advantages offered by African markets (valuable natural resources, cheap labor force, and the prospects of high marketing capacities).

The interplay of such factors makes these countries' companies increasingly willing to export capital in the form of portfolio investments, that is, by purchasing shares in African national companies. In tackling large-scale projects in Africa, the smaller Western countries' companies pool their capital and technical expertise with the monopolies of other capitalist nations in the joint stock companies. Besides, the smaller countries' firms increasingly conclude "production sharing" and "management contract" agreements with African states, under which they are to carry out geological surveys, organize production and train personnel in exchange for raw materials.

Among these European countries, Switzerland and Sweden are the largest investors in Africa. The operations of Danish, Norwegian and Austrian companies in Africa are small-scale. The smaller countries' subsidiaries in Africa play a certain role in the chemical, engineering, food, light, cement and various mining industries.

Nestlé Products, the giant food concern, is the largest African investor among Swiss monopolies. It has taken firm root in the food industries of Algeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria and some other countries. CIBA Chemicals, Ltd., a company specializing in pharmaceuticals, dyes and other chemicals, controls, directly or indirectly, respective enterprises in Egypt, Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Morocco and Algeria. Brown Boverie and Co., an electrical engineering firm, is entrenched in the economies of over 20 African countries. Swiss business interests also invest their capital in insurance companies, hotels and plantations in some countries.

Sweden's largest project in independent Africa is the participation of six Swedish companies in the Lamco J.V. international consortium which mines iron ore in Liberia. Sweden also has small investments in Kenya, Nigeria, Tunisia, Zambia, Ethiopia, Tanzania and some other countries.

Encouraged by the bourgeois government, Swedish private companies are increasingly trying to use government "development aid" to their own advantage.

Trade between independent Africa and the smaller West European countries is relatively small. The factors hampering its development in-

clude the lack of traditions, the sway in African markets of companies based in the former colonial and other big imperialist powers, and the specialization of the smaller industrialized countries in high technology engineering products for which there is little demand in many developing countries because of their low industrialization level.

At the same time, certain factors encourage the smaller capitalist countries to promote trade with Africa: the limited size of their own domestic markets, increasing marketing difficulties in Western Europe and North America, and especially the need to import many types of raw materials largely supplied by African states.

The pattern of trade between Africa and the smaller West European countries is similar to the trade pattern between developing and capitalist nations in general. North Europe, Austria and Switzerland receive primarily raw materials (oil, gas, bauxites, iron and copper ore, phosphates) and tropical and subtropical agricultural produce (cocoa, coffee, citrus and other fruits, cotton, vegetables, timber, tobacco) from Africa in exchange for chemical and engineering products and consumer goods.

In recent years the smaller West European countries have been paying increasingly close attention to global economic issues, including the question of a new international economic order. The vulnerability of these countries' economies to the deteriorating energy and raw materials problems has forced them to make certain concessions to their African partners.

The Nordic states are clearly trying to act as a middleman between the leading imperialist powers and developing countries, creating the impression that the criticism of Western countries and monopolies does not apply to themselves. *Le Monde diplomatique* explains this trend as far as Norway is concerned—this explanation also holds true for some other smaller capitalist countries—by Norway's insignificant investments in developing countries and by the fact that "Norwegian solidarity has gone through no real tests, for the demanded reforms of the world economic order have not yet been carried out. However, one can say that the consequences of the world economic crisis for Norwegian economy have already manifested themselves in the renunciation of certain practical expressions of solidarity, for example, those concerning access to its domestic market."³⁸

The measures taken by the smaller Western countries to increase exports from developing countries have indeed proved of little use due to their limited nature. Even Gunnar Adler-Karsson of Sweden, a staunch advocate of social-reformism and author of the functional socialism concept, admits this. "Our government assistance is a bit bigger, our import of textiles is probably a bit more liberal," he wrote, "but as far as the rest is concerned, the difference between our practical policy and that of other OECD nations toward developing countries is minimal."³⁹ All this contributes little to the growth of the smaller West European countries' prestige in Africa.

Together with economic issues, Africa's political problems are beginning to play an increasingly important part in relations between independent African states and the smaller West European countries. The general changes in the international situation, the attitude to the imperialist policy of blocs, the party composition of governments and the interests of private capital in this or that country directly affect the African policies of the Nordic nations, Austria and Switzerland.

During the cold war the smaller capitalist countries followed the lead of the chief imperialist powers in such important issues as the situation in Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies and the assessment of crisis situations (the Congo crisis of 1961-1964). At the United Nations, "while the United States was an important co-sponsor for Denmark and Norway, members of the Atlantic alliance, this state played a very minor role for neutral Finland and Sweden",⁴⁰ Bo Iluldt observes.

As international tensions eased and the action by the progressive quarters in the Nordic countries against colonialism, racism and apartheid intensified, the Scandinavian governments modified their positions on the issues in question. The Social Democratic parties in control of the Nordic states could not disregard the mood of the working masses. The not always free from self-interest desire to improve relations with independent African countries was an important factor which encouraged the leaders of some smaller West European countries to draw up a more flexible approach to the solution of African political problems.

Prompted by these factors and the growing success of national liberation movements, the Social Democratic Scandinavian governments were the first among the ruling quarters of many other capitalist countries to realize the inevitability of the collapse of racism and colonialist holdovers in Africa. Besides, the smaller countries' leaders feared that Western resistance to Southern African liberation would enhance the prestige of the socialist community in this region. They also wanted to prepare the ground for future access to Southern Africa after the national liberation forces took power there. This led the Nordic countries to establish contacts with such African organizations as MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC, ANC, SWAPO, ZAPU and ZANU in the late 1960s and early 1970s and to provide them with material assistance.

Sweden has been the largest Nordic contributor of assistance to African liberation movements. In the early 1970s its aid was mostly focused on the liberation movements fighting against Portuguese colonialism—FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC. Of the total of five million dollars earmarked for direct assistance to African national liberation movements in 1972-1973, 3.5 million were channeled to the patriots of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Africa did not fail to note this position. According to *Africa*, a London publication, "The Swedish support of PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO of Mozam-

bique and MPLA of Angola, during their wars of liberation won the country many African friends."⁴¹

In the difficult period of the consolidation of Angolan independence the Nordic countries, unlike most Western nations, declared their support for MPLA in its struggle against the South African intervention and the factionalist and foreign-based FNLA and UNITA and recognized, in conformity with the UN Charter, the Angolan legitimate government's right to appeal for aid to any friendly state for repulsing armed aggression. However, this generally realistic position was not disinterested. According to the then Foreign Minister Knud Borge Andersen of Denmark, it was "rooted in the intention to weaken MPLA's conviction that only the communist world was interested in it".⁴²

Thus the situation in Angola highlighted the role of the Scandinavian Social Democratic governments: on the one hand, they were upholding the common class interests of the capitalist system; and on the other, they were ensuring access for their countries' monopolies to the areas in the developing world where the influence of other Western nations waned.

After the fall of the Portuguese colonial empire the Scandinavian countries increased their assistance to Southern African national liberation movements which reached 85 million kronor in the fiscal year 1978/1979. Scandinavian aid is strictly "humanitarian": medical supplies, clothes, food, school supplies, etc.

Faced with the constantly deteriorating situation in Southern Africa and the rise of national liberation there, the Scandinavian governments realized earlier than most other Western countries that the conflict could not be settled without participation by genuine representatives of Southern African peoples. Ola Ullsten, leader of Sweden's Liberal Party and the country's Prime Minister at the time, stressed that "only a solution which is acceptable to the Patriotic Front and to the Frontline States has any chance of success".⁴³ Life has confirmed the realism of this position which gave a headstart to the Scandinavian countries in establishing ties with Zimbabwe after it won its independence. Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe visited the Nordic countries among the first in Western Europe (in September 1981). He expressed his gratitude for the support the patriots of Zimbabwe had received from Scandinavia during the liberation struggle. The talks also produced specific practical results. Several accords were signed on aid to Zimbabwe (18 million dollars from Sweden and 13 million dollars from Denmark), and agreement was reached on expanding operations by Scandinavian firms in Zimbabwe. Pragmatic government policy—as in the case with the former Portuguese colonies—ensures direct profits for Nordic private capital.

There is a certain ambiguity in the position of these countries vis-à-vis Namibia. On the one hand, they have repeatedly declared their support for SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian

people. It was even admitted, albeit unofficially, that the leading Western powers were responsible for the situation in Namibia. For example, Olof Palme, Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party, said it was clear Western nations "are not ready to exert on South Africa the kind of pressure that could persuade this country to change its policy".⁴⁴

On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries, Austria and Switzerland support the activities of the so-called contact group (the United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG and Canada), essentially aimed at isolating SWAPO and setting up a puppet regime in Namibia. The ideological, political, military (for Denmark and Norway) community of interests with these countries and the desire to keep Namibia within the capitalist system prevents the smaller West European nations from taking a consistent stand on the Namibia problem—and this cannot escape Africa's attention.

Like most Western countries, Austria and Switzerland do not provide direct assistance to the Southern African national liberation movements. Going through the motions of denouncing racism, colonialism and apartheid, the Swiss government is in fact unquestioningly following the powerful South African lobby which exists in Switzerland and represents primarily big capital directly interested in further developing its diverse cooperation with the racist authorities of South Africa. According to a survey entitled *Switzerland—South Africa. Economic and Political Relations*, the activities of this lobby have led to an "openly partial" attitude of the Swiss authorities to the white minority regime "which constitutes a flagrant violation" of Switzerland's neutrality.⁴⁵

This aspect of Swiss foreign policy has been duly noted in Africa. Although Switzerland has not been blacklisted as an ally of racism because it is not a member of the United Nations, the Ghanaian press has observed, this does not mean that Africa has overlooked Switzerland's approach to the chief African problem—that of completely eradicating the pockmarks of the colonial past. A Ghanaian newspaper has even raised the question of transferring the headquarters of some international organizations from Switzerland elsewhere and staging a boycott by African delegations of various conferences held in Switzerland to protest this country's policy on Southern African liberation. In other words, African governments and public opinion are closely monitoring the positions vis-a-vis chief African problems taken not only by the great powers but also by the smaller developed states. Africa shapes its attitude toward different countries proceeding from an analysis of these positions.

African countries increasingly realize that while the Nordic policies on the elimination of colonialism, racism and apartheid in Africa do display a number of positive features, they are not at all free of serious shortcomings. Material aid to national liberation movements is far from always combined with support for the latter's key political de-

mands. For example, while it provided PAIGC with humanitarian assistance, the Swedish government delayed diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau by almost twelve months, lagging in this regard behind most other Western countries.

Independent Africa's relations with Scandinavia today suffer the most from the latter's constant expansion of trade and economic ties with racist South Africa. According to *Jeune Afrique*, operations of Scandinavian companies in South Africa threaten to destroy the "capital of trust" these countries have acquired in Africa through their assistance to liberation movements.⁴⁶

Fears of losing this hard-earned "capital" makes the Scandinavian countries take steps toward restricting contacts with South Africa. Specifically, in March 1978 a conference of Nordic Foreign Ministers adopted a joint program of action against apartheid. The program's focal point is the recommendation to the Nordic Council countries that they adopt legislation banning the export of capital to South Africa and restricting the operations of enterprises already existing there. Sweden was the only one to comply with this recommendation by 1982. From July 1, 1979 it is against the law for Swedish monopolies to invest capital in South Africa and Namibia. Virtually all African leaders welcomed this step. Aside from moral acclaim, this has won a considerable practical advantage for Sweden. During the visit to Nigeria of Swedish Minister of Commerce Hadar Cars in the summer of 1979, the two countries reached agreement on a sizable increase of Nigerian oil sales to Sweden. This was justifiably seen as an expression of Nigeria's gratitude for Swedish policies on the problems of Southern Africa.

The fact that the Nordic countries, Austria and Switzerland do not interfere openly in African conflicts largely contributes to relations between these countries and Africa. Leaders of the smaller capitalist states are usually extremely cautious in describing their official views of this or that crisis situation in Africa; in most cases they offer a formal legal interpretation of the "African solutions to African problems" slogan. While criticizing the more notorious aspects of policies pursued by the leading NATO countries, they also readily attack the nations which help progressive African forces to resist action by foreign and domestic reactionaries. Specifically, this was the position taken by Sweden and some other smaller countries during Somalia's armed aggression against Ethiopia. At the same time, Africa welcomed the opposition the smaller West European countries displayed to the trend toward extending NATO activities to Africa and linking detente to African developments.

Another important feature in the African policies of the smaller West European countries is that Social Democracy is trying to establish ties with some African parties, primarily ruling ones. The Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party is especially active in this regard. Objects of its attention include the Kenya National African Union, the

Socialist Destourian Party of Tunisia (PSD), the Senegalese Socialist Party, as well as revolutionary-democratic parties—the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM), the Guinea Party-State, the MPLA—Party of Labor, FRELIMO and PAIGC.

An analysis of relations between independent African states and the smaller West European countries leads one to conclude that the occasional outward conformity between the action of the smaller Western countries and African aspirations is generally explained by attempts to strengthen the prestige of capitalism where it has been undermined by the openly neocolonialist policies of the United States and other leading imperialist powers. At the same time, the ruling quarters of the smaller capitalist countries are guided by the desire of "junior partners" in the capitalist system to exploit their allies' blunders in order to consolidate and expand their own positions in Africa. This is additional corroboration of Lenin's words to the effect that there are two dialectically interconnected trends in the capitalist world: "one, which makes an alliance of all the imperialists inevitable; the other, which places the imperialists in opposition to each other."⁴⁷

Progressive African forces use the positive elements in the policies of the smaller West European countries to further the national liberation process. At the same time, these forces are aware that as an integral part of the capitalist system, these countries pursue the same objectives in Africa as the leading imperialist powers—to keep African countries within the economic, political and ideological orbit of capitalism.

6. Afro-Japanese Relations

Relations with Japan make up an insignificant element in the overall pattern of independent Africa's foreign policy. In all probability, they reflect African response to the initiative of Tokyo and Japanese monopolies who are eager to get a share of Africa's raw materials. Opportunities for this offered themselves after the disintegration of colonial empires in the continent. This explains why these relations only began to intensify from the late 1960s. Today, over 40 African countries have established diplomatic relations with Japan; Japanese embassies have been opened in 20 African capitals and 14 African ambassadors are accredited with Tokyo. Many African leaders have visited Japan, including the Presidents of Zaire, Cameroon, Zambia and Senegal, the Prime Ministers of Mauritius, Morocco, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, as well as a number of ministers. There have been talks on specific aspects of bilateral relations.

There are different motives behind Afro-Japanese political relations as far as African countries are concerned. Some count on Ja-

pan's support in solving their problems at international forums. Others, impressed with the Japanese postwar economic boom, expect these relations to aid them in undermining the sway of the former colonial and other Western powers in African economies by attracting new partners in economic cooperation. For example, in his remarks on Afro-Japanese relations the Zambian Foreign Minister stressed that they "were very important not only for political but also for economic reasons".⁴⁸ African countries are interested in purchasing inexpensive consumer goods and industrial equipment, in increasing their mineral and agricultural exports through sales to Japan. Given their acute shortage of foreign exchange for development purposes, they intend to enlarge the general scope of both financial and technical assistance from abroad by having Japanese economic cooperation programs spread to Africa.

It appears that African countries shape their relations with Japan in response to the desire of Japanese companies to enlarge their sources of raw materials and fuel, almost all of them foreign, and expand their investment spheres. "On the one hand, there are the abundant natural resources of African countries—such as iron ore, copper, bauxite, uranium, diamonds, oil and, not to mention the various agricultural export products, land and water resources which are acknowledged to be the greatest in the world; and on the other, the high technological and human resources of Japan."⁴⁹

Trade and economic contacts have emerged as the basis of Afro-Japanese ties. African imports of Japanese goods have risen substantially (by 250 percent since 1970) and by 1982 reached about 20 percent of all African imports from capitalist countries, exceeding imports from the United States by 50 percent. However, African countries have failed to expand their exports to Japan to any significant degree. Japan's share in total African exports to capitalist countries remains at a stable 5.5 percent. Only the deliveries of mineral fuels skyrocketed thanks to oil (a 60-fold increase); they accounted for about 50 percent of all African exports by the early 1980s. By now all African countries no longer apply Article 35 of GATT to Japan—an article restricting commercial ties—and 20 of them have concluded mutual agreements on most-favored nation treatment with Tokyo. At the same time, Africa is facing considerable difficulties in increasing its exports to Japan.

Each year Japanese aid to Africa is growing. African countries received the largest amount in 1980—23 percent of all Japanese grants. By March 31, 1981 the total of Japanese private investments reached almost 1.5 billion dollars.

Let us recall that African interest in Japan's economic boom is one of the motives behind the development of Afro-Japanese relations. Tokyo argues that the Japanese model should attract African countries. Typically, the African leaders who publicize the Japanese experience are well known for their pro-Western views. One of them, President

Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, stressed that "Japan, a country with very limited raw materials, has moved to the forefront in the global competition thanks to the qualities of its people and exemplary political stability".⁵⁰ There are also attempts to present the "Japanese model" as a case of "a nonwhite nation which has made the economic breakthrough to a highly advanced level of technological and economic development largely by means of its own efforts".⁵¹ Obviously, such assertions are based on the unscientific concept of the alleged solidarity of nonwhite nations which rules out a class approach to problems of socio-economic development.

Another factor which contributed to broader Afro-Japanese relations is the fact that, unlike Southeast Asia, there was no antagonism toward Japan in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s mostly because Africans had no first-hand experience of Tokyo's militarist ambitions. Besides, since Japanese presence in Africa is comparatively new and insignificant, many independent countries are not yet fully aware of the danger posed by the growing aggressiveness of Japanese monopolies. These states erroneously maintain that since Japan "never had a colonial past in Africa",⁵² it entered the African scene with friendly intentions. That is why African countries often prefer cooperation with Japan over relations with other imperialist powers with their perceptibly neocolonialist policies.

However, it is also obvious that as Afro-Japanese cooperation advances, contradictions are mounting between independent Africa and imperialist Japan. These hinge on Tokyo's approach to the two key problems of the continent: complete sovereignty for all African countries and the striving of the liberated states for economic independence as a firm basis of political nationhood.

African efforts to mobilize world public opinion and secure moral and material support for the Southern African liberation movements were reflected in appeals to the Japanese government. The position of Japan, who tried to evade any effective participation in assistance to African peoples, inevitably left a negative imprint on Afro-Japanese relations. As early as 1972 an OAU delegation visited Tokyo hoping to influence Japanese leaders and elicit a promise to cut Japanese trade with South Africa. However, the African press noted, the response was in the form of vague assurances from the Japanese government about "humanitarian" assistance via UN channels and no encouragement of monopolies to expand trade with Pretoria.

Currently, Japan's growing commercial ties with South Africa and violations of the trade embargo evoke continuous protests from independent countries and create in Africa, as *New African Development*, a London periodical, put it, "an image of the Japanese as economic animals interested only in making a profit".⁵³

Criticism of Tokyo is growing, although compared to other imperialist powers—Britain, France, the FRG and the United States—Japan

maneuvers more skillfully to support the white minority regime. Tokyo has no diplomatic relations with Pretoria and has formally prohibited its companies to invest capital in or sell arms to South Africa. Japanese leaders publicly protest their condemnation of apartheid and readiness to fight against it.

Nevertheless, Japan is the fourth largest supplier of industrial equipment and consumer goods to South Africa and the fourth largest importer of South African products, mostly raw materials. South Africa accounts for almost one-third of Japan's total imports from Africa and 20 percent of its exports to the continent. Besides, African countries pay increasing attention to secret deals between Japanese companies and South Africa which violate all official bans: facts are being revealed about Japanese investments and bank loans channeled via European and South African subsidiaries, etc. In actual fact, Tokyo's trade, industrial and financial ties with Pretoria considerably bolster the racist regime which uses them to intensify its oppression of the country's African population. "By committing itself so strongly to South Africa," *Sechaba* wrote, "Japan is increasingly showing itself to be an unreliable ally for independent Africa, and the whole of the Third World."⁵⁴

The broadening of Japanese-South African trade is closely linked to the Namibia problem. After the United Nations declared illegal exports of any natural resources from Namibia prior to its liberation from South African rule, the Chairman of the UN Council for Namibia visited Tokyo where he received verbal assurances from the Prime Minister about support for the struggle against the illegal administration of Namibia by South Africa. In 1981 Japan even said it was willing to join the "contact group" on the Namibia problem. Nevertheless, the imports of Namibian uranium by Japanese companies not only failed to cease but even picked up. SWAPO leaders responded with indignation and said that the Western powers and Japan who import raw materials from Namibia disregard the ban.

As far back as 1974 the OAU protested harshly against Japanese violations of the embargo on exports of Rhodesian chrome, after an analysis of discrepancies in Japanese and South African statistics showed that Japan met about 25 percent of its demand for this mineral by purchases in Southern Rhodesia. Africa also reacted with bitterness to reports of clandestine tobacco imports and sales of Japanese automobiles and other goods to Southern Rhodesia via third countries.

The growing African protests forced the Japanese government to update its tactics. In the summer of 1974 Tokyo responded to UN appeals and declared that no visas would be issued to South African sports, cultural and educational delegations. From the spring of 1975 Japanese banks have been forbidden to extend long-term credits to South African firms for importing equipment in sets. Still, South African businessmen are visiting Japan freely, and implementation of

the long-term contracts Japanese companies concluded with South Africa in the 1970s has begun.

One of the commissions of the Sixth Nonaligned Conference held in Havana in September 1979 again named Japan among those countries who failed to comply with the demand on severing relations with South Africa.

Thus, although independent Africa did make some progress in curtailing Tokyo's contacts with Pretoria by threatening to reduce Afro-Japanese cooperation, the OAU member countries increasingly realize that Japan's halfhearted measures cannot be viewed as effectively helping Africa in its liberation struggle. "Its gestures of solidarity with Africans are mere tokens," *Sechaba* stressed, "designed to cover up the alliance with Africa's enemies."⁵⁵ In May 1981 Japanese companies appeared on the blacklist of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid.

Afro-Japanese relations are directly and increasingly influenced by the struggle of developing countries against neocolonialism, for a new international economic order. Alarmed at this course pursued by the developing world, Japan's ruling quarters even try to accuse it of heightening international tensions. Nevertheless, voicing its regret over the impossibility to "settle" many problems in its own interests, Japan is forced to acknowledge independent states' demands and agree to certain concessions. That is why at the so-called North-South Conference in Cancún in the autumn of 1981—West-South would have been a better name—Tokyo refrained from support for the tough US stand toward developing countries, despite the abrupt turn in Japanese foreign policies which brought them closer to the aggressive US course at the start of the 1980s.

Aiming at equality in foreign trade, Africa has long demanded that Japan take steps to balance it. In the latter half of the 1960s several African countries already introduced temporary restrictions on imports from Japan: they were almost completely banned in Nigeria, Togo, Sudan and Kenya and curtailed severely in Tanzania, Uganda and Algeria. However, this failed to produce any tangible results, and the trade balance remained essentially unchanged in the 1970s. This also affects adversely Africa's attitude toward Japan.

Besides, developing countries denounce the Japanese policy of "economic cooperation" which seeks to secure maximum advantages at minimal costs. Faced with this discontent and under pressure from Western capitalist nations and the United States who want to cut down their own expenditures, Japan's leaders have kept their 1978 promise to double assistance to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America by 1982; in 1981 they also promised to double Japanese aid by the mid-1980s.

Africa keeps up its demands that Japan increase and improve its government assistance. These demands have succeeded to a certain degree. Loan conditions, while remaining quite hard, have been some-

what relaxed.* The number of yen loan recipients has grown considerably. Apart from Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania who received Japanese government aid in the 1960s, it now includes Ethiopia, Zambia, Zaire, Madagascar, Liberia, Rwanda, Gabon, Botswana, Malawi, as well as Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Morocco. Besides, in 1978 Japan provided, for the first time, the African Development Fund with a loan of 4.6 billion yen (about 18 million dollars), and in 1981 the African Development Bank with a loan of 15 billion yen. Still, Japanese government assistance remains the least favorable to developing countries in all respects—in terms of its size, both absolute and compared to that of other countries, and structure.

An analysis of Afro-Japanese relations points to substantial changes in them over the past two decades. African countries have been working persistently to establish equitable relations with Tokyo, stimulated by Africa's objective requirements for foreign economic assistance and technical support and its striving for complete decolonization. Meanwhile, contradictions between independent Africa and Japan have been intensifying over the struggle with the racist regimes in the South which Tokyo supports economically and over the mounting antiimperialist drive to secure equitable economic relations.

7. Africa and the European Economic Community

There are not only close economic but also political relations concerning key international issues between independent African countries and the European Nine. The European Economic Community, which comprises the former colonial powers, exerts pressure on African states in an effort to make them choose capitalist development. "Lesser Europe" pursues a collective neocolonialist policy in order to undermine the growing friendship of African countries with the socialist community—a goal pursued by the United States too.

However, the world has changed and the role of developing—including African—countries enhanced so much that they are now able to withstand pressure from the imperialist powers more firmly and wrest economic and political concessions from them which seemed impossible earlier. The First and Second Lomé Conventions of February 28, 1975 and October 31, 1979, concluded between the EEC and the developing countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (a total of 60 countries), including an overwhelming majority of countries of Tropical Africa, as well as separate EEC agreements with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt contain certain economic conces-

* According to the author's estimates, in the 1960s loans to Africa were provided on the following average conditions: 5.75 percent annual interest for a term of 18 years with a five-year preferential period; the figures for 1972-1973 were 4.56 percent, 18.9 and 6.5 years; and for 1974-1975, 3.85 percent, 23.6 and 7.6 years.

sions to developing countries, secured against the background of a changed international situation.

In their relations with the European Economic Community African states try to change the positions of its member nations on important political questions, primarily having a direct bearing on the future of Africa. In this they use their increased economic weight, political unity and growing solidarity with the developing countries of Asia and Latin America.

For example, there is the so-called Euro-Arab dialogue which has been going on between the EEC and the Arab League for several years. The EEC would like to strengthen its economic ties with rich Arab countries and use the huge financial resources of the Arab oil-producing states in order to consolidate its own positions in Africa. With this end in view, EEC leaders have drawn up cooperation plans for Arab capital, European technology and African raw materials and manpower.

Arab countries wanted the EEC to take an unequivocal position on the question of Israeli aggression and continued occupation of Arab territories. Since 1973 the EEC has adopted numerous statements on the Mideast conflict, and understandably so. It was precisely after the Arab oil-exporting countries imposed, in October 1973, an embargo on oil deliveries to nations pursuing a pro-Israeli course that the EEC was forced to alter its Mideast policies. It issued statements expressing its conviction that a solution to the Mideast conflict should be based on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council and take into consideration the Palestinians' legitimate rights. However, Arab spokesmen in the Euro-Arab dialogue insisted that the EEC should officially recognize the PLO and take specific political and economic measures in order to end Israeli occupation of Arab territories.

The EEC avoided the adoption of such decisions but had to make concessions to the just demands of the Arab countries. On June 29, 1977 the Council of Europe (the leading EEC body comprising the heads of state or government of the member nations) approved a new declaration on the Middle East, for the first time acknowledging that a settlement of the conflict should involve recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate right. This right, the declaration said, should be translated into a reality that would take into consideration the need to "create a national home for the Palestinian people".⁵⁶

This statement clearly stopped halfway. The EEC did not come out firmly in support of a Palestinian state but referred instead to a "national home for the Palestinians", an expression resembling earlier statements by the US administration in this regard and admitting of different interpretations. However, the declaration was definitely a step forward in EEC Mideast policies since it condemned Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

Progressive African countries realize that EEC interests in the Middle East and the Mediterranean are quite close to the objectives of the United States which strives to prevent new progressive regimes

from springing up in this important region and to bolster the reactionary regimes existing there. In this connection one should note that the EEC declaration of June 29, 1977 was ready to be announced in January 1977 but was not made public upon request from the United States.⁵⁷

At the October 1977 round of the Euro-Arab dialogue the EEC countries again refused to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Arab people of Palestine. The motives behind this refusal are clear. The EEC virtually approved the talks between President Sadat of Egypt and Israeli leaders, in which the PLO was barred from becoming a party to a peaceful Mideast settlement. The ambiguity of the EEC position on recognizing the PLO means that the European Community is ready to promote a settlement concluded behind the back of the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. The EEC stand became completely clear after the separate accord between Egypt and Israel was signed under the aegis of the United States. At a conference in Venice in June 1980 the heads of state and government of the EEC countries adopted a new declaration on the Middle East in which they demanded self-determination for the Palestinian people and PLO participation in talks on Middle East problems. The PLO was dissatisfied with the declaration because the EEC did not recognize this organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Besides, the document said nothing about the creation of a Palestinian state. In the autumn of 1981 the leading EEC members (France, Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain) said they favored involvement by their military contingents in the units to be stationed along the Egyptian-Israeli border after the Sinai was to be returned to Egypt in April 1982. At the same time, all the EEC members support the right of the Arab people of Palestine to create a state of their own. Generally, they are in agreement with the Saudi Arabian plan for a Mideast settlement. Still, the EEC has refused to advance its own proposals on this question.

There are also considerable differences between African countries and the EEC on issues of Southern Africa. Most African states have long demanded that the EEC cease its support of the South African apartheid regime. Africa stresses, with good reason, that without comprehensive assistance from such EEC members as Great Britain, France and the FRG the Pretoria regime would collapse very soon.

The EEC ignored African demands which were supported by democratic public opinion throughout the world. However, after the events in Angola EEC leaders began to adapt their policy to the new situation. On February 23, 1976 the EEC issued an African policy statement proclaiming, among other things, these underlying principles: the right of the peoples of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia to self-determination and independence and condemnation of the South African apartheid policy. However, this statement did not point to the need to respect earlier decisions on these issues taken by the UN

and other international forums—that is, precisely the decisions the United States and EEC members grossly violated. Finally, while condemning apartheid, the EEC advanced no initiative aimed at eliminating South African racism. The statement was prompted by the fears that if the EEC continued to openly back the racist regimes, this policy would deprive it of African support, even in countries with pro-Western regimes. Africans were sceptical of the EEC statement, and subsequent developments bore out their misgivings. On May 28, 1976 a contract was signed stipulating that French companies would deliver two nuclear reactors to South Africa, and this brought forth a wave of indignation in independent African countries.

The upsurge of the national liberation struggle in Southern Africa forced the EEC to issue a new propaganda statement on its African policies. The declaration again said the Nine supported the "rights of the peoples of Namibia and Rhodesia to self-determination and independence" and condemned the policy of apartheid. The EEC pledged to do everything in its power to bring about the establishment of democratic governments in Southern Africa.⁵⁸

But this statement failed to change anything in the EEC's Southern African policy. In order to make at least a show of support for African demands, the Nine declared, on July 12, 1977, that they did not rule out the possibility of economic and political sanctions against South Africa if Pretoria did not end its policy of apartheid. The EEC Council of Ministers set up a working group to suggest measures that could be taken against South Africa. The initiative in this matter belonged to Britain's Foreign Minister David Owen, supported by his Dutch, Belgian and Danish colleagues. Mr. Owen also proposed the elaboration of a code of conduct for European companies which should undertake to pay equal wages and salaries to their employees in South Africa irrespective of their race and to recognize trade unions of African workers. Obviously, these proposals were made public merely to take the edge off African criticism of EEC actions. The EEC countries promptly gave up the idea of economic sanctions against South Africa. Even the code of conduct elaborated by the Nine is not yet in force.

The new reprisals against the indigenous population in South Africa in 1977 outraged the world, and especially Africa. At the United Nations, the African group, supported by the socialist community, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council demanding economic and trade sanctions against Pretoria and an embargo on the deliveries of arms and materiel to South Africa. On instructions of their governments, African ambassadors to Brussels issued a communique stating that the OAU was requesting the EEC countries to apply all the sanctions suggested by the African group in the Security Council. As regards France, in December 1981 the French government declared it insisted on the earliest granting of independence to Namibia and pledged its commitment to take part in the implementation of

UN resolutions on this issue.

It is on record that Western powers prevented the adoption of economic sanctions against South Africa, although they had to agree to an embargo on the sales of arms and materiel. In June 1978 the EEC Council of Foreign Ministers decided to delay the imposition of new trade and economic sanctions against South Africa allegedly in order to further the EEC efforts to secure a constitutional settlement of the Namibia problem.

It is also on record that the EEC backs down whenever African countries take concerted action and advance joint demands. However, socio-political differentiation in Africa produces different types of response to some actions by the imperialist countries, including the EEC members. In early April 1977 France interfered in the internal affairs of Zaire and supported the Mobutu regime opposed by a sizable part of the country's population. To justify this move, President Giscard d'Estaing declared he was acting "on request of Africans themselves and within the scope of these requests". The interference of France (and Morocco) in the affairs of Zaire elicited different reactions in different African countries: progressive states condemned it and procapitalist nations welcomed it. These differences enabled the EEC to obscure the issue and present French interference as a move to protect Zaire's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The EEC statement on the events in Zaire was worded cautiously because not all the EEC members approved of the way France acted: some were afraid that Paris would try to dominate the situation in that African country. Still, the regimes of some French-speaking African states (Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Chad and others) fully approved the French intervention and called on "lesser Europe" to strengthen its economic and military ties with Africa, warning that it was the only way to prevent communist ideas from spreading throughout the continent.

The negative attitude of most African countries to the separatist forces trying to destroy Ethiopia's territorial integrity was among the chief reasons behind the EEC's moderate stand on the Horn of Africa developments. In July 1977 the EEC Council of Foreign Ministers decided against support for the separatist movement in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea.⁵⁹ The Nine's refusal to supply arms to Somalia who launched an aggression against Ethiopia is also explained by their reluctance to compromise their relations with Africa.

Despite the acute differences over Zaire between France and Belgium and between France and other members of the EEC, the European Economic Community expressed its approval of the military operations against the insurgents. An overwhelming majority of African states, including many French-speaking countries (the People's Republic of the Congo, Benin and Niger), were against the open involvement of EEC members on Mobutu's side. The African countries which sent their troops to replace the French and Belgian inter-

ventionists (Morocco, Senegal, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Togo) were defeated at the OAU summit conference in Khartoum where they tried to secure endorsement of the military venture they undertook to please imperialist powers. Most African states drew the right conclusions from the events in Zaire: the imperialists should be prevented from blatant interference in African affairs; the EEC is not the friend of African peoples it pretends to be.

The collapse of the "North-East" talks which lasted for over two years and which France initiated, supported by its EEC colleagues, has again demonstrated it to Africans that developed countries try to grow richer at the expense of developing nations. The Brussels talks between the EEC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries on a new Lomé Convention also showed that the interests of African countries and the EEC members are far from identical if not outright opposite. Refusing to grant these developing countries' demands about improving marketing conditions for their agricultural produce and raw materials, the EEC tried to foist the so-called human rights provision on them. The developing countries participating in the talks resolutely rebuffed this attempt, justifiably seeing it as a case of infringement on their sovereign rights and unacceptable interference in their internal affairs. No doubt, African countries will have to wage a stubborn struggle against the neocolonialist forces, including the Common Market, in their drive to secure complete eradication of colonialism and racism, for economic and social progress.

Chapter Seven

INDEPENDENT AFRICA AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

The shaping of political, economic and cultural relations between independent African countries and the nations of Asia and Latin America began, with a few exceptions, after Africa's liberation from colonial rule, in the early 1960s. These ties developed vigorously in the 1970s, when African foreign policy entered a radically new period.

Multilateral relations between African and other developing countries take shape above all within the nonaligned movement and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The underlying principles of both these movements can be traced to the Inter-governmental Conference of Asian and African Countries held in Bandung in 1955. Four independent African countries attended—Ethiopia, Libya, Egypt and Liberia—and Ghana (Gold Coast) and Sudan, not yet independent, were also represented.

1. The Place and Role of Independent Africa in the Nonaligned Movement and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization

In the first postwar decade, when newly independent countries put forward the idea of nonalignment with the military unions of the great powers, Africa was almost fully under colonial rule. But even there, the policy of "positive neutrality" quickly won dedicated adherents among the leaders of the then still few sovereign states. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the struggle of the Arab peoples against efforts to push them into the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), was a pioneer of this course in Africa.

Already at the initial stage of the nonaligned movement everywhere, including in Africa, it became obvious that its goals were much more than merely the refusal to formally join blocs. Following the example of Jawaharlal Nehru, the father of nonalignment, many African leaders proclaimed their firm intention to pursue an active policy of peaceful coexistence and equitable international cooperation. Speaking at

the 1959 session of the UN General Assembly, Sékou Touré, a prominent figure of independent Africa, stressed: "The Afro-Asian action we take in the conviction of acting for the total liberation of peoples and the end of racial discrimination in all parts of the world in no way prevents us from concerning ourselves with world peace."¹ Kwame Nkrumah, another leader of African national liberation, saw neutrality as a "contribution to international peace and world progress".²

The organizational and conceptual cornerstone of nonalignment as an international movement was laid at the 1955 Bandung Conference. However, its official inauguration date is September 1961, when the first summit conference of the nonaligned countries was convened. Today, the movement numbers over 90 member countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. As the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress noted, it has turned into an important factor of international relations and "its strength stems from the stand it takes against imperialism and colonialism, and against war and aggression. We are convinced that the key to any further heightening of its role in world politics—and this we would welcome—is its dedication to these basic principles."³ African countries have a special place in this movement.

The formation of the OAU and the legal formalization in its Charter of nonalignment principles as mandatory for all the OAU members was a turning point in the evolution of the movement as a whole. Many Soviet and foreign experts believe that this marked the start of the African period in its development; there is even a special term—"African nonalignment"—which reflects the distinctive African participation in the nonaligned movement. Indeed, while the Bandung Conference and subsequent nonaligned forums exerted great influence on the formulation of OAU purposes and principles, later, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, the reverse has been increasingly true. Africa has become a powerful catalyst in enhancing the prestige and antiimperialist content of the nonaligned movement. There are several objective reasons for that.

First of all, the OAU, which comprises all of Africa's independent countries, and the nonaligned movement in general objectively need each other and are interested in becoming mutually stronger. Their activities and the shaping of their philosophies are constantly independent and mutually complementary. The nonaligned movement "provides an appropriate basis", OAU resolutions have stated repeatedly, "for effective mobilization of the third world countries and for specific reaffirmation of their solidarity with Africa".⁴ For their part, African countries make up the largest group within the movement, over one-half of its full-fledged members: the 50 independent African states and SWAPO, a national liberation organization.

The community of the chief foreign policy interests of the nonaligned countries explains why African nations' initiatives are supported by the entire movement, consequently enabling these states to act

efficiently within the United Nations and at other forums. Thanks to the broad African participation the international prestige of the nonaligned movement as a whole is growing perceptibly.

The rapid decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s was another important factor behind independent Africa's revolutionizing impact on the nonaligned movement. The simultaneous attainment of independence by many African countries, the similarity of the problems they were facing made their historical community more profound, expanded the basis for their unity and bolstered the anticolonial trend in nonalignment.

And, finally, the third cause: the especially vigorous spread of socialist ideas in Africa due to a number of objective factors.

The above provides a general outline of the way African countries influence the nonaligned movement. The socialist orientation of many African states has also made its foreign policy more radical and imparted an especially pronounced antiimperialist and sometimes even anticapitalist quality to the principle of nonalignment. The legal formalization of this principle in the OAU Charter has started the institutionalization of the movement's concept in international law. Africa's contribution to the strengthening and growth of the prestige of nonalignment is now obvious. This was acknowledged at the fifth nonaligned summit in Colombo in 1976. The conference's Political Declaration stated that the solidarity of Africa as a whole with the principles of nonalignment was "a development of major significance in the history of nonalignment... Africa gave a firm anticolonial and antiracist content to the movement."⁵ African participation in nonalignment strengthened the centripetal trends in the movement. Although the OAU has lived through several grave crises over the past decade, it has nevertheless functioned effectively as a mechanism of African unity in international affairs and helped in the development of a concerted and sometimes even common position in the nonaligned movement. The 1979 Havana nonaligned summit reaffirmed the role of the OAU as an effective instrument in the drive toward peace, security and friendly relations among its members. The conference also stressed the importance of the OAU Charter and the need to observe its principles and the resolutions and decisions of the OAU Summit Assembly.

In a way, Africa is the more organized and dynamic part of the movement. Since the Third Conference in Lusaka in 1970, nonaligned conferences have always been preceded by OAU meetings at which African countries agree on joint action on this or that problem, specify their goals and usually arrive at a common course to be pursued at the forthcoming conference of the movement. This practice invariably brings results.

All this points to the conclusion that the principles of unity and nonalignment in African foreign policy are, as it were, mutually complementary. At the same time, there is ample proof that unity

does not always emerge victorious in African nonalignment. Suffice it to recall the January 1976 OAU Assembly, when disagreement on the Angolan question led to the gravest crisis in the organization's history.

The difficulties in the formulation and consistent implementation of joint policy are rooted in the heterogeneous composition of the nonaligned movement in Africa and the differences in the ruling socio-political forces. Bilateral relations between certain countries sometimes create acute contradictions and tensions. These often lead to armed conflicts or to the severance of diplomatic relations. All this confers certain instability on the unity of Africa's nonaligned countries. Nevertheless, in the developing world Africa displays the closest albeit relative cooperation in foreign policy matters, and the understanding is growing that only joint action can produce effective results in the struggle against imperialism. African countries see the nonaligned movement precisely in this light, as a distinctive way of pooling the efforts of the developing world. This explains why, while traditionally mentioning nonalignment as a basis for the effective mobilization of developing countries, OAU resolutions today state the important role of the African states in strengthening the entire movement's solidarity and unity in the drive toward peace, security, independence and self-determination. Also, the OAU firmly declares it is in the interests of Africa to have a stronger nonaligned movement.

African countries are increasingly associated with the broadening and change in the movement's terms of reference. The nonaligned countries approach many topical issues, of importance to all nations and to the developing world, in conformity with OAU documents or with particular attention to the OAU position. So, largely due to the effectively anticolonialist foreign policy of Africa, nonaligned conferences concentrate on the issues of decolonization and the liberation of Southern Africa. The nonaligned position on colonial issues is identical with independent Africa's views, and the movement's resolutions invariably refer to relevant decisions of the OAU. African influence is also evident in the constructive approach and specific proposals of nonaligned resolutions on decolonization and in the support by the movement of African anticolonial methods. For example, the OAU's efforts brought the intensification of the national liberation movements' activities to the foreground of the nonaligned struggle for national independence. As a result, long before they won power in their countries, MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and other organizations began to take part in the nonaligned movement as observers or full-fledged members. Together with the victories of the armed liberation struggle, the recognition of progressive national organizations as the sole legitimate representatives of their peoples and as future partners in international affairs has been decisive in the support for these organizations by the international community.

The nonaligned movement has also mastered other offensive anti-colonial methods of the OAU. Specifically, this is borne out by the documents of the Havana nonaligned summit. Having accorded priority, as usual, to the situation in Africa and especially in the South, conference participants supported all the major OAU initiatives on decolonization. The Havana summit declared Muzorewa's puppet regime illegal, approved the appeal by the Monrovia Assembly of the OAU to convene, in 1980, an international conference under the joint aegis of the OAU and the United Nations "to mobilize world public opinion in support of effective implementation of economic and other sanctions against South Africa", and called on the oil-exporting nonaligned countries to follow the example of Iran, which suspended oil deliveries to South Africa, and Nigeria, which nationalized British Petroleum enterprises for British violations of the oil embargo against South Africa. Conference participants also decided to activate the Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of South Africa, set up at the Colombo Conference in 1976.

African countries make a distinctive contribution to the tackling and solution of many other global problems. It is due largely to their efforts that the agendas of nonaligned forums now include items like the worldwide expansion of detente or the transformation of Africa into a nuclear-free zone and of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

To a certain extent, African countries initiated and inspired the nonaligned drive for restructuring international economic relations. Since Africa accounts for most of the least developed nations, its economic difficulties are greater than those of the other members of the movement, and this is what the OAU focuses its efforts on. It has planned a number of important moves which have become part of the nonaligned economic programs.

The approach to detente, the assessment of its content, results and prospects point unmistakably to the political essence of this or that international entity. Nonaligned countries approach these issues in two ways. On the one hand, they stress the positive results of detente and its conformity with the purposes and principles of non-alignment. On the other hand, there is the desire to equate the foreign policy of the capitalist world with that of the socialist community, to see the causes of world tensions not in the aggressive imperialist course but in the very existence of military alliances and in the rivalry of the "superpowers". Besides, some members of the nonaligned movement maintain that the two socio-economic systems pursue detente at the expense of developing countries and vie for influence over them. For example, the fourth nonaligned conference in Algiers (1973) stressed that while detente was in general progressive, it merely meant a shifting of confrontation from one region to another. The next nonaligned conference, held in Colombo in 1976, displayed a more objective understanding of the sources of international tensions:

"The underlying cause of international tensions ... was attributable mainly to the forces of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, racism and other forms of alien domination."⁶ Conference participants also identified correctly their allies in detente and voiced their intention to continue with their efforts to ensure cooperation with all peace-loving and progressive forces throughout the world and thus strengthen their ability to wage a successful struggle against imperialism.

At the same time, the documents adopted at the conference contained several traditionally biased assessments of the changes in world politics, maintaining that "detente, as proclaimed in official declarations, does not seem however to have reduced the struggle for influence which is going on in all continents or to have extinguished the hotbeds of tension".⁷ Moreover, detente, some members of the movement held, could mean that the policy of the spheres of influence and partition of the world into blocs could infiltrate the nonaligned movement. Hence, the nonaligned nations claimed, closer relations with one of the "superpowers" could only harm efforts to ensure the security of the developing world.

In contrast with these views, many countries of Tropical and North Africa (Ethiopia, Benin, Algeria and others) advocated strict observance of the principles of nonalignment and urged the movement to rely in its joint efforts for peace and security on the socialist countries, its natural allies.

The situation within the nonaligned movement became abruptly more complicated prior to the sixth nonaligned summit in Havana. The growing contradictions among the nonaligned nations stemmed not only from the increasing differentiation among them but also from the unprecedented pressure imperialism brought to bear on the movement, from the exacerbation in the ideological struggle over nonalignment. Hence the increasingly conflicting views within the movement on many issues, including various aspects of detente.

Relapses into the cold war mentality, brought about by the vicious anti-Soviet campaign launched by the US administration, led to wildly differing opinions at the Havana Conference as to what type of relations the nonaligned countries should maintain in this situation with the two existing socio-economic systems. Several countries yielded to outside pressure (in Africa: Egypt, Senegal, Somalia and Zaire) and severely criticized the socialist members of the movement, primarily Cuba. These countries even tried, albeit abortively, to prevent the convening of the conference in Havana. There were also attacks against Vietnam and other member nations enjoying close relations with the socialist community. However, progressive nonaligned countries, acting jointly and vigorously, rebuffed these attempts. This ensured the overall success of the Havana forum and enhanced the antiimperialist essence of nonalignment.

The documents adopted in Havana largely reflected the views pro-

gressive nonaligned countries held of detente and the obstacles to it. Having noted with profound concern a certain decline of detente, the conference stressed the need to strengthen international peace and security and reiterated its firm commitment to foster the solidarity and mutual assistance among the nonaligned countries in order to resist imperialism, colonialism, foreign domination and occupation, racism, including Zionism, threats, pressure, aggression and all other economic and political measures aimed against them. Reaffirming its dedication to the principles of peaceful coexistence, the conference declared that these included, among other things, the right of each country to its own choice of a socio-economic and political system. Thus the nonaligned countries condemned all imperialist interference in the affairs of the socialist-oriented states (and it is this orientation which prompts Western hostility and interference) and upheld their right to freely choose their path and, consequently, their allies in international affairs.

The conference arrived at its overall positive result after heated debate and a long search for compromise. African countries played an important role in Havana. They were active in both "camps". But, as always, progressive African states, especially their nucleus (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Algeria, Benin and Madagascar), acted in a more concerted way.

In other words, unlike the sphere of decolonization, it is difficult to arrive at a uniform assessment of Africa's influence on the nonaligned movement as far as ways of easing international tensions are concerned. African countries face greater ideological difficulties in their evaluation of detente because this approach is connected with the development paths they have chosen, with the differences in their socio-economic structures and with their interpretation of the nature and forms of the rivalry between the two world systems.

No doubt, virtually all the nonaligned countries are in favor of detente. But the difference is that while some of them advocate cooperation in this field with the socialist community, others pursue the course of the so-called equidistance. The former do not make up an overwhelming majority in African nonalignment but, in cooperation with the socialist nonaligned countries and supported by other forces, they comprise the more efficient part of the movement. Their position has been summed up concisely in an interview of Mengistu Haile Mariam to the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*: "Since the nonaligned movement and the socialist countries have common objectives in their struggle for freedom, equality, peace, prosperity, justice and democracy, it is quite natural for one side to support the other. That is why the nonaligned countries and the socialist community hold similar views and often take identical positions on important and urgent issues at the United Nations and in its specialized agencies."⁸ Africa's progressive countries effectively rebuff attempts to drive a wedge between the nonaligned and the socialist nations. The concept of equidistance from the imperialist and the socialist states, the

Tanzanian *Daily News* wrote on the eve of the Havana summit, should be rejected because it is used merely to make developing countries turn away from the socialist community. It distorts the essence of the current revolutionary process and confuses the issue of who is an enemy and who an ally of the liberated peoples.⁹

The commitment of African nonaligned countries to antiimperialist solidarity with the socialist world was highlighted by the position many of these countries took concerning the events in and around Afghanistan. Despite the intention of certain quarters in the movement to condemn the Soviet Union's internationalist support to the Afghan people, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and some other countries firmly rejected the attempts to interfere in Afghan internal affairs and the accusations charging the Soviet Union with aggression. Speaking in March 1980 at a meeting of the nonaligned group in New York, the representative of Madagascar said that the Afghan government and people were perfectly capable of deciding how they should shape their relations with other countries. The unsavory Afghan campaign, he continued, was clearly designed to bring pressure to bear on the Afghan revolution. Some quarters would like to create the illusion that it was Afghanistan, and the "Afghan question" which were to blame for the abrupt deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. But this, the Madagascar delegate went on, was merely another move in the imperialist strategy spearheaded against the nonaligned countries. Members of the movement, he added, should under no circumstances act as champions of imperialist interests. This approach to the question is fully in accordance with the special OAU resolution adopted at the Khartoum Assembly in July 1978. The OAU members denounced foreign interference in the affairs of other countries and declared that the sovereignty of each state endowed it with the right to appeal to any nation for assistance if the security and independence of the former were in danger. The Belgrade meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers, convened following the Khartoum forum, fully supported the OAU strategy to consolidate the movement.

All this means that the African countries play a leading role in the shaping of the theory and practice of nonalignment, with the more progressive among them becoming increasingly active. Given their typical trend toward taking concerted action, it is entirely possible that these states will in future largely determine the thrust of African influence on the nature and objectives of nonalignment. They increasingly grasp the essence of socialist foreign policy and correctly assess the consequences of one-sided pro-Western orientation and the advantages of cooperating with the socialist world. Solidarity with the socialist countries in no way contradicts the concept of nonalignment for it implies no political or other concessions, does not turn a nonaligned country into an object or tool of the military policy of a great power. The nonaligned country is thus assured independence and freedom of action on the international scene.

As stated earlier, independent African countries also take part in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, the first conference of which was held in Cairo as early as 1958. The conference decided to create a permanent Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). From its inception, AAPSO has acted as a vigorous champion of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for national freedom, independence, peace and social progress. The organization has helped greatly the colonial and dependent peoples of Asia and Africa in their fight for freedom from colonial oppression and for independence. At the current stage of the solidarity movement, Facine Bangoura, Deputy Secretary General of AAPSO, said, "of great importance... is the coordinating and pooling of efforts by the progressive and democratic forces of Asian and African countries in the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, and the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress".¹⁰

In mid-September 1978 an international conference of solidarity with the struggle of African and Arab peoples against imperialism and reaction was held in Addis Ababa. This broad international forum was attended by more than 300 public and political figures from over 100 countries. The conference welcomed the firm stand of the Frontline States—Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana—in assisting the Southern African peoples in their liberation struggle. The participants expressed their solidarity with Ethiopia which had defeated foreign and domestic reactionaries. The conference addressed to the Arab people of Palestine a message of solidarity with their struggle against imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

Since the latter half of the 1970s African countries have been active in developing bilateral political relations with Asian and Latin American nations. For example, in 1976 alone, diplomatic relations at embassy level were established between Algeria and Guyana, Sierra Leone and Mexico, Angola and Pakistan, etc.

2. Independent Africa in the Joint Struggle of Developing Countries for Economic Independence and Issues of Their Economic Cooperation

Developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are working to eradicate their economic dependence. With this in mind, they devote considerable attention at various nonaligned meetings and conferences to such issues as radically transforming the international division of labor, restricting the activities of Western transnational corporations, ensuring full sovereignty over natural resources, easing the recurring fluctuations of supply and demand in world trade, establishing a just system of prices, providing developing countries with effective economic assistance, expanding the transfer of advanced technology to them, and cardinally changing the world monetary system. In

other words, those developing countries which so far remain within the capitalist economic system are trying to establish machinery to forestall the negative effect of the capitalist mode of production on world economy.

It was in Africa that tremendous work was carried out to prepare for the international conference in Geneva at which the creation of UNCTAD was decided. In 1967 it was in Africa that the Group of 77 was formed which drew up and adopted a charter for the first time outlining the need to organize the struggle of developing countries for revising the outdated international division of labor so that conditions for their normal development could be ensured. In 1973, at the Fourth Nonaligned Conference, Algeria put forward an initiative on the establishment of more just prices of raw materials. The late President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria developed this doctrine at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in April 1974.

The Fifth Nonaligned Conference in Colombo, where Africa spoke particularly forcefully, drew up a strategy for economic independence. Colombo's final documents on economic problems reflected a radically new approach of the nonaligned movement to these issues. The member countries adopted the Action Program for Economic Cooperation which, in contrast to earlier similar documents, suggested more specific measures. This confirmed the increased efficiency of the nonaligned movement which no longer wanted its resolutions to remain on paper. The conference decided that representatives of the countries entrusted with coordinating the implementation of the program would meet once a year to review progress in this field.

The nonaligned countries above all intend to use the existing great potential for fuller and more effective cooperation among all developing nations. This will enable them to considerably strengthen their economic solidarity. Specifically, the Action Program envisages looking into the possibility of creating a common currency, bank and payment union of developing countries, and setting up their own transnational trading agencies, new commodity producers' associations and a joint reserve fund for regulating commodity prices. Therefore the goal is comprehensive trade and economic cooperation of developing countries which is to become one of their chief weapons in the struggle for economic independence.

The Colombo forum added another aspect to the concept of non-alignment by specially stressing the need to pursue a policy of "collective self-reliance". The economic declaration of the conference for the first time formalized the cooperation of the member nations on the basis of "collective self-reliance" as an important direction of non-aligned policy. At the same time, the movement recognizes the importance and inevitability of broad international cooperation with all nations.

In recent years, the nonaligned countries have stepped up their offensive against imperialism and its policy, and African countries

are active in this effort. At UNCTAD sessions and nonaligned forums in Nairobi, Colombo, Delhi and Havana criticism of capitalist countries and their monopolies was especially severe. For example, the delegate of Mozambique expressly stated in Nairobi that his country was launching a drive against capitalist exploitation; in international terms it was the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, the culprits of the increasing pauperization among backward countries. In his Colombo speech, Houari Boumedienne denounced the hypocrisy of the West which did all it could to impede the development of the nonaligned countries: "While proclaiming their willingness to enter into a dialogue, some developed countries act as though their real intention is merely to gain time in order to regain the ground lost when the crisis of their economies reached its peak... This ... is aimed at putting off all genuine change in the mechanism of international economic relations."¹¹

In tackling vital economic problems, developing countries increasingly often take concerted action against imperialism, seeing it as the prime obstacle to their development. The working papers prepared by the Group of 77 at the Arusha Conference in mid-February 1979 are an example.

In the 1970s Africa displayed a growing interest in concluding chiefly trade agreements with Asian and Latin American countries; these accords are currently the main form of intergovernmental ties and a substantive element of its foreign policy. Developing countries differ greatly in their levels of economic development, domestic reserves, demand, consumption and the size of natural resources. An analysis of even recent trade cooperation among them points to numerous obstacles to progress which stem from the different levels of their industrial and agricultural potentials.

The chief obstacle to the development of Africa's trade with Asian and Latin American countries no doubt lies in its backward economic basis, with its poor industrialization record and small manufacturing industry. Incidentally, the meager share of the manufacturing industry in the gross domestic product is also typical of the more industrialized countries like Argentina and Iran (28 percent), Venezuela (21 percent), Brazil (20 percent), to say nothing of Nigeria (seven percent), Tanzania (nine percent) and Ethiopia (ten percent).¹² While the overall share of newly independent countries in the worldwide output of the manufacturing industry is seven percent, the figure for Africa is only 0.6 percent.

Another factor seriously hampering the foreign trade of developing countries is the generally low level of cargo shipping due, among other things, to the inadequate tonnage of their national merchant marines. In 1974 these states accounted for only some 3,000 merchant vessels, mostly belonging to a small group of countries (India, Brazil, Liberia and others).

Since developing countries orient their trade mostly toward the im-

perialist powers, they are left with comparatively small stocks for exchange among themselves. There is also the great difference between oil-producing and other developing states. For example, the trade deficit of the latter grew 400 percent (from seven to 35 billion dollars) from 1972 to 1975. As a result, their dependence on imperialist markets increases; this, in turn, checks the advancement of trade among developing countries themselves.

This trade also suffers considerably from the lack of a uniform approach to prices for oil, commodities and industrial goods. This undermines the purchasing power of newly free countries and affects their foreign exchange earnings.

Latin American nations are the largest importers of African goods; they purchase African oil, commodities and agricultural produce, with Argentina and Brazil among the foremost trading partners. Brazil is especially active in expanding this trade; from the mid-1970s it has stepped up its exports of industrial goods and armaments to Africa and has even started sales of aircraft. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has set up a special department to assist companies wishing to trade with African countries and to ensure preferential credit terms for customers.

Latin American trade delegations visit Africa often. For example, in 1976 a Colombian delegation arrived in Algeria where it held talks on strengthening bilateral trade and other economic relations and concluded an intergovernmental agreement on commercial exchanges. That same year the first trade agreement between Peru and Egypt was signed which provided for most-favored-nation treatment for both sides on condition that transactions were to be performed in hard currency.

Notably, Egypt—economically the more developed partner—will export industrial goods, mineral fertilizers, phosphates, cement, glass, sulphuric acid, medical drugs, fabrics, agricultural implements, footwear, clothes, carpets and other articles to Peru. The latter will supply Egypt with copper, concentrated copper ore, zinc, lead, coffee and canned fish.

The growing trade between Algeria and Bangladesh is another example. Algeria exports the products of the chemical, pharmaceutical, textile, oil-producing and mining (lead, zinc) industries to Bangladesh. Bangladesh delivers jute, timber, soybeans, copper, raw materials and other goods to Algeria. These agreements are a sign of certain maturity of trade relations. They enable developing countries to ease their one-sided dependence on the imperialist powers.

While smaller in scale than transactions with Latin America, Africa's trade with Asia comprises more partnerships. India is the largest partner; it mostly supplies industrial goods to meet African requirements. In 1976 India delivered, under a trade agreement, five locomotives to Tanzania for a newly built railroad. Besides, Tanzania placed orders in India for 15 Diesel locomotives, 30 freight and 12 passenger

railroad cars. Indian statistics stress that the share of newly independent countries, including African states, is constantly growing in India's trade. A 1976 tour of Africa (Mauritania, Zambia, Tanzania and the Seychelles) by an Indian government delegation was of great political and economic importance for furthering trade between Africa and India.

Significantly—and this especially applies to the more industrialized Asian and Latin American countries—there is now a firm conviction that African markets, constantly expanding and of great potential capacity, are extremely important and profitable. Recent exchanges of government delegations between Africa on the one hand and Asia and Latin America on the other have led to the signing of a growing number of agreements on economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation; in these Africa usually acts as the recipient of loans, credits and technical assistance in various economic and social spheres.

The donors are mostly either oil-producing or the more industrialized states. The Asian countries are especially active in this regard, above all India and the Mideast states, interested in furthering comprehensive relations with Africa. The Latin American states, which until recently concentrated on trade, are less active. Due to their economic backwardness, African states provide loans or credits very rarely, mostly to the Asian and Latin American countries who are even poorer and less developed.

It is useful here to analyze the forms of economic, scientific and technical cooperation between Africa and Asia, especially widespread in recent years. Specifically, let us consider cooperation with India. Progressive African states appreciate India's relatively high industrial level, its scientific and technological potential, the greatest in the developing world, and its famous and distinctive cultural heritage. Besides, African countries and India hold similar political views on the struggle of both continents against colonialism and racism, for world peace, detente and socio-economic progress.

In 1976, within the framework of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, India extended assistance to Mozambique worth 900,000 rupees for purchases of goods and services in India. That same year Angola received 100,000 rupees to pay for medical deliveries, and Zambia a loan of ten million kwacha (about eight million dollars). Indian experts and government companies are involved in the setting up of small- and medium-size industrial enterprises in several African countries and in various technical assistance projects. For example, Indian experts assisted Uganda in developing its mining, textile, sugar and other industries. The government of Uganda stimulated the establishment of joint Uganda-India industrial enterprises.

Economic cooperation is expanding between Kenya and India. India has helped Kenya build a synthetic fiber factory near Nairobi which is to provide jobs for 500 workers. Indian personnel is assist-

ing Mozambique in health care, education, transport, communications and housing construction. Bharat, an Indian government company, has signed a contract with the Libyan General Electricity Corporation to build the second stage of the Tripoli heat and power complex (two generators of 120 megawatts each).

Oil-producing Asian countries are doing much to further economic cooperation with Africa. As early as 1977 Tunisia and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on cooperation in the oil industry: Saudi companies will help Tunisia prospect for and produce oil and natural gas. Saudi Arabia has undertaken to provide Morocco with a loan of 28 million dollars to finance the construction of an oil refinery (to be repaid over seven years at an annual interest rate of 8.5 percent). Besides, in 1977 the two countries agreed to expand economic cooperation, specifically by encouraging joint projects, and to set up a standing joint commission to oversee the implementation of the accord.

Africa is beginning to broaden its economic ties with other Asian countries too. In 1977 an agreement was signed between Libya and Turkey on the construction of a 45-kilometer road in Libya at a cost of 14.3 million dollars.¹³ Simultaneously, the two countries agreed to cooperate in the fields of shipbuilding, tourism and civil aviation, and to send Turkish experts to Libya.

Even those Asian countries which are geographically remote from Africa are striving to establish trade and other economic relations with it. For example, in 1976 Indonesia acted for the first time as a donor: it undertook to assist Madagascar as best as it could in the development of water transport and civil aviation. Indonesia has trained aircraft pilots and maintenance crews.

In 1977 Libya and Malaysia held talks on establishing joint companies and ensuring economic cooperation. Gabon and the Philippines signed an agreement on cooperation. The Gabonese ambassador became the first African diplomat in the Philippines, and Manila took on an obligation to send its experts to Gabon to share their expertise in industrial development and the organization of a school network.

Economic cooperation between Africa and Latin America is progressing slowly. This is explained by the extremely close links binding the latter to the markets of the United States, Canada and Western Europe and by the relatively well-developed regional integration in South America.

Argentina, Brazil and Mexico display the greatest interest in economic cooperation with Africa. Libya and Brazil examined thoroughly their mutual potential for economic cooperation, specifically regarding the construction in Libya of a factory which would process Brazilian sugar cane. An Argentine company is already involved in setting up three cattle farms in Zaire.

The development of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation among newly independent countries is of exceptional potential

value. However, facts show that only a small group of the more industrialized developing countries, advanced in science and technology, is capable of sharing its expertise and technological knowhow with the least developed independent countries which include most African states.

Countries like Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico and several others have already made certain progress in science, technology and the organization of industrial and agricultural production. They have begun to export their scientific achievements and to provide assistance in research. This means that African countries—mostly importers of scientific and technological knowhow—can use the services of the more industrialized Asian and Latin American nations, especially as regards the training of personnel in a number of fields and the adaptation of existing technology to the requirements of industrial production.

Among the developing countries which can and do provide Africa with technical assistance, India deserves to be mentioned first. It has numerous experts in various fields (the number of experts ranks India third after the United States and the Soviet Union). India's educational establishments train personnel from various developing nations and the country extends technical assistance to nearly 50 states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A new important aspect of this assistance is the cooperation in prospecting for and exploiting oil and gas deposits. The case of Tanzania was a typical example, where Western monopolies refused to continue prospecting for oil and gas, while Indian state-owned oil companies followed the already begun project through.

Foremost among the African recipients of Indian technical assistance are Mauritius, Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya. In Mauritius Indian experts are busy with projects in agriculture, fisheries, management and water resources; in Tanzania they work on planning and the construction of the new capital (in Zanzibar, they are assembling radio and television equipment). Over 80 Indian experts have been seconded to Kenya to help in the fields of education, medical care, irrigation, housing and industrial construction. In recent years India has been fostering technical cooperation with many other African countries, including Somalia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda and Rwanda.

Libya has lately become the recipient of sizable technical assistance from India: about 800 Indian experts are working there in government agencies and companies, in agriculture, housing and industrial construction and transport and communications agencies. Plans are under way to send more experts to this country. India has provided Libya with the technology and licenses for the construction of a steel works, a textile factory and other projects. India has established firm technical contacts with Algeria. Indian technical assistance allows this country to build up its hydropower network and oil refineries.

African cultural ties with Asian and Latin American countries

are still at the incipient stage. This is due to the legacy of colonial rule which kept peoples apart and prevented them from exchanging their cultural values. However, these countries are clearly striving to conclude agreements on cooperation in the field of information designed to acquaint them better with one another. This is typical above all of nonaligned countries which have already decided, at summit level, to set up an international pool of information agencies. Under this accord, bilateral agreements are concluded to regulate the exchange of expertise and information. Such agreements have been signed between Tunisia and India, Tunisia and Syria, Morocco and Syria, Zambia and India.¹⁴ In November 1976 Algeria and India signed an agreement on the exchange of information between *Algerie Presse Service* and *Hindustan Samachar*, their press agencies.

The meetings of Asian and African authors and journalists, held regularly in Tashkent for 20 years in 1978, do much to foster cultural contacts among Asian and African developing countries. Latin American authors and journalists attend these conferences increasingly often.

3. Unity and Contradictions

The salient feature of the political relations of African, Asian and Latin American countries is their striving toward unity, solidarity and cooperation at international forums. These nations are always trying to make the fullest possible use of their joint political potential in their antiimperialist and antimonopolist struggle.

Referring to the danger posed by imperialism and to the need for unity among newly independent countries in their fight against neo-colonialism, Indira Gandhi said: "We should all be alive to this danger and develop the strength to withstand such pressures. While seeking friendship with all countries, we should strive in particular to develop closer cooperation amongst ourselves. Diversification of trade and technological cooperation will lead to greater economic stability."¹⁵

The events of 1973, when the oil-producing developing countries of the three continents reached agreement and understanding in their resistance to imperialist monopolies, offered convincing proof of newly independent countries' readiness to work toward political unity.

These countries have much in common in the position they have taken on the food problem too: it is of equal concern to them all.

A unifying factor in the international relations of developing countries is the need to ensure better living conditions, a more equitable division of labor in the world capitalist economy, a new economic order, the kind of socio-economic development which would do away with the exploitation of the majority by the minority and prevent the gap in economic development levels between developing and developed capitalist countries from growing and, finally, to ensure world peace.

At the same time, while African, Asian and Latin American countries strive for solidarity and joint action—and this is rooted in the community of their histories and socio-economic development paths and in the goals of antiimperialist and antimonopolist struggle—some countries act inconsistently due to their dissimilar orientation in domestic and foreign policy. Because of their still considerable dependence on imperialism, the newly independent countries led by reactionary pro-Western regimes often violate obligations they assumed previously at international forums and hamper the establishment of normal relations with other developing countries.

Pursuing primarily its purely self-serving class interests, the indigenous bourgeoisie in some developing countries often encourages closer political and economic relations with the more reactionary regimes directly allied with imperialism and trying to suppress the national liberation movements in their countries. For example, hankering for the promised economic assistance, Sudan has decided to establish diplomatic relations with the reactionary regime of South Korea and invited South Korean companies to take part in the construction of industrial projects, the deliveries of equipment and their financing.

After Anwar Sadat became President, the government of Egypt has also established diplomatic relations with South Korea and is working hard to encourage further improvement of political, trade and other economic relations with it. The Central African Republic has also set up diplomatic links with South Korea and received in return a gift of five ambulances. In 1977 a South Korean government delegation toured several pro-Western African countries, including the Ivory Coast, Zaire and some others, and held comprehensive talks on strengthening political, economic, scientific, technological and cultural relations.

Despite the emergent cooperation, trade and other economic relations between African and Latin American countries display considerable contradictions. Since both continents produce largely the same agricultural and food commodities (coffee, cocoa, bananas, meat, etc.), they inevitably clash as competitors on the world capitalist market. However, the contradictions between them are mostly due to the fact that they have to sell their goods, for example, in Western Europe, at wildly different prices. While African countries cooperate with the Common Market under the *Lomé Conventions* which offer them certain financial, trade and customs privileges, other developing countries, not parties to these conventions, are denied this preferential treatment. The latter group includes almost all Latin American nations. This naturally aggravates the trade and economic contradictions between Africa and Latin America and gives rise to mutual charges of unjust trade conditions. It also hampers their joint struggle against imperialism and for a new international economic order.

Special attention should be paid to the contradictions between Africa and Latin America concerning the approach to the problems of

Southern Africa, specifically the trade embargo against South Africa imposed by the UN General Assembly. There are countries in Latin America (Mexico, Peru and others) who condemn the racist regime and the illegal South African occupation of Namibia and demand strict observance of the trade boycott. However, certain quarters in several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile) violate the embargo and trade with South Africa.

A United Nations report has officially noted South Africa's ties with Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and other reactionary Latin American regimes.¹⁶ Paraguay and Uruguay were the first Latin American countries to establish, in the mid-1960s, full diplomatic relations with South Africa which have been growing stronger each year. South African ties with Chile flourished under the Pinochet junta, after the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government. The strengthening of relations between the more reactionary Latin American regimes and South Africa is based primarily on their common economic and military-political interests. These regimes ignore UN decisions and betray African interests.

Ties with South Africa grew especially strong after Vorster's 1973 tour of several Latin American countries. While in 1966 only Argentina, Brazil and Chile maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa, they were later joined by Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. The persistent efforts on the part of some Latin American states to improve ties with racist South Africa encounter widespread condemnation in independent African countries and gravely exacerbate economic and political contradictions between them.

An analysis of the unity and contradictions between African and other developing countries shows that the ratio between the two trends depends on many factors. These include the socio-political and foreign policy differentiation; the uneven levels of their economic development; domestic political instability in many countries stemming from the nature of their socio-economic system; and the subversive activities of imperialism and international reaction.

Chapter Eight

INDEPENDENT AFRICA AND MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

1. Africa and Detente

The turn in international relations from the cold war to detente at the juncture of the 1960s and 1970s made an impact on Africa too. The drive to strengthen and spread detente worldwide—that is, the recognition and actual implementation of a code of sorts of peaceful and equitable international relations, its formalization in international acts and a broad framework of agreements on international cooperation in many fields—and the simultaneous effective steps toward arms limitation and disarmament are indispensable for each nation in its pursuit of the fullest possible use of its development potential.

The need for peace is a vital necessity, the chief prerequisite of development for Africa which suffered so long under colonial rule, which consequently encounters problems of backwardness, dependence and imperialist oppression, and where colonial rule has survived even into the early 1980s. No wonder African public opinion increasingly realizes that there is no rational alternative to detente. Factual evidence is growing that this is the only way to open new opportunities for African countries and peoples to completely eliminate colonialism, racism and apartheid, strengthen their national sovereignty, step up their struggle to do away with economic dependence on imperialism, overcome the existing backwardness and attain progress in the social field.

Many representatives of independent African countries have begun to advance constructive ideas and proposals at the United Nations during debate on ways to strengthen international security and avert the danger of nuclear war. These delegates insist on consolidating and deepening detente and stress that it should be viewed not only in the context of relations between the great powers but also as an issue concerning all nations. In this connection one should stress that most African countries welcomed the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation and its results.

Detente has become part of the foreign policy concepts of many African states; at each international conference of any significance African delegates—whether representing governments or civic organizations—voice their fundamentally positive attitude to detente.

In the light of the drive to consolidate detente, the position of independent Africa is determined by its desire to solve, first and foremost, the following tasks:

- securing complete decolonization and the eradication of apartheid and racial discrimination;
- removing foreign military bases;
- eliminating hotbeds of conflicts in Africa;
- creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa;
- transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and creating a zone of peace in the Mediterranean;
- establishing equitable international economic relations free of imperialist diktat.

Among the more notable signs of Africa's political advancement in the 1970s was the vigorous use of detente to step up the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid; this steadily enhanced Africa's prestige and role in the antiimperialist drive. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the 1980 victory of the patriots of Zimbabwe was an extremely important stage in the liberation movement for the complete eradication of colonial rule in Africa. The emergence of independent Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Zimbabwe contributed substantially to the antiimperialist potential of all independent African countries. The consistent and successful anticolonial struggle has become a stimulus for the peoples of Southern Africa still under colonial and racist oppression. The birth of these new African states has undermined the overall positions of colonialism, apartheid and imperialism in Africa and offered additional historical proof that the international situation of the 1970s produced radically new favorable conditions for stepping up the struggle against colonialism. Detente made it much more difficult for imperialism to justify its defense of colonialism and apartheid and to support racist South Africa. "In our part of the world," Yusuf Dadoo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party, noted, "It is only the followers of Vorster, Smith and Caetano who have profited from the cold war. It has enabled them to win some political support abroad for their detestable regimes by posing as front-line crusaders and defenders against 'the Communist menace'. They bitterly oppose every move towards detente and strive by all means—aided by their influential overseas investors and accomplices—to revive world tension. A genuine atmosphere of international detente greatly encourages and strengthens the liberation struggle of our peoples for national freedom and increases the isolation of colonialists and racialists."¹

However, the interdependence between the struggle against the apartheid regime and support for detente does not mean merely that an improved international climate favors the peoples fighting for their liberation. The struggle against apartheid in itself makes a substantial contribution to the strengthening of peace because the con-

tinued existence of racism and apartheid in Africa remains a permanent source of international tensions and conflicts and poses a grave threat to independent African countries. In 1973, at the Tenth Anniversary Session of the OAU, leaders of independent Africa expressly stated that no task had a higher priority than the demand for freeing Africa from racism and the holdovers of colonialism. They knew, they declared, that they could not devote all their energy to economic and social development as long as colonialism existed in any part of Africa. Colonialism, they added, remained a threat to their individual security and to peace in the region and in the world. The main political declaration of the OAU on this issue stated directly that the struggle against colonialism and racism should be seen as Africa's contribution to strengthening world peace.

Facts irrefutably prove that racist South Africa poses a threat to peace in Africa and the world. South African acts of aggression against Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique aggravate the conflict and build up tensions in the region.

Of particular danger to peace is the close cooperation between the major imperialist powers and Pretoria in the nuclear and military fields. As early as the 13th OAU Assembly in Port Louis (July 2 to 6, 1976) African heads of state and government voiced their alarm over this collaboration and declared that the further buildup of South African military and nuclear capabilities offset all efforts to create nuclear-free zones in Africa and other regions.

On November 5, 1976 the UN General Assembly resolutely condemned this cooperation between Western powers and the racist minority regime of South Africa. France, the FRG, Great Britain, the United States and Israel were specifically listed among such powers.² The General Assembly urged these countries to refrain from any steps which would enhance Pretoria's ability to produce uranium, plutonium, other nuclear materials, reactors and military hardware.

It is now clear that only Western help has enabled South Africa to create a substantial military capability used both to consolidate its colonial rule in the South of Africa and to launch aggression against neighboring states. This explains the broad international response to the warning about the "grave repercussions for the security of African peoples and universal peace which actions by the South African authorities aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons can entail", voiced by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, head of the Soviet delegation at the 32nd session of the UN General Assembly.³

The worldwide movement against apartheid has long demanded a comprehensive embargo on arms sales to South Africa as an effective step to ensure international security. To this day, however, South Africa's traditional allies manage to find loopholes and act in violation of this demand. Prior to 1982 the NATO countries delivered arms to South Africa worth a total of over three billion dollars. In the Security Council, the United States exercised its veto power to frustrate the

adoption of any measures going beyond mere condemnation of racist South Africa. This has enabled Pretoria to ignore UN resolutions on decolonization, to try and install a puppet regime in Namibia and attack Angola.

Recently, imperialist propaganda has been trying to find "contradictions" between the socialist community's efforts to consolidate detente and its continued assistance to national liberation. However, these inventions no longer deceive anyone, especially in Africa. An outstanding champion of African independence Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania, said in connection with this: "Racialist minority governments cannot be acknowledged because they are a negation of the very basis of our existence. Coexistence is impossible..."⁴ Detente, as understood by African statesmen and politicians and as practised by the socialist community, in no way contradicts the right of oppressed peoples to direct their liberation struggle along the path they consider correct and necessary, resorting to both political and military means.

2. The African Aspect of International Security

Efforts to ensure international security create additional possibilities for strengthening the political independence of newly free countries and for defending them from imperialist encroachment and direct armed aggression. These efforts tie the hands of reactionaries in the countries who otherwise could have counted on imperialism for direct armed support. Moreover, an improved international climate enables the new national states to more effectively resist imperialist attempts at binding them militarily to the imperialist system.

For example, by the time former French colonies attained sovereignty, Paris had entangled them in an intricate snare of military dependence. This included agreements on the so-called technical (including military) assistance, multilateral and bilateral defense treaties and the right to use military installations in these states. Under the pretext of upholding law and order French troops intervened in the internal affairs of Camerooni, the Congo, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Gabon and the Central African Republic. Special army units were created in France for this purpose. Similar measures were taken by the ruling quarters of Great Britain and the United States.

While in the 1960s, especially after the emergence of the OAU, the imperialist powers were forced to make certain concessions, in the latter half of the 1970s the trend toward involving African countries in military-political alliances grew stronger again, obviously aimed at eroding the principle of nonalignment, the cornerstone of the OAU and independent Africa's foreign policy. Of this there are several examples.

In recent years, conservative Arab regimes have been assiduously publicizing the idea of the so-called Red Sea Security Pact which, its

architects maintain, should become a subsidiary of sorts for NATO and compensate for the disintegration of CENTO. If implemented, this plan would create a new tool of imperialist policy hostile to progressive African countries, especially revolutionary Ethiopia.

The Western press has launched another trial balloon—the US plan for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) which would comprise racist South Africa, reactionary Latin American regimes and "reliable" African states like the Ivory Coast or Zaire.

The 1980 agreements the United States imposed on Somalia, Kenya and Egypt to secure military bases and other facilities there are the latest and perhaps the most graphic example of this kind.

Africa's uncompromising stand on turning the continent into a nuclear-free zone is of great importance in the light of this imperialist military activity. On November 11, 1961 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1652 (XVI) on recognizing Africa as a nuclear-free zone. This was in response to the French nuclear tests in the Sahara, conducted at a time when the African movement against colonial rule and for national independence entered its decisive stage. Significantly, the resolution did not merely stress the recognition of Africa as a nuclear-free zone: it insisted that the solution of the economic and social development tasks of independent African countries was a matter of priority since this would lay the groundwork for African participation in the tackling of peace and security issues. The resolution also urged all the UN members to refrain from conducting or continuing any nuclear tests, and from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, stockpiling or transporting nuclear weapons. Four years later, on December 3, 1965, the General Assembly adopted its Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. This move was prepared and predetermined by the decision of the first emergency session of the OAU (Cairo, July 17 to 21, 1964) in which heads of state and government of African countries came out unanimously in favor of denuclearizing Africa. Specifically, in this decision they declared their readiness to conclude, under the aegis of the United Nations, an international treaty and to undertake not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. This OAU position was welcomed at the second nonaligned summit held in Cairo in October 1964. Significantly, the UN declaration stated for the first time that the denuclearization of Africa was a positive step toward further limiting nuclear weapons throughout the world and toward universal and complete disarmament. Underscoring this provision, the UN General Assembly Resolution 3261 E (XXIX), adopted on December 9, 1974, extended the denuclearized zone in Africa to Madagascar and other islands adjacent to the continent.

The history of independent Africa shows that conflicts arising there can easily spread beyond the region's borders. In such situations the socialist community invariably advocates steps to contribute to the "earliest peaceful settlement of conflict situations and the prevention

of new ones".⁵ No doubt, the breeding ground of such explosive conflicts in Africa is the harsh legacy of colonial rule—the continued existence of the racist regime in the South of the continent and the complex issue of the former colonial frontiers of the now independent states.

The legal basis for settling open or latent conflicts in Africa is provided in the principles formalized in the OAU Charter as early as 1963. Foremost among them are the following: noninterference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and of its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation or arbitration. These principles were subsequently specified and detailed in other policy-making decisions of the OAU. For example, in July 1964, in connection with the border conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Somalia and Kenya, the OAU Assembly adopted a resolution on border disputes in Africa stating that all the member countries were to respect national borders as they existed at the time of independence.

By this decision African leaders unequivocally declared that peace and security in Africa could be ensured and guaranteed only by strict compliance with these obligations and not at all by attempts to revise OAU resolutions on border questions. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said at the 32nd UN General Assembly that "in Africa, like in Europe, not only the proclamation but also actual respect for the principle of territorial integrity is of considerable importance, and this applies to all regions and all continents. Violation of this principle leads to armed conflict, bloodshed and huge losses suffered by the peoples involved in the conflict."⁶

Since its inception, the OAU has done much to defuse potential conflicts in Africa. At its 14th Assembly in 1977 the OAU set up a special committee on the settlement of disputes. The issue of conflicts has also been discussed at the 15th, 16th and all subsequent OAU assemblies. And the fact that this issue has not yet been fully resolved is largely explained by imperialist interference in African affairs which generates, directly or indirectly, tensions in this region. This is borne out by the deterioration of the situation in the Horn of Africa, in Western Sahara, in Southern Africa and around Chad.

The desire of the imperialist powers and their partners to use the old territorial dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia for furthering their own objectives in the strategically important Red Sea region directly threatens the positions of progressive forces in this part of Africa. Imperialism and the reactionaries of some Red Sea states see this conflict as a means to check the advance of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia. The pretext used in these efforts is the alleged concern over the security of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

The socialist countries maintain that peaceful settlement of disputes

is a matter of priority because tensions and instability in this and other areas of independent Africa weaken national sovereignty, distract attention from socio-economic development tasks and from efforts aimed at eradicating the racist regime in the South of Africa, and threaten the gains of the national liberation revolution.

The question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is directly connected with the problem of international security in Africa and the world. The joint efforts by the socialist and the nonaligned countries aimed at ensuring peace and security in the Indian Ocean region can and should be viewed as an important contribution to the further expansion and consolidation of detente.

An important international event in this regard was the Presidium Bureau session of the World Peace Council held in Madagascar in late January 1981. The session paid considerable attention to the increased military threat in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. All speakers noted that the runaway buildup of the US military presence there threatened to produce a new hotbed of war in this region. In this connection they stressed the great importance of the Soviet proposals on ways to peacefully settle Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf problems advanced by Leonid Brezhnev in his speech to the members of the Indian parliament during his visit to India in December 1980.

The imperialist countries' policy of building up their military presence in the Indian Ocean greatly alarms African peoples. Today, there are 18 coastal or littoral independent African states on the shores of the Indian Ocean. To them, the Indian Ocean is a vital transport route, a source of food and raw materials. Therefore, the old imperialist "gunboat diplomacy" is justifiably viewed as a threat to their sovereignty and independence.

Newly independent countries advanced their first initiatives on creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean in the OAU, the nonaligned movement and at the UN in the early 1970s. On December 16, 1971 the UN General Assembly approved its Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It expressed the conviction that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would aid in checking the spread of the arms race to the Indian Ocean region and in easing international tensions. The coastal and littoral states, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and other countries whose interests were represented in the region were urged to take part in the creation of a collective security system there without military alliances, and to strengthen international security through regional and other forms of cooperation.

The existence of the racist regime in the South of Africa, the last hotbed of colonialism, is a factor seriously destabilizing the situation in the Indian Ocean. The overall shift in the balance of forces in Africa in favor of peace and progress compels the racists to step up their expansion in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic in a bid to at least preserve the shrinking spheres of influence. South Africa's fore-

most objective is to prove its worth as a reliable ally of the imperialist powers and to secure, as a result, still greater assistance from them in order to stabilize its positions.

Pretoria is trying to divert world public attention from its inhuman system of domination and racial oppression by pushing to the foreground issues of safety of the maritime routes around the Cape of Good Hope and "the need for Southern African stability in the Western defense chain".⁷

At the same time, the racists are aware that the imperialist powers are unable to give up the vast South African raw material resources of strategic military importance to the West. The NATO headquarters in Brussels has already drawn up plans for the bloc's military operations in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean in case of "crisis". NATO strategists reserve an important role for racist South Africa in these plans, referring to the mythical threat from the Soviet navy to the Cape of Good Hope and the sea routes in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

The discussions by NATO leaders of "protecting the Cape and the security of the Southern Hemisphere" invariably center on the thesis about the "vitally important" role of the South African naval facilities located at the juncture of the two oceans. For example, South Africa has repeatedly offered NATO and specifically the United States the use of its naval base at Simonstown. The fact that no imperialist power has so far agreed to openly sign military accords with South Africa is explained rather by political than by other considerations, since effective military cooperation with this country is under way and there is good reason to believe that NATO and Pretoria coordinate their military moves closely.⁸ For example, Admiral John McCain, former US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, openly called for such cooperation and stressed: "What has happened in Mozambique and Angola makes our possession of Diego Garcia more important than ever. But it also means that we absolutely need access to the South African naval facilities at Simonstown and Durban."⁹

At the May 1975 meeting of NATO defense ministers West German and US delegates suggested the establishment in South Africa of a NATO radar station to monitor the Cape sea routes. Such a station was built in Silvermine, a command center of the South African armed forces near the Simonstown naval base, with the help of Siemens and AEG-Telefunken of West Germany. South Africa was the first non-NATO member to be provided with a classified NATO coding system for this station.

Advocates of a closer integration of the racist regime into the NATO infrastructure keep harping on the "Soviet threat" despite the obvious fact that the Soviet Union is working consistently to transform the Indian Ocean into a scene of mutual accord, international cooperation, peace and progress.

Under the impact of constructive peaceful initiatives of the Soviet

Union, other members of the socialist community, the nonaligned movement, the OAU and progressive international organizations and despite the occasional misconceptions reflected in the views still persisting in some coastal African countries about great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and similar matters, the more realistic African statesmen and political leaders are becoming more aware that the existence of foreign military bases is the main threat to peace and security in the region, that improvement of the situation here depends, first and foremost, on the removal of the existing bases and the renunciation of new ones. Africans increasingly link their demand for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean to the intensification of the struggle against imperialist forays and to efforts to encourage social progress and open new opportunities for cooperation among the region's newly independent countries.

For example, Mozambique, which formalized the principle of transforming the Indian Ocean into a nuclear-free zone of peace in its Constitution, sees the continued existence of military bases in this region as the main obstacle to the implementation of the UN Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Samora Machel, head of state of the People's Republic of Mozambique, said: "We consider that the peoples of that region who suffered so greatly from the evils of colonial and imperialist domination and who today are engaged in the campaign against poverty, ignorance, disease and all the consequences of underdevelopment, in a struggle which is a precondition to achieving true human dignity and true freedom should be spared the threat of a nuclear war and all its attendant destruction... Until a short time ago, the Indian Ocean was safe from involvement in the event of nuclear conflicts. For that reason, although we welcome warmly all those who come to the Indian Ocean with peaceful intentions or for the development of fruitful economic relations, we are extremely apprehensive about, and resolutely condemn, the establishment of any military bases of foreign Powers in the zone."¹⁰

The coastal and mainland independent African countries in the Indian Ocean region possess (except Zambia) quite limited natural resources. Peace and security there will enable them to reduce their military expenditures and save additional resources for development. That is why they see steps to encourage regional cooperation as an important element of their efforts. These states justly maintain, as a number of their representatives stressed at the 16th OAU Assembly in Monrovia, that the extension of detente to the Indian Ocean region would enable them to tackle economic and social tasks more effectively. Therefore they combine their action to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean with efforts to completely settle bilateral problems, remove the causes leading to conflicts, and constructively interpret the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders.

A similar situation is taking shape in the Mediterranean. The initiative of creating a zone of peace there belongs, primarily, to the coastal states. This was evident from their action before and during the Helsinki Conference and the follow-up meeting in Belgrade. African Mediterranean countries hold that European security is organically linked to the security of the Mediterranean.

For example, the Algerian delegate said in Belgrade that for Algeria the main thing was that the countries participating in the European Security and Cooperation Conference should be ready to expand, stage by stage, the scope of detente, recognize the unity of European and Mediterranean security, and extend detente to this region by proclaiming a policy of cooperation and good-neighborly relations. This general view reflects the positions of all the other African Mediterranean countries. The Moroccan representative at that meeting stressed that there would be no security for Europe from Gibraltar to Cyprus to Turkey if security from Tangiers to the coast of Lebanon was not assured simultaneously. He said efforts were in order to make the Mediterranean an international zone of peace, that is, a nuclear-free zone.

In the context of their struggle to strengthen international security in the Mediterranean, the region's African countries raise such issues as a Mideast settlement, the question of Cyprus and a solution to the Western Sahara conflict. They also accord greater attention to regional cooperation among all the countries there. The socialist nations welcome these efforts and extend comprehensive support to the region's countries. Suffice it to recall the official announcement by the Soviet Union to the effect that it was ready to immediately consider the question of withdrawing all nuclear naval forces from the Mediterranean, as well as other proposals aimed at improving the military-political climate in the region.

3. African Countries and Disarmament

The problem of ending the arms race and achieving disarmament is among the central concerns of independent Africa's foreign policy. African statesmen and political leaders have repeatedly stressed that military detente and the easing of international tensions are mutually indispensable. "We in Zambia believe," Shadreck Joshua Soko said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "that it would be naive to leave the responsibility of promoting peace and detente to few nations. We appreciate, therefore, the Soviet Union's effort to promote peace and detente by establishing contacts with the Western world..."¹¹ An overwhelming majority of African countries recognizes that the arms race essentially undermines national, regional and world security. It poses a permanent threat of war, including a nuclear war, in which the major powers could take part and which could be accompanied by a number of local wars.

The awareness of this obvious fact is natural for African leaders because questions of disarmament, cessation of nuclear tests and removal of foreign military bases have been on the minds of Africans since they attained political independence. The protests against French nuclear tests in the Sahara, the drive to make the continent a de-nuclearized zone, the long-established movement for the removal of US, British, French, Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese military bases, against the arming of racist regimes have demonstrated Africa's striving to dissociate itself from the arms race and the war preparations of the imperialist powers against the socialist community.

From the mid-1970s, as political detente grew stronger, African leaders, political parties and civic organizations have increasingly focused their attention on these issues. Africans demand that the strategic and nuclear arms race be curbed and the resources saved be channeled to meet the needs of developing countries. The African position on this problem has been quite unequivocal at OAU forums, at non-aligned conferences and at UN General Assembly sessions, especially the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament. For example, the resolution on disarmament adopted at the nonaligned conference in Colombo called for "urgent banning of the use, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons". At recent UN General Assemblies delegates of African countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Tunisia, Benin, Cameroon, Madagascar and others) have supported the Soviet proposal on concluding a world treaty banning nuclear tests and on adopting a declaration concerning the deepening and strengthening of detente. They have also supported the draft resolution on averting the danger of nuclear war and come out in favor of the soonest possible solution to the disarmament problem and of ending the arms race.

The Soviet proposals advanced at the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament and aimed at restricting the manufacture of strategic armaments evoked widespread response. Most African speakers made it clear that these proposals were in the interests of Africa since their implementation would help strengthen world peace and make it possible, by rechanneling budgetary allocations from the military sphere to that of aid, to tackle more effectively the problems of increasing economic development assistance to independent countries.

The record shows that an overwhelming majority of African states favors curbing the arms race. For example, speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, C.A. Kamara-Taylor said: "We appeal to all concerned parties of the contesting military blocs to take all necessary measures to save humanity from a nuclear holocaust. We from Sierra Leone will continue to support initiatives aiming at halting the arms race, for complete and general disarmament."¹²

At the same time, each year developing countries themselves increase their military appropriations and the strength of their armed forces. Incessant imperialist intrigues against the freedom and independence of newly free countries and the worsening contradictions

between some of them raised the combined military expenditures of developing countries from 15 billion dollars in 1960 to almost 50 billion by 1980.* Governments of these countries spend twice what their economies permit on military purposes, thus slowing down the solution of the urgent problems they face.

All African countries (except Egypt) spent 10,250 million dollars for military purposes in 1979 (9,134 million in 1975).¹³ Compared to the world total which reached about 500 billion dollars in 1980, African military spending may appear modest but it is not so by African standards. The yardstick here should be the ratio of military expenditures to the overall economic capability of a given country.

The economic condition and the size of the population of most African countries prevent their governments from maintaining large armies. Nevertheless, in 1979 the total armed forces strength of the OAU members exceeded 2,150,000 men, with Tropical Africa accounting for 780,000.

The reasons behind the arms race differ for different African countries and can by no means be reduced to the formal need for a sovereign state to have an army. These reasons can be generally grouped as follows:

- many African countries are arming themselves to rebuff potential imperialist aggression, especially on the part of the racist regime, and to defend their progressive gains;
- some countries often build up their military capabilities to bolster their territorial claims on their neighbors;
- arms purchases are often rooted in the domestic situation and are seen as a means of enhancing one's prestige on the African scene and leadership in individual areas.

Naturally, this classification is relative but on the whole it reflects African realities. And, naturally, the last two factors usually have a negative impact on peace in Africa.

While fully aware of the obvious danger of the arms race to Africa, many African leaders nevertheless refuse to raise the issue of reducing conventional armaments. On the contrary, some of them are looking for fresh opportunities to acquire modern military hardware and allocate more and more funds for arms purchases.

Recently, the United States has been especially active as an arms merchant in Africa. During his election campaign Jimmy Carter repeatedly promised to cut down on arms sales, especially to developing and above all African countries. However, as President he failed to keep his word for long. The logic of mounting US interference in the domestic political processes in developing countries and the pressure from the military-industrial corporations interested in arms sales brought about a return to the former, Republican course, albeit with "human

* Calculations here and later in this chapter are according to the 1973 rate of exchange.

rights" reservations.

The act on the policy concerning arms sales adopted by the US Congress in April 1977 contained certain provisions on the limitation of such sales to developing countries. But, already in his Congressional message on this issue, made public in July 1977, President Carter allowed for changing this legislation to permit bigger arms sales.

Together with political, economic and ideological means, the United States uses the exports of arms and other military hardware to exert pressure on domestic political developments in African countries. For example, the deterioration of the situation in the Horn of Africa in the summer of 1977 created, the Carter administration maintained, favorable conditions for adding Somalia to the coterie of Washington's "friends". After Mengistu Haile Mariam's visit to the USSR in May 1977, Jimmy Carter announced the United States' readiness to sell arms to the Somali government in order to offset the alleged threat from Ethiopia which received arms from the Soviet Union. Somalia's abrogation of the treaty with the USSR encouraged the United States to take bolder steps in this direction. In November 1977 a delegation of the House Armed Services Committee held talks in Mogadisho on US arms deliveries and other assistance. Today, the United States supplies Somalia with arms under the 1980 treaty which provides for US use of military bases on Somali soil.

Generally, the United States tries to supply arms to as many African countries as possible. While from 1946 to 1973 Washington delivered arms and other military equipment to African countries worth a total of one billion dollars, the figure for 1977 alone was about 250 million (aside from deliveries to Egypt and South Africa). In 1978-1979 the Carter administration continued to expand the circle of its customers: besides Morocco, Tunisia, Zaire, Kenya and Liberia, the United States began to supply arms to Tanzania, and in July 1979 the President approved a program of emergency military aid to Egypt. US arms deliveries have been growing since the Reagan Administration came to power. Up to 1986 military assistance to Egypt will be worth 5.5 billion dollars. Sudan will receive 140 million dollars' worth of arms; the figure for Somalia is 40 million; for Kenya, 130 million, etc.

The buildup of the South African military capability is a serious factor in the arms race in Africa. The South African military budget has been growing fast, especially since the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the defeat of the invasion into Angola.

Pretoria responds to the upsurge of African liberation by substantial additions of draftees and reservists to its armed forces: their total strength rose from 119,500 in 1974 to over 400,000 in 1980. The South African munitions industry is already meeting 75 percent of the armed forces' requirements in arms and other hardware. As to nuclear weapons, their mass production becomes theoretically possible after the commissioning of a large uranium enrichment plant (processing up to 10,000 tons a year) and the nuclear power station

in Coburg. In 1965 the United States supplied South Africa with 104 kilograms of enriched uranium, enough to produce ten atomic bombs. Simultaneously, the United States provided Pretoria with a substantial amount of heavy water and trained about 150 South African atomic scientists and experts. A TASS statement on South African plans to manufacture nuclear weapons (August 1977) stressed that Pretoria's actions were a direct threat to the security of African states and could escalate the instability and tensions in the South of Africa. This threat materialized after the test of a South African nuclear device registered in 1979.

South Africa's military might is clearly out of proportion to its defense requirements. Created with the help of NATO members, Pretoria's arsenal comprised, already in 1977, 625 combat planes, 215 helicopters, 525 tanks, 2,400 armored personnel carriers and cars and 294 self-propelled artillery pieces.¹⁴ The United States and the FRG have provided the South African security police with all the necessary equipment and supplies.

Pretoria's racists do not conceal their intention to use their military capability against national liberation. That is why independent African governments have repeatedly requested the UN Security Council to take effective steps so as to remove the threat to peace in Southern Africa, but each time decisions on this question—specifically, concerning an arms embargo—were frustrated by the United States, Great Britain and France. That was the case in 1975 and 1976. Only in 1977 the West appeared to alter its position. The United States supported the November resolution of the Security Council banning arms exports to South Africa.

The fact that the imperialist powers would like to retain their influence in Africa needs no additional proof. But, whenever the question of implementing the just demands of African countries and liberation movements with regard to South Africa is raised, the community of class interests gains the upper hand, and Western powers, especially the United States, go back on their obligations. One can state with a certain measure of assurance that in case the domestic political struggle in South Africa takes a turn that would displease the West, the policy of verbal "confrontation" with the racists will be inevitably given up and an opposite course will be adopted. President Reagan included South Africa among the chief allies of the United States in Africa.

The situation in the South of the continent affects considerably the position of independent African countries on disarmament. While opposing nuclear and strategic armaments, they expand their conventional armed forces and purchase arms and military equipment. This makes it particularly topical to follow up the socialist countries' proposals on disarmament, on the defusing of the threat of armed conflict and peaceful settlement of disputes. Nothing is more destructive for African unity than the imperialist-instigated policy of stirring

up hostility between governments, nations and ethnic groups. A weaker African unity fosters the arms race on the continent and directly affects the task of eradicating racism and the holdovers of colonialism in Southern Africa.

4. Independent African Countries and the Mideast Problem

It took African countries* long to shape their present position vis-a-vis the Mideast developments of the past decade. Prior to 1970, only seven African countries (Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia) consistently supported, within the UN framework, the Arab demands that the Israeli aggressors withdraw from the occupied territories. Five more (Burundi, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritius and Uganda) supported the Arabs more or less consistently. All the other non-Arab members of the OAU—21 African countries—in most cases voted against resolutions aimed at meeting Arab interests.

However, at the Fifth OAU Assembly (Algiers, September 1968), the report of the OAU Secretary General noted that a worthy, peaceful and final settlement of the Mideast crisis was of great importance to the OAU because this crisis and its consequences not only deprived one OAU member of a part of its resources but also gave rise to serious problems among the OAU membership, directly concerned many African countries and, in the final analysis, posed a grave threat not only to international peace and security but also to the stability and harmonious development of a larger part of Africa.

At its 1968, 1969 and 1970 Assemblies, the OAU adopted a number of resolutions on the Middle East demanding, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242, withdrawal of foreign troops from all the occupied Arab territories. However, African countries took no practical steps to assist Egypt, let alone other victims of the Israeli aggression.

There were several reasons behind this African reluctance to get involved. One of them is that African leaders had different views of the very concept of African unity; another is the differences in the political orientation of African countries, which inevitably did and still do generate centrifugal trends in the OAU. Most of the major political decisions on the Mideast developments were reached through compromise. On the whole, the OAU condemned the Israeli aggression, but most of its members continued to develop and strengthen their relations with Israel because they needed it as a donor and above all as

* OAU documents on the Middle East use the term "African countries" to denote non-Arab OAU members.

an intermediary in securing foreign economic and technical assistance.* Meanwhile, relations between Arab and tropical African countries were practically at a standstill (see Chapter Four, para. 3 for more details). There was virtually no Arab economic assistance to Africa. The Arab members of the OAU (apart from Libya and Algeria) were themselves in great need of foreign assistance, and the Libyan and Algerian aid funds were mostly used to help the victims of the Israeli aggression. The Arab League took no initiative to establish effective contacts with the OAU in order to draw up a specific program of action against their common enemies: neocolonialism, racism and Zionism. The understanding was that the membership of the Arab countries of North Africa in the OAU and the Arab League should ensure adequate contacts between the two organizations. However, there were no such contacts.

Another negative factor was that in many African countries Levantines (people from Lebanon, Syria and other Mideast states) offered stiff competition to the indigenous African petty and middle bourgeoisie, the strata which produced many national leaders. Some of them saw "secret Pan-Arab schemes" that could only lead to trouble in the attempts by the "Arab lobby" in the OAU to draw Africa's attention to the situation in the Middle East and in the concept of closer Arab-African cooperation.

Israel made wide use of such anti-Arab prejudice in its propaganda offensive in Africa. Distorting historical and current facts, Israeli propaganda tried to brainwash Africans into believing that Africa and Israel faced the same problems and that Pan-Arabism threatened Africa. The aim was to prevent the consolidation of the African and Arab national liberation movements.

But it was in the late 1960s that political conditions were maturing which, after receiving a further impetus in 1971-1973, led Africans to reappraise the role Israel played in Africa and the Middle East. This was due primarily to the advancement of the African and Arab national liberation movements and the objective rise of anti-imperialist trends in them. The international situation also made a substantial contribution: there was the consolidation of the solidarity movement among developing countries, the growing advantages of detente, and the events in the Middle East where Israel's action exposed the actual thrust of its "struggle to survive". Besides, Africans were increasingly suspicious of the growing cooperation between Israel and South Africa.

From the 14th session of the OAU Council of Ministers (March 1970) the Mideast question has been on the OAU agenda as a major political item. Although most African states did not yet consider it possible to equate the urgency of this problem to that of, say, the

* Prior to 1972 Israel maintained diplomatic relations with 24 African countries and various forms of cooperation with six more.

question of Southern Rhodesia, the 14th session noted in its resolution on the Middle East that the Israeli aggression was supported by world imperialism, especially by US imperialism. The seventh session of the OAU Assembly (September 1970) decided to bar Israeli representatives from OAU sessions. No doubt this was a very serious political step, considering that most OAU members still maintained diplomatic and trade relations with Israel. At the same time, the session rejected the Arab proposal that representatives of the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM) be invited to the next session of the OAU Council of Ministers to provide firsthand information on the struggle of the Palestinian people and the objectives of the PRM.

Nevertheless the next, Eighth OAU Assembly (June 1971) adopted not only the most comprehensive and detailed resolution on the Middle East but also decided to launch a vigorous search for a solution to the Mideast problem. A Committee of Ten was set up to deal with this matter.

On instructions of the Committee of Ten four African Presidents (of Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria and Zaire) visited Egypt and Israel in early November 1971. Proceeding from Security Council Resolution 242, the Presidents aimed to lend more weight to the Mideast mission of Gunnar Jarring, representative of the UN Secretary General. However, Israel simply sabotaged the efforts of the African Presidents. Tel Aviv overrated the strength of its positions in Africa and did not take the OAU demarche seriously. Meanwhile, radical changes were about to occur in Afro-Israeli relations.

African public opinion was becoming increasingly pro-Arab. The Rabat session of the OAU Assembly (June 1972) discussed the Mideast question as a priority agenda item. The Assembly's resolution unanimously appealed to the UN membership to refrain from providing Israel with military or moral support which aided in the continued occupation of Arab lands. Acting in the spirit of the Assembly, six African countries followed Uganda's example and severed relations with Israel.

In February 1973 a session of the OAU Council of Ministers adopted a resolution condemning Israel not only for its occupation of, and its refusal to withdraw troops from, Egyptian territory, but also for its expansionist policy manifested in the ouster of the Palestinian people. Thus the OAU began to view the Mideast problem not only as a military and political crisis brought on by the Israeli aggression but also as a more general problem which hinged on the question of Palestine. Significantly, the OAU was the first non-Arab regional organization to recognize that the problems of the Middle East could not be resolved without a just settlement of the question of Palestine.

The Tenth OAU Assembly (May 1973) was held at a time of trial for Africa: the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and increased efforts by the advocates of a "dialogue" with South Africa threatened to complicate the operation of the OAU. In this context the Assembly's

unanimous support of the resolution on the Middle East was particularly significant. The resolution added two new provisions to those that had appeared in previous resolutions. Paragraph 4 stated that the Assembly considered all changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories illegal and undertook not to recognize any changes that might lead to a fait accompli or prejudice the territorial integrity of the countries victims of the Israeli aggression. Paragraph 7 warned that the position of Israel who refused to withdraw from the territories of these countries could lead the OAU member states to take individual and collective political and economic action at the African level.

The fact that the decisions of the Tenth OAU Assembly were no empty phrase was confirmed in October and November 1973, when all African countries except Malawi broke diplomatic and economic relations with Israel.

After severing these relations, African countries took an even more consistent and firm stand with regard to the Mideast conflict. The 23rd session of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Mogadisho in June 1974 and the 11th Summit Assembly in June 1974 adopted resolutions stating that a just and durable peace in the Middle East could only be based on the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories and from the Arab part of Jerusalem and the realization by the Arab people of Palestine of their right to self-determination. Five months before the Rabat summit conference, the 11th OAU Assembly proclaimed its full support of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in their heroic struggle against Zionism and racism.

In February 1975 the 24th session of the OAU Council of Ministers for the first time considered the Mideast problem as a purely African issue. The main attention was paid to the question of Palestine. It was recognized that Africa should make its contribution to the solution of this problem. The OAU Liberation Committee discussed the issue of financial assistance to the PRM together with the questions of support for the national liberation movements in the South of Africa.

In the summer of 1975 the situation in the Middle East changed fundamentally. Africa reacted acutely to the split in the Arab anti-Israeli front brought on by the preparation and signing of the Sinai accords between Egypt and Israel. At the 12th OAU Assembly there were five abstentions (Zaire, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone) in the vote on a proposal on joint action by the OAU members at the UN which envisaged suspension of Israel's UN membership until it complied with UN resolutions on the Middle East. This was largely due to two reasons: the abstaining countries were incurring heavy losses because of the Arab oil price rise; besides, they used to maintain the liveliest and most comprehensive ties with Is-

rael. These countries were therefore exerting a measure of diplomatic pressure on the Arab oil producers and making a certain pro-Israeli representation. The consequences of Africa's misunderstanding of the Sinai deal were especially evident at the 30th UN General Assembly, during the vote on Resolution 3379 which condemned Zionism as a form of racism.

African countries also responded differently to the November 1977 visit by the Egyptian President to Jerusalem and to the opening of the separate Egyptian-Israeli talks. On the whole, Africa failed to grasp the true motives behind Sadat's course. This was reflected in the 15th OAU Assembly resolution on the Middle East which described Sadat's surrender as a "peace initiative". However, Africa refused to follow the lead of those who wanted to present the Egyptian-Israeli-US deal as a genuine settlement of the extremely complex Middle East issues. In the same resolution African states again roundly condemned Israel's aggressive policy and voiced their complete support for the just cause of the Arab people of Palestine.

Most African countries saw Camp David as a move running counter to the interests of the peoples fighting for national liberation. Africa supported the decision of the Arab summit in Baghdad which rejected the Camp David version of a settlement. At any rate, no African country approved the Camp David provisions. The 16th OAU Assembly (July 1979) again demanded recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and roundly condemned Egypt's separate deal.

Egyptian participation in the US anti-Iranian operation was another grave warning to Africa that the Egyptian-Israeli alliance engineered by US imperialism would constitute a real neocolonialist threat to independent African countries.

5. Independent Africa and the Struggle to Restructure International Economic Relations

The struggle for a radical restructuring of international economic relations on the basis of equality and justice—that is, for a new international economic order—has in recent years emerged as a major foreign policy objective of African developing countries. The significance of this issue is rooted in the tasks African peoples have been facing since independence and in the distinctive external economic situation in which they began to tackle these tasks.

African countries are striving to overcome their economic and cultural backwardness, the legacy of foreign domination. To achieve this end, they have to fully use their rich natural resources, comprehensively develop their productive forces and raise the living standards of the masses. Success here depends, first and foremost, on the efforts of African peoples themselves, on the purposeful and

far-reaching transformations in each country. At the same time, effective implementation of national development programs calls for a continuous influx of financial and material resources to Africa on favorable terms and for gradual application of the achievements of the worldwide scientific and technological revolution. African countries have a vital stake in securing greater returns from the exports of commodities and in expanding the markets for the goods produced by their emergent national industries.

Meanwhile, from the very first years of independence, African countries learned firsthand that the nature of international economic relations in the world capitalist system contradicted their vital interests and seriously impeded the development of independent national economies.

For historical reasons, African developing countries today maintain most of their foreign economic ties with Western powers. The aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, spontaneous fluctuations on world markets and unstable rates of exchange weigh heavily on newly independent countries. In many, the chief economic controls are still in the hands of multinational monopolies based in Western Europe and the United States. Realistic political figures in Africa who uphold national interests see clearly that their continent is an object of neocolonialist exploitation, that its natural resources are being plundered by the monopolies and the gap in the living standards between developing and industrialized capitalist countries keeps growing. All this prompted African states to advance, jointly with other developing countries, a number of fundamental demands concerning international economic relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The major directions of foreign economic policy pursued by newly independent countries converged with the drive to restructure international economic relations on a democratic and just basis initiated by the Soviet Union. In the very first months after the October Revolution the Soviet Republic abrogated the inequitable treaties imposed by the tsarist government on the countries of the East and, as soon as it became possible, established economic relations with all its foreign partners on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. After World War II a system of positive and equal economic cooperation emerged within the socialist community and between it and developing countries.

In 1958 the Soviet delegation to the 13th UN General Assembly submitted a draft declaration on the fundamental principles of international economic cooperation. These principles included respect for national sovereignty over natural resources, the inadmissibility of economic discrimination, and assistance to economically backward countries without any economic, political or military strings attached which ran counter to national sovereignty. Subsequently, newly independent countries proceeded from similar principles in drawing

up a joint platform for the restructuring of international economic relations, and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have invariably supported their just antiimperialist demands.

The nonaligned movement and the Group of 77* have become the chief spokesmen of developing countries as far as international economic relations are concerned. African countries have been active in the Group of 77 since its emergence. At the first three sessions of UNCTAD, developing countries, supported by the socialist community, secured certain concessions from the West. Specifically, most capitalist nations introduced "general preferences" (customs discounts) for the industrial goods exported by developing countries.

A new stage in the struggle of the developing world for a radical restructuring of international economic relations began in the first half of the 1970s. This was largely due to the successes scored by OPEC which raised world oil prices substantially in late 1973. In the 1970s Asian and African countries nationalized the property of many oil companies and other transnational monopolies. Detente and the growing influence of the socialist community, ensured by the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, contributed greatly to a change in the alignment of forces in favor of developing countries.

Making use of these positive factors and acting on the initiative of President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, developing countries succeeded in having the UN General Assembly convene its Sixth Special Session in 1974. President Boumedienne's statement outlined the principal demands of developing countries which formed the basis of the session's decisions. The session ended in May 1974 by adopting a Declaration and a Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.

In the years that followed, the demands and proposals of developing countries were specified and expanded in decisions of several representative international forums, including the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly and the Second General Conference of UNIDO in Lima in 1975.

In 1975 the 29th UN General Assembly approved the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States containing many important provisions. For example, Article 1 of the Charter affirmed the sovereign and inalienable right of each state to choose its economic, political and cultural system in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference or the threat or use of force in any form.

During preparations for UNCTAD IV major representatives of the Group of 77 held a conference in Manila in January and February 1976. The declaration and program of action adopted there were

* By the end of 1980 the Group of 77 comprised over 120 states with a joint platform at UNCTAD and other UN agencies; aside from Asian, African and Latin American developing countries, Yugoslavia and Romania are members too.

a detailed and specific platform of developing countries on the more urgent aspects of international economic relations.

That was how an integrated program of developing countries' demands concerning a new international economic order came into being. Its chief objective is to eliminate the economic inequality of newly independent countries in world capitalist economy and to create a system of international economic relations that would provide the greatest possible assistance in the improvement and restructuring of their economies.

The establishment of a new international economic order calls for the elimination of all forms of inequality, diktat and discrimination in international economic relations.

Since commodities remain the largest part of the exports of developing countries, questions relating to the strengthening of national sovereignty over natural resources and to world commodity trade are central to their program. Under the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, "every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities". This sovereignty is seen as an effective instrument of creating the independent national economies. For example, the Charter stresses the right of every state to nationalize and expropriate foreign property and the right to regulate and control foreign investment, including the activities of transnational corporations.

As concerns international trade in commodities, the chief demand of developing countries has become the realization of their integrated program which envisages the establishment of just and stable commodity prices, the conclusion of international commodity agreements on major types of raw materials, and the creation of a joint fund to finance the accumulation of buffer stocks and other measures to stabilize markets. Developing countries also demand the introduction of indices which would reflect the direct relationship between prices for commodities and for finished goods exported by industrialized nations. The developing world also tries to expand its exports of finished and semifinished items and in this connection works toward the removal of customs and other restrictions which interfere with the access of these goods to Western markets. The program on the restructuring of international economic relations comprises demands for greater economic assistance to developing countries; the transfer of modern technology on favorable terms; the easing of these countries' debt burden; a reform of the world monetary system with participation by all interested parties; restrictions on the activities of transnational monopolies; special measures in favor of the least developed, landlocked and island states; and greater economic cooperation among developing countries.

In their joint statement at UNCTAD IV the socialist countries reacted positively to the Manila Declaration and Program of Action

and supported all those provisions of these documents which were antimonopolist and reflected the legitimate aspirations of developing countries for the restructuring of the inequitable economic relations existing in world capitalist economy.

The West rejects most of developing countries' just demands. Even the proposals on which compromise resolutions were negotiated at UNCTAD IV in 1976 still remain on paper because of the negative approach of the leading capitalist countries. Contradictions between developing and industrialized capitalist nations grew more acute at the 11th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Economic Problems, held in August and September 1980. A statement by the Group of 77 noted that over recent years no substantial progress had been achieved in implementing a new international economic order.

At this session the socialist nations supported, as always, the just demands of the developing world. They stressed in their joint statement the close connection between the restructuring of international economic relations and progress in arms limitation and the strengthening of peace. The statement also set forth the major aspects on which the socialist countries were ready to focus their economic and technical cooperation with interested developing states.

The African group is always very active at sessions of the United Nations and its specialized agencies during discussions of fundamental issues relating to the new international economic order. Here is a typical example. When at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi Henry Kissinger, former State Secretary of the United States, contrasted the US proposal on the setting up of a World Resources Bank to the Group of 77 demands on world trade in commodities, no African country supported the US move; developing and socialist countries voted against it and it was rejected.

While active in the joint efforts of developing countries, African states conduct regional meetings and conferences to draw up their own position on problems of particular concern to Africa. For example, in its analysis of the 1976 Manila Program of Action the UN Economic Commission for Africa has pointed out that the 18 types of mineral and agricultural commodities on which the Program envisages to conclude international agreements make up (in terms of value) about 60 percent of all exports by African developing states (excluding oil). That is why African countries are very much interested in concluding stabilizing agreements on these commodities and in the creation of a joint fund.

Broader access for their industrial goods to Western markets is also a topical issue for African countries, although their manufacturing industry is so far poorly developed. Therefore they are particularly interested in economic and technical assistance aimed at accelerating industrial development. Here one should recall that the developing states are extremely worried about the recent upsurge of protectionism in industrialized capitalist nations. Since world public opinion

would view a direct rise of customs duties on goods imported from developing countries with disapproval, today the West resorts to various techniques of disguising protectionism and exerts political pressure on developing countries so as to make them introduce "voluntary restrictions" on their exports of industrial goods. North Africa has been hit hardest by these protectionist moves in recent years as it expanded its textile industry hoping to increase the exports of textiles to Western Europe.

Action to benefit the least developed countries is of vital importance to Africa. In 1979, 20 such countries accounted for about 31 percent of the total population of developing Africa and over 40 percent of its arable land. Besides, 11 African countries are land-locked. In spite of the numerous UN and UNCTAD decisions on these problems, the economic position of the least developed countries remains extremely difficult. The African states are striving to secure greater financial and technical assistance to these countries and the soonest possible implementation of measures designed to improve their economies.

African delegates have made several statements at international forums to express their grave concern over the deteriorating economic situation in Africa. For example, during the discussion of international trade in the Second Committee of the 32nd UN General Assembly in November 1978 the representative of the People's Republic of the Congo said there was no way to effectively protect the purchasing capacity of developing countries and no provision for the rationalization of trade or a system that would stabilize commodity prices. The fact that it had still not been possible to remove the difficulties impeding the operation of international economic machinery, he added, was largely explained by the lack of political will on the part of the countries in almost complete control of this machinery.

The delegate of Nigeria stressed that the International Monetary Fund and GATT did not aid in the establishment of a new international economic order.

In order to elaborate a joint platform on urgent trade and economic problems, Asian, African and Latin American developing countries held a conference in Tanzania in February 1979 which adopted the Arusha Program. During the discussion of these issues at UNCTAD V in Manila in May and June 1979 representatives of the socialist community expressed a generally favorable opinion of the Arusha Program and supported its positive provisions although, they pointed out, the Program's efficiency was impaired by the fact that it did not reflect the fundamental differences between the socialist and the capitalist socio-economic systems and between the ways countries belonging to these two systems approached their relations with the developing states.

The divergence between developing (including African) and industrialized capitalist countries intensified further at UNCTAD V which

consequently failed to reach agreement on many agenda items.

In connection with the elaboration of an international development strategy for the 1980s, several new aspects have emerged in recent years in the views of leading African politicians and economists on the establishment of a new international economic order. This issue was discussed at several ECA sessions and at conferences of ministers of African countries. The conclusions reached there were reflected in the plan of action approved at the April 1980 OAU Assembly on economic issues held in Lagos. ECA and OAU documents state that the negotiations on restructuring international economic relations held within the framework of UNCTAD and other specialized agencies have failed to create conditions for advancing Africa's economies or solving its acute socio-economic problems.

For this reason African countries consider "self-supporting development on the basis of collective self-reliance", aimed at raising the living standards of their population, to be the principal goal of their economic strategy. Priority will be accorded to the development of agriculture and accelerated industrialization, including the creation of basic heavy industries and those directly servicing food production. Since no African country can solve such tasks on its own, comprehensive efforts are envisaged to further inter-African economic cooperation. The plan aims at the creation of an African economic community comprising all independent African countries by the year 2000. This does not mean that African states intend to give up participation in international economic relations or refuse foreign assistance. Specifically, the plan of action adopted in Lagos provides for the greatest possible diversification of African foreign trade and for stronger economic ties with developing countries in other regions and with the socialist community.

The struggle of African and other developing countries for a radical transformation of international economic relations will take a long time. However, given that several years have elapsed since the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, one can try to draw certain conclusions from the record of the first stage in this struggle.

The Western tactics vis-a-vis the new international economic order have become clear over these years. At first, the West rejected all developing countries' demands out of hand. However, it appears that lately Western countries have in part reconciled themselves to the need for certain changes in the world economic order. But they have been fighting a delaying battle, occasionally agreeing to some concessions. At the same time, the leading capitalist nations are preparing fall-back positions and searching for ways to evade or minimize these concessions. For example, they agree to stabilize or raise prices for some commodities, but immediately raise prices for finished goods. They agree to aid in the development of the manufacturing industry in backward countries, but immediately introduce new protectionist measures and demand special guarantees for their investments in these

countries. They work hard to try and split the united front of the developing states and isolate them, primarily African nations, from the socialist community, their natural ally.

But the record also bears out the unshakable will of independent African countries to continue their just struggle for a new international economic order. Here, a swift victory can be assured by the closest possible unity among developing countries, as well as between them, the socialist community and progressive forces in the West. Favorable opportunities for translating these transformations into reality are organically linked with the preservation and deepening of detente and with the cessation of the arms race; this could free vast financial and material resources for development purposes.

The position of the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist community on this issue was expressly outlined in Leonid Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU Congress: "Restructuring international economic relations on a democratic foundation, along lines of equality, is natural from the point of view of history. Much can and must be done in this respect. And, certainly, the issue must not be reduced, as this is sometimes done, simply to distinctions between 'rich North' and 'poor South'. We are prepared to contribute, and are indeed contributing, to the establishment of equitable international economic relations."¹⁵

CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of African developing countries has entered its third decade. The major spheres of this policy are now delineated clearly: inter-African relations (within the OAU at the continental level and in regional groups at the bilateral level), relations with Asian and Latin American developing countries, with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, with former colonial powers, the United States and other Western countries, and activities in international organizations.

The authors of this book have examined these and some other directions of African foreign policy and reached certain conclusions.

A truly scientific analysis of any nation's foreign policy can be methodologically precise only on the basis of the class approach, of Lenin's thesis that "it is fundamentally wrong, un-Marxist and unscientific, to single out 'foreign policy' from policy in general, let alone counterpose foreign policy to home policy".¹ African realities fully bear out this concept Lenin advanced. Differentiation—on a class, not on a national basis—is becoming increasingly typical of African foreign policy. Certain differences in the foreign policies of the individual states reflect the polarization between, on the one hand, the forces of social progress and genuine national independence and, on the other, proimperialist and reactionary trends. That is why the vanguard positions in the foreign policy of the developing nations invariably belong to socialist-oriented countries. An organic element of their foreign policy is the resolute and uncompromising struggle against imperialism, against the predatory strategy and tactics of transnationals and neocolonialism, for genuine national and economic independence. This foreign policy naturally leads to comprehensive cooperation with the socialist community and restricts and weakens the activities of domestic reactionaries who seek to reach class compromises with imperialism.

Socialist orientation has long emerged as the leading, decisive factor of all social development in independent Africa; it ensures a progressive domestic and foreign policy. It is therefore natural to expect still closer relations among African socialist-oriented countries in all spheres of their foreign policy, the elaboration of common

political positions, the development of economic ties, and mutual support in rebuffing attempts at imperialist interference in their internal and foreign affairs. In this they can firmly rely on the solidarity and assistance of the socialist community.

The foreign policy of any nation always reflects the ruling parties' political ideology, which is shaped according to the interests of the dominant class or social system. At the same time, African countries have a complicated social structure due to the diversity of economic patterns widespread in Africa. However, the general laws of social development apply here fully too. The clearly temporary existence of many economic patterns in Africa cannot justify assertions to the effect that there is a distinctive type of a "multistructural" state whose domestic and foreign policy allegedly develops somewhere in between capitalist and socialist policy. For a number of historical and socio-economic reasons, especially the weakness of the nascent working class, intellectuals and civil servants, including army officers, have today emerged as an influential force in many African countries. However, differentiation is under way among the people in this category too. Some of them join revolutionary, national-democratic parties which are moving closer to scientific socialism. Others forge links with the indigenous businessmen and form a group described as the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". This differentiation is especially pronounced in foreign policy.

The analysis in this book also leads to the conclusion that foreign policy factors exert a growing influence on the overall development of independent African countries. This new phenomenon has long-term prospects and reflects the increasingly international aspect of social processes. Not only all nations but also their domestic institutions are becoming drawn in different ways into international affairs. For example, the role of politics in international economic relations has grown greatly. Science and the transfer of equipment and technology are becoming increasingly internationalized. The share of economic and social problems in worldwide foreign policy is rising steadily. Foreign policy factors particularly affect independent African countries because the latter possess the underdeveloped productive forces and are still dependent on industrialized capitalist nations.

Naturally, the changing alignment of the social and class forces which make up the superstructure is responsible for the shaping and evolution of African foreign policy. However, in terms of national self-awareness which determines ideology and politics, the superstructure emerges in African countries earlier than an economic basis adequate to it. Together with their socio-economic backwardness, the distinctive character of superstructure institutions in independent countries accounts for the distinctive influence of foreign policy factors on their development as a whole, including politics. The book singles out three major factors of this kind, three major policies: of

the socialist community; of the imperialist powers and the other industrialized capitalist countries; and of international Social Democracy.

The socialist countries exert a twofold influence on the development of newly independent states—by their successes, power and example and by their purposeful foreign policy. Consequently, the influence of socialist countries' foreign policy is also twofold. The first is shaped by their overall foreign policy—their drive toward peace, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and the restructuring of international economic relations on a just and equitable basis, as well as their struggle against all kinds of colonial, neocolonial and racial oppression. The second concerns the direct and diversified assistance to African countries. Both these aspects are organically interrelated, and they exert an integrated influence on the foreign policy of newly independent countries.

The influence of the policy pursued by the imperialist powers and other industrialized capitalist nations results from the fact that all newly independent countries, including socialist-oriented ones, remain within the capitalist economic system, that petty-bourgeois ideology is widespread in these states, and from the high economic level of the three imperialist centers, the distinctive features of state-monopoly capitalism and the role of TNCs. The methods and temporary results of this influence may differ, but it invariably threatens to bind the countries in question closer to world capitalist economy, step up the infiltration of international monopolies into their economies and, consequently, increase their economic and political dependence. Besides, this influence encourages isolation from the socialist community, thus seriously impeding the struggle against neocolonialism. The documents adopted at the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Tropical and Southern Africa (the summer of 1978) stress that the capitalist orientation of a number of African countries has emerged and is being maintained under the impact of joint efforts by international imperialism and proimperialist quarters of the indigenous bourgeoisie and traditional aristocracy.

The policy of international Social Democracy and the Socialist International also has a negative impact on the development of newly independent countries although it is based on the spontaneous interest in socialism among the peoples of these states. However, this interest is combined with the inability or reluctance of some African leaders to grasp the fundamental difference between scientific socialism and social-reformism. The relatively firm positions of the petty bourgeoisie in many developing countries also stimulate the activity of West European Social Democracy. In foreign affairs, this factor can breed mistrust of socialism and secure greater freedom of action for neocolonialism.

On the whole, one can conclude that apparently the impact of foreign policy factors on the development of newly independent coun-

tries and the shaping of their foreign policy will remain strong until they overcome their acute need for various types of foreign assistance, including financial aid. Consequently, the contradiction between the generally antiimperialist foreign policy of most developing African countries and the capitalist-dominated system of their foreign economic ties will remain and intensify.

The authors of this book have also concluded that independent African countries will increasingly focus their foreign policy on issues of war and peace, universal security and the expansion and deepening of detente. Even now, African governments pay attention to these problems but, for various reasons, they often see purely African political issues as outweighing international developments elsewhere. However, African countries are obviously interested in the strengthening of peace, disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and in peaceful coexistence. Some have a natural stake in these matters because of their socialist orientation. Others explain their striving toward peace by moral considerations. Still others maintain that peace will simply profit Africa, that detente promises more assistance. At any rate, this trend will play an increasingly decisive role in African foreign policy.

Nationalism is another foreign policy factor with many newly independent countries. It is a complex and manifold social phenomenon. Neocolonialist and other reactionary forces are now trying to use the traditionally antiimperialist ideology of national liberation movements to negatively affect some countries' foreign policy. Local nationalism is becoming increasingly active, aggravating territorial disputes in Africa and impeding regional integration. The genuine interests of some countries are being sacrificed, to different degrees, to narrow-minded nationalism fraught with dangerous consequences. Nationalism can also be used to undermine the solidarity of the peoples who have thrown off the colonial yoke with their natural allies, the socialist countries. Simultaneously, this severely restricts the opportunities for resisting the aggressive policy of imperialism, neocolonialism and Zionism.

However, it is obvious that progressive and realistic African quarters view with vigilance and suspicion the attempts by neocolonialism and its accomplices at using nationalism to drive the foreign policy of some countries off course. These quarters are increasingly aware that without retaining the antiimperialist thrust of nationalism, without combining it with an internationalist patriotic ideology, progressive foreign policy is impossible and the unity of newly independent countries is difficult to strengthen and maintain.

The examination of the system of relations of the independent African states with Asian and Latin American countries has shown that although there is a measure of political unity between them within the nonaligned movement and agreement has been reached on their common economic problems at large forums, serious contradictions

still plague their relations. These contradictions are especially acute as concerns the implementation of the agreed principles. At the same time, although neocolonialism encourages these differences assiduously, the trend toward joint action by these countries on the international scene is gaining strength.

Paradoxically enough, imperialism acts as a catalyst of sorts in this process. This has been reaffirmed by UNCTAD V (Manila, May and June 1979), the Sixth Nonaligned Conference (Havana, September 1979) and subsequent international forums of developing countries. These conferences have demonstrated the essentially opposite interests of the imperialist powers and an overwhelming majority of developing states. The confrontation between the two groups deteriorated sharply on questions of restructuring international economic relations. Industrialized capitalist nations virtually renounced their obligations under previous agreements. This gave a new impetus to the unity of African, Asian and Latin American countries in terms of foreign policy. It also reaffirmed the fact that the positions of the developing world and the socialist community on the main aspects of restructuring international economic relations are similar or identical.

The analysis this book offers also traces a clear-cut trend in the foreign policy of independent African countries—their striving to shake off the onerous old ties, especially with the former colonial powers, and to diversify international contacts so as to strengthen their solidarity and ensure greater independence in political and economic matters.

The rise of this trend is, to a certain degree, connected with the membership of all of Africa's former colonies and semicolonies in the nonaligned movement, although in actual fact African neutralism sometimes turns from a mandatory doctrine into a flexible diplomatic method.

At the same time, it appears that the foreign policy of any African country cannot ignore the existence of certain mutual obligations under multilateral and bilateral agreements. This also applies to the agreements African countries have concluded with their former colonial powers and other Western nations. These accords often restrict the scope and activity of the foreign policy pursued by newly independent countries. This is essentially rooted in Africa's profound backwardness, the poor development of the productive forces, single-crop economies, and considerable dependence on world capitalist economy, its markets and credits.

The above analysis also shows that the class and political instability of petty-bourgeois democracy, the pressure on it from procapitalist and neocolonialist quarters, the corruption and pro-Western leanings of the comprador, bureaucratic bourgeoisie considerably impair the rise of the antiimperialist and anticapitalist trends in the foreign policy of most African countries. The book demonstrates that

the zigzags and deviations in the foreign policy of some African countries, including socialist-oriented ones, stem from the domination of nonproletarian intermediate strata in these countries, the weakness of the working class, the absence of scientific socialism parties, Western influence which forces them to yield to the pressure of international monopolies, chauvinist trends, and the subversive activities of foreign and domestic reactionaries.

Nevertheless, the antiimperialist thrust of African foreign policy will intensify. The authors substantiate this conclusion by the fact that Africa's struggle for national liberation is steadily evolving into a struggle against exploitation, for social emancipation. Capitalism has failed to become the guiding light for peoples who have freed themselves from direct colonial oppression. As the head of the Mozambique delegation, Marcelino dos Santos, said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "imperialism spells mass murder and crime".²

The record of the past decades proves that progressive transformations in developing countries can expand and intensify only if the latter strengthen their solidarity with the socialist world. Reliance on and international cooperation with the socialist community ensure the greatest possible advances of national liberation. Therefore, the analysis of African foreign policy leads to the inescapable conclusion that for all the difficulties in its development, for all the rivalry of different trends, the course toward closer friendship and cooperation with the socialist community, a loyal ally of the national liberation movement, is and will be playing an increasingly great role in African foreign policy. As to the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has said that "solidarity with countries that have freed themselves of the colonial yoke, with peoples asserting their independence has been and remains a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy".³

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